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characterizing the degree of economic polarisation in the Latin American 
and Caribbean (LAC) countries. The study is based on a dataset of 
household surveys from 21 LAC countries in the period 1989-2004. Latin 
America is characterised by a high level of economic polarisation, compared 
to other regions in the world. On average, income polarisation has mildly 
increased in the region since the early 1990s. The country experiences in 
terms of income polarisation, however, have been heterogeneous. The region 
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the gaps between the rich and the poor in terms of access to basic services 
(water and electricity) have been reduced.  
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1. Introduction  
There is an increasing concern on issues of social cohesion and polarisation arising from 
the observation that in many countries societies may be separating out into groups 
internally homogenous and increasingly different among them. That concern is 
particularly relevant in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), a region with 
traditionally very high levels of inequality, and increasing income disparities over the 
last two decades.
1  
Social cohesion is likely to be weak when the dispersion in the socioeconomic 
characteristics of a population is high. If people have access to substantially different 
sets of opportunities, and enjoy (or suffer) very different living standards, social 
tensions are likely to emerge. An economically polarised country is more likely to be 
socially and politically unstable.
2  
This study documents the levels and trends of economic polarisation in Latin America 
and the Caribbean by exploiting a large database of household surveys carried out in 21 
countries in the period 1989-2004. The document seeks to identify dimensions where 
polarisation is more intense and countries/regions where fragmentation has been 
increasing over time.  
As a result of the complexity and ambiguity of the concept, there is not an empirical 
counterpart of the idea of social cohesion. Rather than attempting to justify a unique 
indicator, we report different measures of socioeconomic disparities among groups. In 
this sense, we present indices of income polarisation and inequality, indicators of 
differences in the labour market as well as in the access to social services, and measures 
of educational gaps. The focus is not only on the levels of polarisation, but also in the 
patterns over the last 15 years.  
The document shows evidence suggesting that Latin America is characterised by a high 
level of economic polarisation, compared to other regions in the world. On average, 
income polarisation has mildly increased in the region since the early 1990s. The 
country experiences, however, have been heterogeneous. While income polarisation 
substantially increased in some countries, the income distributions of other LAC 
economies turned less polarised. The region has moved forward toward the reduction of 
educational polarisation, and the gaps between the rich and the poor in terms of access 
to basic services (water and electricity) have been reduced. 
The rest of the document is organised as follows. In section 2 we briefly discuss the 
concept of economic polarisation and social cohesion. In section 3 we present the 
                                                 
1 See IADB (1998), Morley (2000), Ganuza et al. (2001), Bourguignon and Morrison (2003) and 
Gasparini (2004 a) for evidence on inequality in LAC.  
2 Of course, the causality can go both directions: socioeconomic fragmentation can be the consequence of 
social and political instability. A companion paper explores these links (Gasparini and Molina, 2006).  
  2database of household surveys from which we draw most of results in the document. 
Section 4 is the core of the study, as it includes the statistics and analysis of income 
polarisation and inequality for the LAC countries. Section 5 presents a set of statistics 
on differences in labour market outcomes. In section 6 the focus is shifted toward 
education: we present statistics on various educational gaps, education inequality and 
educational mobility. In section 7 we report the differences in the access to housing and 
certain basic services, as water and electricity. Section 8 closes with a brief assessment 
of the results.   
  3 
2. Economic polarisation 
The concept of polarisation is directly linked to the sources of social tension. The notion 
has its roots in sociology and political science, with Karl Marx arguably being the first 
social scientist to study it. In Economics its formal analysis has its origins in the 1990s, 
in the works of Esteban and Ray (1991, 1994), Foster and Wolfson (1992) and Wolfson 
(1994). It was subsequently extended, with the ultimate goal of developing not just an 
index that measures polarisation, but also achieving an understanding of the possible 
causes which may affect it.
3  
Following Esteban and Ray (1994) we rely on what might be called the alienation-
identification framework. The intuition is simple: given a relevant characteristic such as 
religion, income, race or education, a population is polarised if there are few groups of 
important size in which their members share this attribute and feel some degree of 
identification with members of their own group, and at the same time, members of 
different groups feel alienated from each other. This three elements (size group, 
identification and alienation) produce antagonism among the population which 
generates a hostile environment. 
To be fair, the concern for differences in economic variables across groups has always 
been in the Economics agenda. David Ricardo (1817) stated that “to determine the laws 
which regulate the distribution (among landowners, capitalists and workers) is the 
principal problem in Political Economy”. Economists have contributed to the discussion 
of social fairness, and have developed a large literature on the measurement of 
inequality.
4 The concept of inequality is closely linked to the principle of Dalton-Pigou: 
a transfer from an individual with higher income to another individual with lower 
income generates a more equal distribution. Equality is usually associated to social 
fairness, and it is viewed as a desirable social objective.
5 It is believed that a more equal 
economy is more stable from a political and social point of view, and it is more likely to 
have democratic regimes, less crime, and under certain circumstances higher economic 
growth.
6  
To understand the difference between polarisation and inequality, suppose a country 
with six persons labelled as A, B, C, D, E, F with incomes equal to $ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, 
respectively. Suppose now two transfers of one peso: the first one from C to A, and the 
second one from F to D. The two transfers are equalizing (from richer to poorer 
persons), so all inequality indices complying with the Dalton-Pigou criterion will fall, or 
                                                 
3 See Esteban and Ray (1994), Foster and Wolfson (1992), Wolfson (1994), Alesina and Spolaore (1997), 
Zhang and Kanbur (2001), D’Ambrosio and Wolf (2001), and Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004). 
4 See Atkinson and Bourguignon (eds.) (2000), Deaton (1997), Cowell (2000) and Lambert (2001).  
5 Sen (2000) argues that all views of social fairness imply equality of something.  
6 See Persson and Tabellini (2003) for an introduction to this literature. A companion paper (Gasparini 
and Molina, 2006) discusses this issue in the LAC context.  
  4at least not increase. The inequality analysis assesses the new situation as “better” than 
the initial one.  
Notice, however, that in this example the new income distribution has three persons 
with $2 (A, B and C), and three persons with $5 (D, E and F). The population in this 
country is divided into two clearly differentiated groups that are internally perfectly 
homogeneous. Although less unequal, this society has become more polarised.
7 The 
notion of polarisation refers to homogeneous clusters that antagonize with each other. In 
the new situation of the example people may identify themselves as part of clearly 
defined groups which are significantly different from the rest. This polarisation may 
derive in greater social tension than in the initial distribution, and then in more social 
and political instability, crime, violence and other “bads”. In fact, the conjecture that 
motivates research on polarisation is that contrasts among densely homogeneous groups 
can cause social tension. The polarisation measures depend on the degree of equality 
within each group (identification) and the degree of differences across groups 
(alienation). Higher identification and higher alienation raise polarisation.  
The previous example is designed to illustrate a case where polarisation goes in 
opposite direction to inequality. However, it is likely that in most cases polarisation and 
inequality go in the same direction. Going back to the example, suppose that from the 
initial distribution there is a transfer of $1 from B to E: the economy is now more 
unequal and more polarised.  
Thus, the analysis of polarisation should be viewed as complementary to that of 
inequality. Both polarisation and inequality are different although related dimensions of 
the same distribution. This document gives priority to the study of polarisation due to 
two reasons. First, the concept of polarisation seems more related to social cohesion, 
social tensions and instability than the concept of inequality. As mentioned above, the 
research on polarisation is mainly motivated by the conjecture that the differences 
among homogeneous groups cause social tension and instability. Even if we eventually 
find a high correlation between polarisation and inequality measures, we believe that 
statistics on polarisation should have the central role in a study on social cohesion. 
Second, polarisation is by far the distributional dimension less studied. While the 
inequality literature is large in Latin America, we are not aware of studies computing 
many polarisation measures for a large set of countries in the region. Although for both 
reasons this study focuses on income polarisation measures, we also present and analyze 
a large set of income inequality measures for all the LAC countries in our sample. 
Social cohesion surely depends on both economic and non-economic variables. Even in 
a quite economically homogeneous society tensions may emerge because of, for 
instance, religious or racial differences. Similarly, a very economically-polarised and 
unequal society may exhibit high social cohesion if the sharing of some values, ideas 
and views is strong. Even if the income distribution remains stable in a given period of 
                                                 
7 See below and section 4 for a rigorous definition of income polarisation. 
  5time, social cohesion may increase under certain circumstances (e.g. under a war with 
other country) and decrease in others. This study focuses only on economic polarisation 
(and inequality) and then it is just a contribution to the assessment of the degree of 
social cohesion in a society. We estimate the distribution of economic variables and 
compute measures of polarisation and inequality. On average, we expect these measures 
to be positively correlated to situations of instability, lack of social cohesion, social 
tensions, crime and violence.  
Most of this study deals with income polarisation. Income is usually taken as a proxy 
for well-being, but it is certainly not the only variable we should consider in the 
analysis. People may not care about incomes but about polarisation in the opportunities 
to generate incomes, and then be more concerned about the distribution of variables like 
education, assets, health, or access to basic services. In this document we follow the 
tradition of studying the income distribution as a proxy for the distribution of living 
standards. Anyway, we compute and report gaps in educational variables, housing and 
access to basic services as a way of measuring other variables affecting the current well-
being of people, and determining their future opportunities.    
In this study we present static measures of polarisation, i.e. those computed over the 
distribution of income from cross-section data from household surveys. Following the 
above example, suppose that for seasonal reasons individuals A, B and C earn $2 per 
month in the first half of the year and $5 per month in the second half, while individuals 
D, E and F earn $5 in the first semester, and $2 in the second one. In each semester, the 
income distribution is polarised; however, on average the yearly income distribution is 
egalitarian, and then not polarised. Unfortunately, household surveys do not follow 
individual over long periods of time to allow computing a more dynamic picture of 
polarisation. We are not aware of any study of income polarisation using the few short 
panels available in Latin America. Inequality studies from those panels suggest that the 
basic patterns persist although the levels of income inequality are lower than those 
arising from cross-section inequality studies. In particular, the region continues 
exhibiting very high levels of inequality. Our conjecture, then, is that the polarisation 
picture emerging from our study would not be very different from the one obtained with 
panel data.  
 
  63. The household surveys 
8
This document is based on microdata from a large set of household surveys carried out 
by the National Statistical Offices of the LAC countries in the period 1989-2004. The 
database used for this study is a sample of a larger one put together by CEDLAS and the 
World Bank: the Socioeconomic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(SEDLAC).  
Table 3.1 reports the household surveys used in the study. The sample includes 
information for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. The sample 
covers all countries in mainland Latin America and four of the largest countries in the 
Caribbean – Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica and Suriname. In each period the 
sample of countries represents more than 92% of LAC total population. 
Whenever possible we select three years in each country to characterize the two main 
periods in the last 15 years: the growth period of the early and mid 1990s when several 
structural reforms were implemented, and the stagnation and crisis period of the late 
1990s and early 2000s. Unfortunately, there is not enough information to characterize 
the recent recovery of the LAC economies that started around 2003.   
 
Box 1: Growth in Latin America 
On average per capita GDP in the LAC economies grew at an annual 2% between 1990 
and 1997. Growth was particularly intense in South America (annual 2.8%). This period 
of relatively fast growth ended up in the late 1990s when several crises affected the 
region, in particular South America where growth became negative. Around 2003 most 
economies overcame the crises and started a strong recovery. Figure B.1 shows per 
capita GDP in constant prices for all the economies in our sample.  
 
Most household surveys included in the sample are nationally representative. The main 
two exceptions are Argentina and Uruguay, where surveys cover only urban population, 
which nonetheless represents more than 85% of the total population in both countries. 
The household survey of Suriname has also an urban coverage (the city of Paramaribo). 
We also work with some surveys that cover only urban areas in Bolivia and Colombia 
to have a larger perspective of distributional changes.  
Household surveys are not uniform across LAC countries. The issue of comparability is 
of a great concern. We make all possible efforts to make statistics comparable across 
countries and over time by using similar definitions of variables in each country/year, 
                                                 
8 Some paragraphs of this section are taken from SEDLAC (2005), where we describe the database from 
which we have taken the sample used for this document.   
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comparability is far from being assured. A trade-off between accuracy and coverage 
arises. The particular solution adopted contains an unavoidable degree of arbitrariness. 
We try to be ambitious enough to include all countries in the analysis, and accurate 
enough so not to push the comparisons too much.  
It is well known that household consumption is a better proxy for well-being than 
household income.
9 Despite this dominance, nearly all comparative distributional and 
poverty studies in LAC use income as the well-being indicator. A simple reason 
justifies this practice: few countries in the region routinely conduct national household 
surveys with consumption/expenditures-based questionnaires, while all of them include 
questions on individual and household income. In this study we compute polarisation 
and inequality measures for the distribution of income, not consumption.  
Some authors and agencies adjust average income to accord with consumption data 
from national accounts to estimate distributional measures (ECLAC, 2003; Wodon, 
2000; WDI, 2002). However, it is not clear that the adjustment for consumption 
increases comparability, since the reliability of national accounts need not be greater 
than the reliability of household surveys (Deaton, 2003). In this study we do not 
perform any adjustment to the original data to match national accounts.   
A typical problem in household surveys is that of misreporting, in particular under-
reporting. Under-reporting can be the consequence of the deliberate decision of the 
respondent to misreport, or to the absence of questions to capture some income sources, 
or to the difficulties in recalling or estimating income from certain sources. Although 
some sources more relevant for the poor as earnings from informal activities and home 
production are likely to be under-reported, capital income is probably the main under-
reported income source. The share of capital income and profits captured by LAC 
household surveys is on average 4%, which is clearly too low as compared to National 
Accounts figures.  
One strategy to adjust for misreporting is applying some grossing-up procedure. Income 
from a given source in the household survey is adjusted to match the corresponding 
value in the National Accounts. This adjustment usually leads to inflating capital 
income relatively more than the other income sources. However, it relies on the dubious 
assumptions that data from national accounts is error-free (Deaton, 2003). If we 
performed this kind of adjustment, the distributional comparisons across countries 
would depend on things like the treatment of capital income in the National Accounts of 
each country. For these reasons we decided to compute statistics with the raw data, as in 
most academic and official studies.  
In Chile in order to alleviate under-reporting problems, incomes from the household 
survey (CASEN) are adjusted to match some National Accounts figures. Unfortunately, 
for this study we could not completely undo these adjustments to make Chile fully 
                                                 
9 See for instance Deaton and Zaidi (2002).  
  8comparable to the rest of the countries. Pizzolitto (2005) reports that income growth, 
poverty and inequality patterns are robust to these adjustments. 
A common observation among users of household surveys is that they do not typically 
include “very rich” individuals: millionaires, rich landlords, powerful entrepreneurs and 
capitalists do not usually show up in the surveys. The highest individual incomes in 
LAC surveys mostly correspond to urban professionals. This fact can be the natural 
consequence of random sampling (there are so few millionaires that it is unlikely that 
they are chosen by a random sample selection procedure to answer the survey), non-
response, or large under-reporting. The fact is that rich people in the surveys are “highly 
educated professionals obtaining labour incomes, rather than capitalist owners living on 
profits” (Székely and Hilgert, 1999). The omission of this group surely implies an 
underestimation of polarisation and inequality of a size difficult to predict. Studies for 
other regions have used tax information to estimate income for rich individuals (Piketty 
and Saez, 2003).  
For comparability purposes we compute income using a common methodology across 
countries and years. In particular, we construct a common household income variable 
that includes all the ordinary sources of income and estimates of the implicit rent from 
own-housing.
10/11 Of course, even when we follow the same procedure, since household 
surveys differ across countries, we may end up with non-fully comparable variables.  
 
                                                 
10 In the web site of the SEDLAC we provide details on the construction of household income. 
11 Some surveys include reliable self-reports of the implicit rent. In those surveys where this information 
is not available or is clearly unreliable we increase household income of housing owners by 10%, a value 
that is consistent with estimates of implicit rents in the region. All rural incomes are increased by a factor 
of 15% to capture differences in rural-urban prices. That value is an average of some available detailed 
studies of regional prices in the region. See SEDLAC (2005) for a discussion on this adjustment.  
  94. Income polarisation  
In this section we first discuss the measurement of income polarisation, and then present 
and analyse levels and patterns of polarisation in LAC based on microdata from the set 
of household surveys listed above.  
 
4.1. The measurement of income polarisation   
As stated above, we rely on the alienation-identification framework: a population is 
polarised if (i) there are few groups of important size, (ii) in which their members share 
an attribute and feel some degree of identification with members of their own group, 
and (iii) members of different groups feel alienated from each other.  
Income polarisation measures could be classified into two main sets. Although both sets 
use income as the variable for alienation, they differ in the nature of identification. 
While the first uses a discrete variable to provide the relevant grouping of the 
population, the latter uses income. The first set is known as “polarisation by 
characteristics”, whereas the second is called “pure income polarisation”. For instance, 
income polarisation by the area where the household lives (urban-rural) is part of the 
first set, while income polarisation where individuals identify themselves with those 
with similar income levels is known as “pure income polarisation”.  
 
Gradín Group Polarization (1999)
Zhang - Kanbur (2001)






Duclos-Esteban-Ray (2004) -EGR - 
Wolfson
Discrete variable: 
area, race, educational 
level, etc 
Continous      
variable: income
Continous      
variable: income
IDENTIFICATION ALIENATION TYPE INDEX
 
In what follows we provide a brief overview of the polarisation measures to be used 
throughout this paper. The sections are rather technical, even when we derive most 
analytical presentations to the Appendix, so it can be skipped by the reader without a 
formal background.  
 
Polarisation by characteristics 
Although alienation is considered to be into the income space, there might be other 
population characteristics that create group identity (e.g. religion in Northern Ireland, 
race in USA). As Gradín (2000) states it, “despite polarization occurring in the income 
space, groups in the distribution are the result of similarities with respect to a relevant 
attribute other than income” Therefore, it is interesting to explore different attributes 
that could potentially reflect a well-defined social group.  
The literature on polarisation by characteristics has been recently increasing at a fast 
pace. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) measure polarisation in an empirical analysis of civil 
  10war, Reynal-Querol (2001) studies polarisation by religion groups and its relationship 
with the probability of a conflict in sub-Saharan countries, D’Ambrosio (2001) argues 
that the region of residence accounts for polarisation in the Italian distribution of 
personal income, Gradín (2000) finds that education and socioeconomic condition are 
the key variables to explain polarisation in the Spanish distribution of income, and 
Zhang and Kanbur (2001) apply some polarisation measures to regional disparities in 
China. 
In this paper we use Gradín (2000) “group polarisation”, and Zhang and Kanbur (2001) 
indices. Gradín (2000) makes an extension of the Esteban and Ray (1994) approach to 
polarisation in order to analyse the role of different household characteristics in the 
formation of groups, and unlike other measures, accounts for both intra-group inequality 
as well as the overlapping between groups. Zhang and Kanbur (2001) propose an index 
of polarisation which is based on the ratio of the between-group inequality to the 
within-group inequality – both measured with Theil’s Generalized Entropy index, where 
groups are defined accordingly with an attribute. See the Appendix for more on both 
indicators of group polarisation.  
 
Pure income polarisation 
In what follows we assume that income is a proxy of other relevant characteristics that 
generate identification among individuals. The first approach to implement a pure 
income polarisation measure is based on the idea of discrete groups, or socioeconomic 
classes. Following this logic, it is necessary to identify the number and the support 
interval of each disjoint group. Wolfson (1994), Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban, 
Gradín and Ray (1999) are the main contributions in this approach. Wolfson’s (1994) 
measure assumes two groups of equal size, while the ER (1994) measure allows n 
groups of potentially different sizes. EGR (1999) leaves the determination of the 
number of groups to the researcher, while implements a methodology to endogenously 
determine group sizes based on the idea of minimizing income heterogeneity within 
groups. See the Appendix for further information.  
Esteban et al. (1999) implement two enhancements on the original ER index (Esteban 
and Ray, 1994). The first includes a correction to account for intragroup dispersion, and 
the second, a methodology for selecting group sizes. This approach consists of choosing 
the n-spike distribution that minimizes the income dispersion within all socioeconomic 
classes (see Appendix).  
Although the framework discussed so far follows an intuitive and common way to refer 
to different socioeconomic strata, the division of the income distributions in a finite 
number of groups is unnatural, due to the fact that income is a continuous variable. This 
fact implies some drawbacks: (i) there is a degree of arbitrariness in the choice of the 
number of income groups, and (ii) continuous changes in polarisation are not captured 
in some cases, given that the population is divided into a finite number of groups.  
  11The Duclos-Esteban-Ray index (DER)
12, sets out to solve these problems. In order to do 
so, they redefine the axioms that must be satisfied by a polarisation index for continuous 
variables and present a measure of pure income polarisation. This new index allows for 
individuals not to be clustered around discrete income intervals, and lets the area of 
identification influence be determined by nonparametric kernel techniques, avoiding 
arbitrary choices. The authors establish that a general polarisation measure that respects 
a basic set of axioms must be proportional to 
∫ = ) y ( dF ) y ( g ) y ( f ) F ( P
α
α  
where  y denotes income and F(y) its distribution. The function g(y) captures the 
alienation effect while f(y)
α captures the identification effect. The higher the α 
parameter, the larger the weight attached to identification in the polarisation index.
13 
The value of α should be set by the analyst, the policy maker or in general the person 
who is evaluating income polarisation in a given economy. In that sense α implicitly 
captures the value judgments of the analyst.
14 In the empirical part of the paper we 
present polarisation statistics for alternative values of the parameter α.  
It is possible to account changes in polarisation through the contribution of alienation, 
identification and their joint co-movements. Increased alienation is associated with an 
increase in income distances, while increased identification implies a sharper definition 
of groups. When taken jointly, these effects may reinforce each other, in the sense that 
alienation may be highest at the incomes that have experienced an increase in 
identification, or they may counterbalance each other.  
 
Box 2: Some illustrations 
Pure income polarisation is a complex phenomenon to grab in a simple graph, since it is 
the result of the interaction of two distributional characteristics: identification and 
alienation. In general, no simple inspection of densities could determine whether or not 
a distribution A is more polarised than a distribution B. For instance, a unimodal 
distribution could be more polarised than a multimodal because of the lower 
identification of the latter. In order to develop some intuition of polarisation changes, 
Table B.1 shows the normalised means and the coefficients of variation (CV) for the 
income deciles in Venezuela, 1989 and 2003. The income changes were clearly 
unequalizing, raising alienation. However, in almost all deciles the within dispersion 
increased, thus reducing identification. The increase in the mean distance among deciles 
was not accompanied by clustering. These factors make the 2003 distribution more 
                                                 
12 Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) 
13 When α=0 identification within groups is ignored by the index. In that case, the polarisation index 
coincides with the Gini coefficient. It can be shown that in order to respect the axioms, the parameter α 
must lie within the interval [0.25, 1]. See the Appendix for details. 
14 See Atkinson (1970) for a similar discussion regarding inequality indices.  
  12unequal but less polarised when a larger weight is attached to identification (e.g. large 
values of the parameter α in the DER index).  
Figure B.2 presents the mean-normalized income densities of two countries with 
roughly the same average alienation, Dominican Republic, 2004 and Mexico 2002. 
However, the Mexican distribution displays lower identification, resulting in a relatively 
lower level of polarisation.  
 
4.2. Income polarisation in LAC 
After discussing polarisation concepts, we show evidence on both group polarisation 
and pure income polarisation for all the countries/years in our sample of household 
surveys.  
 
Polarisation by characteristics 
Which household variable is the most relevant to characterize the population into 
homogeneous groups that antagonize each other in terms of income? How has income 
polarisation across these groups evolved in the last decade? This section is aimed at 
answering these questions. We focus on household per capita income as the income 
variable, and consider six alternative groupings of the population according to area 
(urban-rural), region, and the educational level, gender, race, and labour status of the 
household head. The classification of the population by area and region follows the 
definitions made by the National Statistical Offices in the household surveys.
15 We 
classify household heads according to education into seven groups: illiterate, primary 
incomplete, primary complete, high school incomplete, high school complete, college 
incomplete and college complete. Household heads are divided into whites and non-
whites following Busso, Cicowiez and Gasparini (2005). We classify people according 
to their labour status into unemployed/inactive, formal and informal. The latter group is 
comprised by those employees in small firms (less than 5 employees), the self-
employed without tertiary education, and zero-income workers (mostly family workers).  
In Table 4.1 we present the Gradín Group Polarisation (GGP) and the Zhang and 
Kanbur (ZK) indices computed for each LAC country. For both indicators education is 
the most relevant variable for income polarisation, followed by labour relationship, and 
then depending on the country, region, area or race.
16 When divided by education, 
people in each group look more alike, and differences across groups are larger than 
when dividing by other characteristic. In particular, the classification by gender looks 
                                                 
15 Notice that it is not possible to compare the level of the indices for the regional grouping across 
countries because the number of categories (regions) differs across nations. Comparability is assured for 
the rest of the variables. 
16 This result may depend on the weight to the identification term. However, in general the ranking is 
quite robust to changes in the weights.  
  13almost irrelevant for polarisation. Although incomes in male-headed households are in 
general higher than incomes in households headed by females, both the identification 
within groups, and the income differences across groups are very small.  
Among the sample of countries for which we could implement a consistent definition of 
race, group polarisation by this variable is particularly relevant in Brazil, Bolivia and 
Paraguay. Compared to the rest of the countries in the sample, they have the highest 
values for the race GGP and the ZK indices (Table 4.1). In these countries households 
headed by non-whites are substantially poorer than white households and particularly 
homogeneous in terms of income. 
 
Box 3: Race 
As it is well documented in some recent studies, there are large differences between 
white and non-white in terms of income and other proxies of well being. The first panel 
in Figure B.3 documents these differences by showing the ratio of average household 
per capita income between these two groups in a sample of countries for which we 
could implement a consistent definition of race (see Busso et al., 2005). A significant 
share of these differences arises from a polarised distribution of education. White 
individuals have a considerable higher stock of human capital that allows them to obtain 
more productive jobs. The second panel in Figure B.3 illustrates the ratio white/non-
white for years of education for people between 15 and 55 years old. In all LAC 
countries white individuals have substantially more years of formal education than their 
non-white counterparts. Besides differences in human capital, there is evidence pointing 
out to (at least statistical) discrimination: on average the labour market pays higher 
wages to white individuals with the same observable characteristics than non-white 
workers (Busso et al., 2005). 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the ranking of LAC countries according to the level of the GGP index 
of income polarisation by education. The index ranges from 1 in El Salvador to 1.53 in 
Colombia. The latter has educational groups which are (relatively to other LAC 
countries) internally very homogeneous in terms of income, and very different among 
them.  
The country ranking by income polarisation for educational groups does not replicate 
when dividing the population by other characteristic as area, labour status or gender 
(Figure 4.2). For instance, Brazil, the second country with the highest income 
polarisation by education has relatively low polarisation by area and gender when 
compared to other LAC countries. Instead, Peru ranks high in all characteristics except 
gender. These results suggest that countries significantly differ in the relevant variables 
that separate out their populations into relatively internally homogeneous groups that 
antagonize each other in terms of income.  
  14Table 4.2 shows the sign of the change in the GGP index and its components. In most 
LAC countries income polarisation by educational groups has increased over the last 
decade. In many countries this has occurred through both larger identification of people 
within educational groups and higher antagonism across groups. Results are similar 
when using the Zhang and Kanbur Index (ZK) (see Table 4.3). 
Income polarisation has also a geographical dimension. According to Table 4.2 income 
polarisation by regions has been increasing in most countries, while the experience of 
polarisation by area is somewhat more inconclusive.  
Polarisation by labour status has increased in almost every country in the region, due to 
higher identification and antagonism. Households headed by formal workers are 
increasingly differentiating in terms of income from those households headed by 
informal workers. At the same time, in many countries both groups are becoming 
increasingly more homogeneous. This pattern may have important implications in terms 
of social tension arising from polarisation in the labour market. Section 5 has more on 
this.  
 
Box 4: Basic Needs 
Poverty can be defined over the space of “basic needs”. Some LAC agencies and 
governments classify households as poor if some conditions of low-quality dwellings, 
no access to water and hygienic restrooms, low education and high dependency rates are 
met. We follow a similar methodology (see SEDLAC (2005) for specific details), and 
investigate the degree of income polarisation between the poor and the non-poor defined 
by basic needs. High income polarisation by this characteristic would reinforce the 
fragmentation by structural living conditions and would potentially lead to social unrest. 
Figure B.4 shows the GGP and ZK indexes for all the countries in the sample. Peru, 
Mexico and Brazil have the highest values for the GGP, while Guatemala, Honduras 
and Nicaragua rank high when ordered by the ZK index. Income polarisation by groups 
of basic needs is significant, but in most countries is lower than polarisation by 
education of the household head.  
 
Pure income polarisation   
 
In this section we turn to the analysis of pure income polarisation. In addition to 
documenting the level and changes in polarisation, this section studies how polarised is 
the region relative to other countries in the world, what are the empirical differences 
between inequality and polarisation, and which socioeconomic strata are more 
polarised. In order to do so, tables 4.4 to 4.9 report various indices of pure income 
polarisation (Wolfson, EGR and DER for several parameters) for all countries/years in 
our sample. Estimates are presented for each country, and for urban and rural areas, 
separately. The polarisation measures are computed for the distribution across 




How polarised are the LAC countries?  
We start the analysis of the income polarisation measures by comparing our estimates 
for LAC countries to those reported for other regions of the world. We make the 
comparisons in terms of the recently developed DER index. Duclos, Esteban and Ray 
(2004) compute this measure for a large sample of OECD countries using the 
Luxembourg Income Study database. Figure 4.3 shows these estimates along with our 
results for LAC countries for roughly the same period (mostly late 1990s). Although we 
apply the same methodology as in Duclos et al. (2004), there might be some differences 
in the treatment of the data that may bias the comparisons. Fortunately, Mexico 1996 is 
in both studies, and the two estimates are pretty close (difference of 2%), a fact that 
gives us some degree of confidence to take the comparison seriously.  
The average DER pure polarisation index in Latin America and the Caribbean is 44% 
higher than the average for Europe, and 40% higher than the average for the rest of the 
OECD countries included in the Duclos et al. (2004) study. The most polarised country 
in Europe, Russia, is almost at the same level as the least polarised country in LAC, 
Uruguay. This small and largely urban South American country, the prototype of social 
cohesion in Latin America,
18 would be considered a very polarised society in the 
European context.   
The picture of Latin America as a set of highly income-polarised economies does not 
come at a surprise. It has long been argued that inequality in the region is among the 
highest in the world.
19 Figure 4.3 suggests that the statement is also probably true when 
referred to income polarisation. Following the arguments in section 2, the evidence of 
Figure 4.3 helps to understand why Latin America is a region characterised by relatively 
high levels of tension and socio-political instability.    
 
Which is the income-polarisation ranking across LAC countries? 
                                                 
)
17 We define an individual’s equivalized household income as total household income divided by 
, where A is the number of adults, K (
θ π π 2 2 1 1 . . K K A + + 1 the number of children under 5 years old, and K2 
the number of children between 6 and 14. Parameters π allow for different weights for adults and kids, 
while  θ regulates the degree of household economies of scale. Deaton and Zaidi (2002) suggest 
intermediate values for the π  (π1=0.5 and π2=0.75), and a rather high value of θ (0.9) for countries like 
those in Latin America. We take that as the benchmark case. Although it would probably be more correct 
to assign different parameters to LAC countries in different states of development, we prefer to use the 
same scale across countries for transparency in the comparisons. 
18 Uruguay is known as the “Latin-American Switzerland”. 
19 See IADB (1998), Morley (2000), Ganuza et al. (2001), Bourguignon and Morrison(2003) and 
Gasparini (2003), among others. 
  16Figure 4.4 shows the polarisation ranking for the most recent survey in each country 
(early 2000s) for the DER with α=0.5. Brazil ranks as the most polarised country in the 
region. Bolivia, Haiti and Colombia are also high income-polarised countries.
20 On the 
other hand, Uruguay, Venezuela and Costa Rica are the least polarised countries in the 
region. The rankings are in general robust to the change in the weight to identification. 
Table 4.10 reports that most of the Spearman rank-correlation coefficients are higher 
than 0.90. Although some re-rankings occur (e.g. Uruguay ranks as the least polarised 
country with all indicators, except DER with α=0.75, for which it ranks second), they 
do not modify our general picture of polarisation in the region.   
Polarisation measures differ by area. Figure 4.5 illustrates the DER for urban and rural 
areas for the last survey available for each country in our sample. The income 
distributions in urban areas have more antagonism than in rural ones in most LAC 
economies. On average, the DER in rural areas is 2 points lower than in urban areas. 
Panama, Mexico, Paraguay and Bolivia are the only countries where polarisation is 
significantly higher in rural areas (for DER with α=0.5).  
 
How has income polarisation evolved during the last 15 years?  
This subsection is divided into two parts: we first summarize the main patterns in the 
region, and then present a brief description of the country changes. Patterns in LAC 
polarisation can be traced with the information contained in tables 4.4 to 4.9. Tables 
4.11 and 4.12. show changes in the main LAC polarisation measures and the Gini index 
of inequality for two periods (wherever possible): (i) the period of growth and reforms - 
early and mid 1990s - and (ii) the period of stagnation and crisis – late 1990s and early 
2000s.
21 Four main general results emerge from these tables: 
 
1. Heterogeneity 
Experiences have been heterogeneous across LAC countries. On average, 10 out of 16 
economies have experienced some increase in inequality and polarisation over the 
period under analysis. Distributional changes have been large in some countries, and 
negligible in others. Differences in patterns are noticeable even at the level of 
subregions. For instance, in the Mercosur, while inequality and polarisation went down 
in Brazil and to some extent in Chile, most indicators of these distributional dimensions 
dramatically increased in Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay over the last two decades.  
                                                 
20 Jamaica is also a very polarised country according to the 2002 survey. However, the quality of the 
income data in that country is low (the household survey is a consumption survey) and polarisation 
measures are very volatile. For that reason we prefer not to highlight the high value of the Jamaica’s DER 
in the graph. 
21 Changes can be studied for a sample of 16 countries. There are not enough comparable surveys to 
analyze patterns over the 1990s and 2000s in Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, and 
Suriname. 
  17This heterogeneity of patterns is striking, since LAC economies share many structural 
characteristics and were subject to similar shocks. The political cycle is also similar 
across Latin-American nations. In particular, during the 1990s most countries 
implemented market-oriented reforms. Despite these similarities economic 
performances have been substantially different, including changes in income 
polarisation and inequality. The heterogeneity of results provides a useful instrument to 
identify policies and scenarios under which some countries have managed to grow 
and/or become more equitable.
22  
 
2. On average, small increase in polarisation and inequality 
As mentioned above, more than half of the countries have experienced increases in their 
levels of polarisation and inequality. Anyway, changes in most countries have been 
rather small. On average polarisation and inequality have mildly increased in the region 
over the last 15 years. Table 4.12 reports an increase of around 2.5% in the polarisation 
indicators. The average increase in the Gini was about the same amount.  
There is a heated debate in Latin America (as well as in other regions of the world) 
regarding the effect of globalisation on economic disparities, and hence on social 
tension. Of course, showing polarisation and inequality patterns during a period of 
increasing economic liberalisation and globalisation does not prove any causal 
relationship. However, it helps to feed a debate that seems many times based on weak 
anecdotal evidence.  
Results 1 and 2 above appear to be in contrast to the extreme versions of the 
globalisation debate. On the one hand, in contrast to some anti-globalisation arguments, 
polarisation did not increase in all economies subject to economic liberalisation, and in 
many the increase was rather small. In fact, the inequality story of LAC in the 1990s 
does not seem significantly worse than that of the 1980s, when globalisation was not a 
relevant issue. On the other hand, and in contrast to the arguments of some globalisation 
advocates, polarisation and inequality did increase on average in the region. Moreover, 
that implied that in some LAC countries, even when economies were growing 
presumably as a consequence of liberalisation policies, poverty significantly increased. 
Globalisation may have not benefited the whole population, and may have even harmed 
the poor, at least in some economies.  
 
3. Larger increase in polarisation and inequality in South America in the 1990s  
The increase in the LAC average is driven by changes in South America (Table 4.12). 
In most Central American countries changes have been almost negligible. In contrast, in 
                                                 
22 Naturally, the rigorous study of the determinants of the performance of the LAC economies is well 
beyond the scope of this paper. See Ganuza et al. (2001), Morley (2000), and section 5 of this paper for 
some arguments of a large debate.  
  18most (not in all) South American countries inequality and polarisation went 
significantly up. The increase seems to have been particularly relevant in the early and 
mid 1990s, a period of relatively fast growth and structural reforms. The described 
pattern fits to the cases of Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela, and probably Ecuador. This process may be closely link to the generation of 
social tension as well as the existence of social unrest.  
 
4. Convergence  
Changes have implied some sort of convergence across LAC countries: inequality and 
polarisation have especially increased in the group of less polarised/unequal countries: 
Argentina, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The coefficient of variation of the 
polarisation indicators and the Gini coefficient have declined over the last 15 years (see 
last row in Table 4.12).  
 
In what follows we briefly comment on the changes in inequality and polarisation in all 
countries in the sample. Figure 4.6 is constructed with information from SEDLAC 
(2005) that uses the same datasets as in this study. The different panels illustrate 
changes in the Gini indicator of inequality and in the EGR income polarisation index in 
each LAC country. Figure 4.7 presents the DER, Wolfson and EGR3 polarisation 
measures.  
Argentina has experienced a sharp increase in inequality. The Gini coefficient for the 
household per capita income increased almost 6 points from 1992 to 2004. Table 4.11 
reports sizeable increases in polarisation for most indicators (see also Figure 4.6). In 
particular, when dividing the population into 2 or 3 income groups, polarisation 
substantially increased. Inequality and polarisation have increased particularly during 
the 1990s, and to a lesser extent in the stagnation/crisis period from 1998 to 2004.
23 
Like its neighbour Argentina, Uruguay has witnessed a steady increase in inequality and 
polarisation. This has occurred both during the growth and the stagnation periods, and 
was larger (more than twice) than the average for LAC. Inequality and most measures 
of polarisation display a slight increase in Paraguay since 1997, when national 
household surveys became available. Various sources of information suggest a sizeable 
increase in inequality in the first half of the 1990s.
24  
In Brazil the income distribution has become less unequal and polarised since the early 
1990s, according to most indicators. Figure 4.6 shows a declining pattern since 1990 
both in inequality and polarisation. Table 4.11 indicates that the fall has been 
approximately the same in the growth period of the 1990s and in the stagnation period 
                                                 
23 The comparison considers a year when the crisis was over (2004). Horenstein and Olivieri (2004) find 
that inequality and polarisation climbed during the peak of the crisis (2002), with the latter rising at a 
higher rate. Both dimensions quickly went down when the economy recovered. 
24 See Fazio and Tornarolli (2005).  
  19that followed. The exception to this picture is when computing the DER with high 
weight to identification.  
The Chilean economy is characterized by high income inequality and polarisation. The 
income distribution remained basically unchanged over the 1990s. There are some signs 
suggesting a significant fall in inequality and polarisation in the last household survey 
(CASEN, 2003). If that change is confirmed in the next survey Chile would have started 
a road toward a more equitable distribution.    
In Bolivia changes in the income distribution have been unequalizing in the last decade. 
All indicators computed in this study also record an increase in polarisation. In 
particular, polarisation has increased if identification is given high weight in the DER. 
Polarisation has increased both during the growth period of the 1990s and during the 
stagnation initiated in 1998. Also, there is evidence on inequality-increasing changes in 
Peru during the reform and growth years of the 1990s. Our sample covers the stagnation 
period 1997-2003. There are no signs of significant changes in inequality and 
polarisation in that period.   
Colombia is a highly unequal/polarised society. Moreover, both inequality and 
polarisation have increased in urban areas.
25 The increase took place during the 1990s 
and was of a magnitude larger than in most other countries. Its neighbour Venezuela has 
also experienced a significant increase in inequality and polarisation between 1989 and 
1998. Although the distribution has substantially moved since then, the comparison 
1998-2003 implies no significant changes in inequality and polarisation.
26  
Costa Rica has one of the least polarised distributions in LAC. However, the country 
has experienced a sizeable increase in inequality and polarisation since the early 1990s. 
Most of the increase in polarisation has occurred in the period of stagnation that started 
in 1999. El Salvador has experienced a slow but steady fall in inequality and 
polarisation. All measures in table 4.11 are in accordance with this pattern. In contrast, 
the income distribution in Honduras has been rather stable in the 1990s. The household 
survey (EPH) of 2003 has some signs of increasing polarisation. The Nicaragua’s 
economy fell during the 1980s and early 1990s. The strong recovery that started around 
1993 was accompanied by a significant reduction in inequality and polarisation. The 
stagnation in per capita GDP since 1999 has implied a rather unchanged distribution. In 
Panama inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, was rather stable: that indicator 
increased less than 2%. Increases in polarisation measures were in general a bit larger. 
Fragmentation was particularly large when computed with the DER 0.75. 
                                                 
25 Although the Colombia’s survey (Encuesta Continua de Hogares) has now a national coverage, for 
comparison purposes and given that the survey was only urban in the early 1990s, we use only the urban 
observations.  
26 The exception is the DER with α=0.75. See Box 2 for more on this.  
  20The Mexican economy exhibits a steady trend toward less inequality and polarisation. 
The intensity of this pattern differs across indices (Table 4.11). The reduction in 
polarisation seems to have happened both before and after the Tequila crisis.  
 
Box 5: Polarisation: the sub-national level  
The national statistics hide a wide range of situations within countries. In Table B.2 we 
present the DER index for all regions in each country. Although most general result 
concerning polarisation patterns are unchanged, the table suggests the presence of 
relevant idiosyncratic factors. Table B.3 presents a ranking of regions by the DER with 
α=0.5. There is considerable overlapping across countries (see Figure B.5). It is 
interesting to notice that national polarisation in some countries is above the regional 
values. That is for instance the case in Peru, where regions considered separately have 
relatively low values of the DER, but as income differences across regions are large, 
total national polarisation is relatively high.  
 
What is the (empirical) difference between inequality and polarisation?  
As explained in previous sections income polarisation and inequality are different 
although related dimensions of the income distribution. The correlation between these 
two dimensions is positive and significant. Figure 4.8 displays the Gini coefficient and 
the DER income polarisation index for different α parameters. As α goes up the weight 
of identification in the polarisation measures is increased and hence the linear 
relationship between polarisation and inequality looses strength. As Duclos, Esteban 
and Ray (2004) states, “…the extent to which inequality comparisons resemble 
polarization comparisons depends on the parameter α, which essentially captures the 
power of the identification effect”. When α=0.25 the linear fit is very precise: the R
2 is 
0.98. Instead for α=1 the R
2 is 0.45: the relationship is still positive and statistically 
significant, but, loosely speaking, there are things captured by the polarisation index 
that do not show up in the inequality measure.  
Figure 4.9 presents the percent changes in polarisation and inequality between the first 
and the last survey available for each country. When α=0.25 (first panel) the signs of 
the changes in polarisation and inequality coincide. The strength of this relationship 
weakens as α goes up because the polarisation index attaches more weight to the 
identification within income groups. In some cases the identification effect shifts the 
sign of the overall polarisation change. For instance, Brazil exhibits a decrease in 
polarisation for most indicators in the period 1990-2003, mainly because the decline in 
alienation outweighs the increase in identification over the period. However, for a large 
α polarisation stays roughly unchanged. 
 
Box 6: Polarisation and the shrinking middle class 
  21Although in practice polarisation may go along without a reduction in the middle-
income groups, the stereotype of a polarisation process suggests a vanishing middle 
class. Some authors have alerted on a process of distributional “stress” for middle-
income households (Birdsall, Graham, and Pettinato, 2000). In addition of being a 
worrying phenomenon per se, that stress may have relevant consequences on policy 
issues, as the support of the middle-class is key in the political process.  
We apply the methodology of Birdsall et al. (2000) to our dataset by defining the 
middle class as those individuals whose household per capita incomes are in an interval 
around the median of the income distribution (in the range of 75 and 125 percent of the 
median). This criterion, that departs from the traditional definition based on fixed 
income intervals, or in labour and educational characteristics, is useful for comparison 
purposes across countries.  
The first two columns in Table B.4 show the share of the population that belong to that 
interval, and the share of income accrued to that group. On average, the middle-income 
group defined as explained above represents 22% of the country population, which 
coincides with the mean value found by Birdsall et al. (2000). They report a share of 
over 30% for advanced economies, ranging from 24% in the United States to 49% in 
Finland.  
On average, the share of income in the middle-income group is about 13%, which is 
relatively low compared to international standards. It is interesting to notice that LAC 
income distributions are pretty similar around their median values.  
The third column reports the share of the mean with respect to the median, a measure of 
skewness of the distribution, and hence a measure of inequality. That ratio ranges from 
1.4 in Uruguay to 1.9 in Haiti. Finally, in the fourth column we report the ratio between 
the median income for the richest group of individuals that generate 50% of total 
income over the median. There are considerable differences in this ratio across LAC 
countries: while the ratio is 2.86 in Venezuela, it rises to 5.58 in Brazil.  
Changes in the size of the middle-income groups (in terms of population and income) 
have been similar to those reported for polarisation and inequality. The “middle-class” 
seems to have been shrinking in most of South America, with the exceptions of Brazil 
and Chile. Changes in Central America and Mexico have been milder, without clear 
signs of a significant reduction in the middle class.  
 
Who contributes more in income polarisation? 
The DER polarisation measure is the sum of all individual antagonism in the society. It 
is interesting to know how the different income strata contribute to overall polarisation. 
In order to accomplish this task the population is partitioned in twenty income vintiles 
so the sum of the antagonism of each vintile is the total DER measure.  
Figure 4.10 indicates that the poorer vintiles in general are the ones that contribute the 
most to total antagonism because of their high identification. The lower the parameter 
  22α, the larger the contribution to total polarisation. The contribution of the richest vintiles 
is smaller due to their relatively low identification, even though they have a more 
intense alienation. In other words, although the richest vintiles are relatively farther 
away in the income dimension, they are relatively more heterogeneous and thus less 
identified with their vicinity.  
Given a level of total polarisation, a homogeneous distribution of antagonism over the 
population may lead to lower tension. In contrast, if the lowest vintiles are highly 
polarised, then a high-level antagonism of this population potentially creates more 
tension and would disrupts social cohesion. That seems to be the situation in most LAC 
countries: on average, the first 8 vintiles exceed their theoretical participation of 5% in 
more than 1 percentual point. 
Most LAC countries behave as the mean shown in Figure 4.10. Bolivia and Jamaica 
present a relatively higher participation in the lowest vintiles that produce a monotone 
downward slope relationship (see Figure 4.11). The reason relies on the relatively large 
identification effect reinforcing alienation in the first two vintiles. In other words, the 
poorest 10% of the Bolivian and Jamaican population are internally more homogeneous 
than the poorest 10% in the rest of the countries in the region. 
 
Box 7: DER decomposition 
The DER polarisation measure could be decomposed into three multiplicative 
components: mean identification, mean alienation and the rescaled correlation between 
individual identification and alienation.
27 This decomposition allows us to explore how 
these components interact in each income distribution to determine total polarisation.
28 
Table B.5 considers the case of α=0.5. Brazil has a lower level of average alienation 
(Gini coefficient) than Jamaica or Haiti, but the average α-identification (column i) and 
the correlation (column c) counterbalance the first effect. Consider now two countries 
with the same level of average alienation (inequality) such as Mexico and Dominican 
Republic. They end up with different levels of polarisation because of a higher 
identification in the latter country. 
Table B.6 explores the change of the three components over time. The sign of the 
change in polarisation depends not only on the weight to identification but also on the 
correlation. For instance, with α=0.75, in Argentina as well as in Venezuela there is a 
compensation between the average alienation change, and changes in the α-
identification and the correlation term.  
 
                                                 
27 For further details see Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004). 
28 Of course, it is impossible to move independently these components, because they are all interrelated 
dimensions of the same distribution. 
  235. Labour markets    
The previous section documents levels and changes of household income inequality and 
polarisation across LAC countries. The differences in the household income distribution 
between two countries (or between two points in time in a given country) are the 
consequence of differences in four sources: (i) labour incomes, (ii) capital incomes 
(including benefits and land rents), (iii) government transfers, and (iv) the demographic 
structure of households.  
There is some evidence pointing out to the particularly unequal distribution of capital 
and land rents in Latin America (Deiniger and Olinto, 2002). These differences, 
however, are not behind the high levels of inequality and polarisation in LAC shown 
above, because capital income is not well captured in the household surveys of the 
region. The share of capital income in total income reported in the surveys is around 
4%, which is much lower than the figures usually reported in National Accounts.  
A similar argument applies to government transfers. In particular, cash transfers do not 
play a key role in the redistributive schemes of the countries in the region. Some 
countries have recently implemented conditional cash transfers, but in most cases they 
are still small programs. Government cash transfers represent just less than 1% of total 
income recorded in LAC household surveys, and then cannot account for differences in 
patterns in inequality and polarisation across countries or over time.  
Finally, although demographic factors may account for some differences in the 
household per capita income distributions of LAC countries, their contribution is 
empirically estimated to be small (Haimovich et al, 2005). Moreover, as demographic 
changes occur at a slow pace, the recent income distribution changes in the region are 
hardly mainly determined by demographic factors.
29  
Given the small share of capital income and transfers in total income, and the slow 
changes of demographic factors, the conclusion is straightforward: differences in the per 
capita income distributions documented above are mainly the consequence of 
differences in labour market outcomes. Figure 5.1 shows a high positive correlation 
between the polarisation index DER computed over the distribution of labour income 
and over the distribution of household per capita income.    
Table 5.1 reports a large set of polarisation measures for the distribution of individual 
labour income. Wherever possible we report three values corresponding to early 1990s 
(around 1992), mid/late 1990s (around 1997) and early 2000s (around 2003). Figure 5.2 
illustrates the patterns of changes in polarisation of labour incomes for all the countries 
in the sample.
30 Very few countries have experienced a consistent pattern of reduction 
in labour income polarisation. When comparing the observation for the early 2000s with 
                                                 
29 See Marchionni and Gasparini (2004) for evidence on Argentina.  
30 In those countries where an observation is missing (e.g. Paraguay and Peru in the early 1990s) we have 
estimated polarisation measures based on trends in inequality reported by other authors. 
  24that of the early 1990s, polarisation as measured by the EGR 3 decreased only in Brazil 
and Mexico. But note that these results do not hold when using the DER 0.5: 
polarisation in Mexico did not significantly changed, while polarisation in Brazil went 
up. As the weight to identification increases, changes in the labour income distribution 
in Brazil are assessed to have been polarisation-increasing. 
In figure 5.3 we take advantage of a recent study carried out with the same dataset used 
for this document (Gasparini et al., 2006) and report patterns in the Gini coefficient for 
the distribution of earnings. Although results differ across countries, in most LAC 
labour markets wage inequality has not fallen. In fact, earnings disparities have 
substantially increased in some countries of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Uruguay 
and Paraguay), the Andean region (Colombia and Venezuela) and Central America 
(Costa Rica, Panama and Nicaragua). The increase was particularly noticeable in 
Argentina, where the Gini coefficient jumped from 0.40 to 0.47 in just a decade. The 
earnings distribution has remained quiet in Chile (although there are some signs of 
falling inequality in the last survey), Bolivia, Honduras and El Salvador. Brazil has been 
experiencing small but sustained reductions in wage inequality. The Gini coefficient 
dropped from a level of 0.6 in the early 1990s to 0.55 in 2003. Wage inequality has 
been also steadily fallen in Mexico in the last decade. 
The labour income statistics do not take into account those people who are unemployed. 
Figure 5.4 shows the unemployment rates in the LAC countries.
31 While unemployment 
is relatively low in Central American economies, the rates are high in some Andean and 
Southern Cone countries.   
As expected unemployment is higher among the youth. What is more worrying is the 
relative large raise in unemployment in that age group documented in Figure 5.5. In 
many countries in the region youth unemployment rates have dramatically increased 
over the last decade. That increase has occurred in general over the whole period under 
analysis. The growing unemployment among the youth is not only a worrying fact per 
se, but also due to its potential effect on social instability, given the potentially active 
role of young people. If the youth feel increasingly excluded from the labour market, 
social tensions may emerge. Even when the statistics suggest that they would have 
better employment opportunities when adults, that may not be enough for the youth to 
continue investing in human capital and social capital for the future, and to peacefully 
accepting a state of affairs that they may consider increasingly unfair. 
In most of the countries where unemployment went up, the increase was more intense 
for the unskilled (see Figure 5.6). That was the case in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. This pattern is certainly worrying. A fraction of the population 
is becoming increasingly less attractive for the labour market, and hence they have 
fewer chances to find a decent job, and to be integrated to the market economy. In this 
context social tensions are more likely to emerge.  
                                                 
31 See Gasparini et al. (2005) for a more comprehensive study of labour markets in LAC.   
  25Notice that in many countries unemployment for the unskilled substantially increased 
over the growth period of the early and mid 1990s. This was a period of important 
reforms, but not a period of macroeconomic crisis. Even in a context of strong growth 
the labour markets of many countries could not absorb the unskilled labour force. The 
crises of the late 1990s/early 2000s deepened the difficulties for the unskilled. It is 
interesting to note that in many countries, even when the economies recovered from the 
crises and now have levels of activity similar or higher than those of the 1990s, the 
unemployment rates of the unskilled remain substantially higher than in the previous 
decade. Figure 5.7 stresses this result by showing relative earnings by education groups. 
The first panel illustrates the earnings ratios for (i) the skilled relative to the semi-
skilled, and (ii) the unskilled relative to the semi-skilled. The second panel shows the 
changes in these ratios over the last 15 years. Notice that the gap between the unskilled 
and the semi-skilled is not large and has not significantly changed over time. In sharp 
contrast, the gap between the skilled and the rest is large and has substantially grown in 
most LAC countries.  
Table 5.2 illustrates changes in the gap skilled/unskilled by showing the coefficients for 
a college dummy in a Mincer equation. The “returns” to superior education in terms of 
hourly wages have increased in almost all countries of the region.  
The increase in the gap between the skilled and the rest took place in a period when 
most countries implemented reforms including trade liberalisation, financial 
liberalisation, privatisations and market de-regulation. These reforms were followed by 
significant changes in the sectoral structure of the economy, and maybe more important, 
changes in the ways of production used throughout the economy. The incorporation of 
new technologies, machinery and equipment yielded a reduction in the relative demand 
for unskilled labour that implied a sizeable reduction in their possibilities of finding a 
decent job. There is an increasing literature discussing these hypotheses, but much more 
research is needed to provide rigorous evidence.
32  
Notice that the economic changes affected the unskilled and the semi-skilled in roughly 
the same way. These two groups are increasingly alike, in comparison with the skilled.  
Many countries seem to have experienced a bipolarisation between professionals and 
technicians with a superior education degree, who have taken advantage of the new 
economic environment, and the rest of the workers, who have struggled with the new 
economic conditions. This polarisation may lead to increasing social tensions, even if 
the economy manages to grow and the unskilled get a wage raise. An unbalanced 
growth of opportunities and outcomes in the labour market may weaken social cohesion 
and lead to social instability.  
A remarkable feature of LAC labour markets is the substantial increase in the labour 
participation of women. Employment rates have also substantially increased for female 
workers. Women wages are still lower than their male counterparts (even when 
                                                 
32 See Ganuza et al. (2001), Behrman et al. (2004), Sánchez Páramo and Schady (2003) and Gasparini 
(2004), among others. 
  26controlling for observable characteristics), but the gap has been narrowing down over 
the last decades (see Figure 5.8) in most countries of the region.  
  276. Education   
The differences in incomes and labour outcomes documented in previous sections are 
largely determined by differences in productive assets. Chiefly among them is the level 
of human capital. Formal education can contribute to social cohesion through various 
channels. If differences in the access to formal education are small, the opportunities to 
accumulate human capital would be similar across individuals. An economically-
polarised society is less likely to arise from an egalitarian distribution of human capital, 
considering that economic outcomes are closely related to the endowment of human 
capital. Moreover, formal education can help to build a common set of values and 
reinforce a national cultural identity, contributing to social cohesion.  
In this section we present a large set of statistics aimed at documenting and 




As in most of the rest of the world, Latin American and Caribbean countries have made 
substantial progress in extending the coverage of formal education in the last decades. 
Figure 6.1 shows the average years of formal education for different age groups in the 
latest survey available for each country in our sample. The Figure allows a log-run view 
of the LAC educational systems as they include people aged 70 and older who have 
received their education in the 1930s.  
In all cases the curves are positive-sloped, meaning higher educational levels for the 
younger cohorts. For most countries we present the years-of-education curves by 
gender, area (urban-rural), race (white-non-white) and quintiles (quintile 1 – the poorest 
–, and quintile 5 – the richest). It is important to take into account that for people in 
their twenties the process of formal education may have not finished yet. In particular, 
since disadvantaged groups are less likely to pursue superior studies, the education gap 
is under-estimated for the youngest generations.  
The region has experienced substantial progress toward the aim of gender equality in 
terms of education. While among the LAC elderly men are significantly more educated 
than women, that is not true anymore for the youngest generations. In fact, in the 
majority of countries young women have more years of education than young men. A 
cross in the education curves has taken place in most countries. The timing has been 
different. While in Argentina women in their late forties have more years of formal 
education than their male counterparts, in Honduras that situation holds only for people 
in their early thirties and younger. There are some countries where the gender gap in 
favour of men still remains but has been reduced over the decades. That group is 
comprised by Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru. Haiti is the only 
country in LAC where there are no signs of a shrinking gender educational gap. Figure 
  286.2 shows examples of these patterns. While the gap has turned in favour of men in 
Venezuela and Brazil, it has been reduced in Mexico, and remains large in Haiti.  
In contrast to the case of gender, differences in education between urban and rural areas 
remain large. On average, people in the countryside have four years of education less 
than in cities. In none of the countries in the sample the difference in years of education 
between urban and rural areas has significantly fallen. This does not mean that there has 
not been progress in rural areas, but instead that progress has been at roughly the same 
rate as in urban areas (see Figure 6.3). The same conclusion holds for the differences by 
race in those countries where a specific race question is included in the latest household 
survey available (see Figure 6.4).  
There are large differences in educational attainment among people in different income 
strata (Figure 6.5). In many countries the difference for the youngest generations 
between the top and the bottom quintile is around 6 years of education. The coverage of 
formal education has increased among the poor, but at the same time the rich have 
increased their years of education, implying a roughly unchanged gap over the last 
decades.  
In summary, while the educational gaps by gender have been eliminated, they still 
remain large in terms of area, race and income strata. The results in terms of social 
cohesion are ambiguous. On the one hand, the situation of the disadvantaged has 
substantially improved in terms of years of formal education over the last decades. The 
strong increase in enrolment is certainly a key instrument for a more integrated society. 
However, this positive outcome is shadowed by some qualifications. As illustrated 
above, the “distance” of the disadvantaged (in terms of income, area or race) with 
respect to the most-favoured groups remains the same. All groups have scaled up the 
educational ladder, but they are still at very different steps, a fact that surely undermines 
social cohesion and economic mobility. In addition, there is some evidence pointing to a 
fall in the education quality received by the poor, as a consequence of a more massive 
public education system.  
 
Inequality in years of education  
 
In table 6.1 we compute the Gini coefficient for the distribution of years of education as 
one measure of inequality in education. The use of educational-Ginis has been recently 
increasing in the literature.
33 However, it is not obvious that inequality in education 
should be measured by an index of relative rather than absolute differences among 
individuals.
34 For that reason we also report the absolute gap in years of education 
                                                 
33 For instance, Thomas, Wang and Fan (2002) calculate Ginis over the distribution of years of education 
for 140 countries in the period 1960-2000. 
34 The Gini coefficient, as most of the inequality indices, is scale-invariant (see Lambert, 2001).  
  29between quintiles 1 and 5. Results are shown for three age groups: (10-20), (21-30) and 
(31-40). Figure 6.6 illustrates the changes in the educational Ginis and the educational 
gaps by income quintiles between the first and the latest survey available (in most cases 
early 1990s and early 2000s). Notice that while Figures 6.1 to 6.5 have shown the 
patterns in education over the last seven decades, Figure 6.6 documents changes 
occurred during the last 15 years.  
The educational Ginis have dropped in most countries, with only a few exceptions. 
Although the educational gaps by quintiles have also decreased in several countries, the 
second panels in Figure 6.6 do not suggest a consistent movement toward narrower gaps 




Most LAC countries either have already achieved or are close to achieve 100% literacy 
rates. Since the most advantaged groups were already close to that goal, most of the 
improvements in the last decades involved the most disadvantaged groups: women, 
rural areas, non-whites and the poor. Figure 6.7 shows literacy rates of different age 
groups for all the countries in the sample. In nearly all the cases the gaps in terms of 
literacy rates have been reduced over the last six decades. Only in few countries with 
low mean literacy rates, like Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua, the gaps are still large.   
 
Primary completion rates 
 
The primary completion rate, computed as the share of youngsters aged 15-24 with a 
primary school degree, is a relevant indicator of educational progress. Figure 6.8 shows 
the primary completion rates of each age group for the last available survey in our 
sample of 21 LAC countries. As with the previous indicators, all countries have 
experienced improvements over the last decades. In particular, rates for the most 
disadvantaged groups have been growing. However, in many countries changes have 
been slower than for the most favoured groups. That is the case in Bolivia, Brazil, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua, all countries with low mean 
primary completion rates.  
There seems to be a pattern of educational growth, in which first the gains are more 
concentrated in the urban middle and high income groups. In that stage of development 
the educational gaps widen. When educational rates (literacy, primary completion, and 
others) are already high for the most favoured groups, growth slows down (the obvious 
case is when the rate is 100%) and the most disadvantaged groups start to catch up. In 
  30some countries at a higher development stage the catch up in primary completion rates 
is close to be completed. This is the case of  Argentina, Chile, Jamaica and Uruguay.
35  
 
School enrolment  
 
In this section we document levels and patterns of net enrolment rates, i.e. the share of 
individuals in a given age group that are attending the educational level that corresponds 
to their age. Net enrolment rates are computed for primary, secondary and tertiary levels 
of education. Table 6.2 shows the gaps in these rates when dividing the population by 
income, gender and area. The gaps are defined as the difference of rates between two 
groups.
36  
In most LAC countries the primary school enrolment gap by income is small, given that 
the attendance rates are relatively high for poor children (see Figure 6.9). In the poorest 
Central American countries (El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua) primary 
school enrolment rates are still under 80% in the bottom quintile, while they are higher 
than 95% in the top quintile. In contrast, some countries have achieved primary 
enrolment rates for the poorest children higher than 95%, and then the enrolment gap 
has become very small. This is the case in Jamaica, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Mexico, 
Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Colombia (urban), Brazil and Peru. 
The enrolment gaps by income are substantially higher in the secondary and tertiary 
levels. On average, the difference between quintiles 5 and 1 is around 30 points. Low-
income Central American countries have large gaps in secondary school, but low in 
tertiary, given the low attendance rates, even for the rich.
37 The more developed 
countries of the Southern Cone - Argentina, Chile and Uruguay – have relatively small 
gaps in secondary school, but large gaps in superior education. While these countries 
have achieved relatively high levels of high school attendance among the poor, 
universities have still a very low proportion of poor people. In contrast to other 
countries in the region, the enrolment rates for the tertiary level are above 60% in the 
richest quintile of these countries.  
In most countries the gap in primary school enrolment by income has shrunk over the 
last 15 years (Figure 6.10). That is also the case for secondary school, although there are 
some countries where the gap has widened. The gap in enrolment has substantially 
widened at the college level in nearly all countries of the region. In most of these 
countries enrolment rates for the poor have increased but at a lower pace than for the 
rich. The increasing opportunities for the poor in terms of higher education may foster 
                                                 
35 That seems to be also the case in the city of Paramaribo (Suriname).  
36 For reference we also define in table 6.2 the gap by quintiles as the ratio of enrolment rates. 
37 The gaps computed as differences in rates are small, but computed as ratios are huge, given that almost 
no poor people attend universities and tertiary institutions.  
  31social cohesion; however, as they may perceive that progress has being slower than in 
other groups, social tensions might arise.  
The gender gaps in primary school are almost inexistent, with the exception of 
Guatemala, where attendance rates are somewhat lower for females (Figure 6.11). That 
Central American country and Peru are the sole cases where high school enrolment rates 
are slightly higher for men. In the rest of the countries females are more likely to attend 
secondary school than men are. That gap is also present, although with less intensity, at 
the college level. 
School attendance rates are significantly higher in urban areas than in the countryside 
(Figure 6.12). The gaps are rather small in primary school, but quite large in secondary 
and college levels. Poor Central American countries have the largest area gaps in 
primary and secondary school. In most countries the area gaps in primary and secondary 
school have been reduced, while gaps in tertiary education have widened (Figure 6.13).   
 
Educational mobility  
 
As discussed in section 2, polarisation is perceived as a less pressing issue when social 
mobility is high. If people can easily move from one group to the other, social tensions 
can be reduced by the prospects of future changes. In this section we present statistics 
on educational mobility that capture the degree to which some educational outcomes are 
linked to the socioeconomic situation of the student. In a high-mobility country 
differences in educational outcomes across children and youngsters are weakly linked to 
the incomes and educational status of their parents. Since formal education is one of the 
main determinants of incomes, we expect high educational mobility to translate into 
high income mobility.  
However, there are some reasons why this translation may not function perfectly. 
Incomes are greatly affected by a sort of unobservable factors like contacts, education 
quality, some dimensions of ability, and others that might be more concentrated in rich 
households. Second, some income sources like capital gains and land rents may be 
weakly linked to formal education.  
In this section we compute an Educational Mobility Index (EMI), following Andersen 
(2001). The EMI is defined as 1 minus the proportion of the variance of the school gap 
that is explained by family background. In an economy with very low mobility, family 
background would be important and thus the index would be near zero. To compute the 
EMI we run regressions of the schooling gap, defined as the difference between (i) 
years of education that a child would have completed had he entered school at normal 
age and advanced one grade each year, and (ii) the actual years of education.  
Table 6.3 shows the EMI for teenagers (13 to 19) and young adults (20 to 25) for all 
countries in our sample. The poorest Central American countries have the lowest values 
for the EMI. In the other extreme Argentina, Chile and Jamaica are countries with 
relatively high educational mobility. Changes have been slow over time, and mostly 
  32toward more mobility in the (13-19) age group, and toward less mobility in the (20-25) 
age group (see Figure 6.14). That difference may be related to the increase in the gaps in 
tertiary education documented above.   
 
Public and private schools  
 
The study of the type of school (public or private) is interesting for two reasons. First, 
education quality may substantially differ between public and private schools, which 
raises an issue of potential polarisation, even if the gaps in terms of years of education 
are small. Second, even in the case of similar education quality across school types, the 
educational segregation, i.e. a situation where certain socioeconomic groups attend only 
certain types of schools, may be a source of social fragmentation.  
Table 6.4 shows the share of students attending public schools at the primary, secondary 
and tertiary levels. The difference of that share between income quintiles 5 and 1 
significantly differ across countries and educational levels (Figure 6.15). In urban 
Argentina for instance, while 94% of primary school students from quintile 1 attend 
public schools, the share is just 33% in the upper quintile. In Mexico the gap is smaller: 
97% and 70% respectively.  
Few countries have information for public school attendance in several years. Figure 
6.16 shows changes in the difference in public school attendance between poor (quintile 
1) and rich (quintile 5) students. In most countries the differences in primary and 
tertiary education have been reduced in the last decade. The result is ambiguous in the 
case of high school. In Chile, for instance, while an increasing number of higher-income 
children are attending public primary schools, rich youngsters have been moving toward 
private institutions.  
  337. Housing and services   
Housing is the main asset that most people own. However, the decision whether to buy 
a house does not necessarily depend, at least in an obvious way, on wealth or income. If 
for instance rich people are more mobile, they may choose to rent houses or apartments 
instead of buying them. The expected positive relationship between housing ownership 
and wealth is based on the imperfections in the credit markets. When the access to a 
credit is difficult or impossible, poor people are less likely to buy a house, and more 
likely to sell an inherited dwelling in bad economic times to smooth consumption. The 
fragmentation of the society can take a housing dimension: on the one hand poor people 
renting or just illegally occupying dwellings and lots, and on the other rich people 
owning the houses and apartments where they live. In the first part of this section we 
explore that potential situation by using information on housing ownership from the 
LAC household surveys.  
There are other dimensions that are more interesting, but impossible to investigate with 
the data at hand. The spatial segregation of the population is probably the most relevant. 
In an increasingly polarised society people live close to those in their “group”. The 
picture of rich people living in gated neighbourhoods and poor people in shanty town 
comes easily to mind. Unfortunately, in most datasets released by the National 
Statistical Offices we do not know the exact location of the dwelling to carry out a 
spatial segregation analysis.          
Surveys do contain information on housing ownership. We construct a variable that 
takes the value 1 when the household owns both the lot and the dwelling. Table 7.1 
shows the share of owners by area and quintiles of the income distribution. It is 
interesting to notice that while in some relatively richer countries (e.g. Uruguay, 
Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Brazil) high-income people are more likely to own a 
dwelling than poor people are, the opposite is true in other poorer countries (see also 
Figure 7.1). Part of the difference comes from the fact that ownership is more common 
in rural areas than in the cities, even among the poor. In countries like Bolivia, 
Guatemala, and Peru the higher national housing ownership rates in quintile 1 compared 
to quintile 5 are basically explained by high housing ownership rates of the rural poor. 
Figure 7.2 suggests that over the last decade the difference in housing ownership 
between the rich and the poor has increased in some countries, although not in all. 
Among the countries with already a difference in favour of the rich, the gap has become 
even larger only in Argentina. In those countries where the gap increased, only in 
Argentina, Honduras and Paraguay the share of poor people owning their dwellings 
went down.  
In summary, from the evidence shown it does not emerge a clear picture of severe 
fragmentation in terms of housing ownership. The difficulties for the poor of buying a 
house seem greater in urban areas (and hence in more urban countries).  
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The easy access to a safe source of water is one of the fundamental indicators of 
development. Most LAC surveys do not ask about potable water, but on the location of 
the water source. Table 7.2 shows the share of households with access to a source of 
water in the house or lot.  
Countries widely differ in the share of households with easy access to water, and in the 
gaps between the rich and the poor (see Figure 7.3). As expected, in all countries the 
access to water is more difficult for the poor. In several countries the differences are 
enormous. In Peru, for instance, while 89% of people in quintile 5 report easy access to 
water, the share in quintile 1 is just 31%. As discussed above, that does not necessarily 
mean any access to potable water, but indicates the difficulties for poor people in 
getting water, which translates into higher costs in terms of time and money, and less 
use of water, with presumably health consequences.  
In most countries high-income groups have already achieved high water coverage rates. 
Hence, the expansions in the water network benefit mostly the poor. Figure 7.4 shows 
that in almost all countries the gap between quintile 5 and 1 in terms of access to water 




The access to electricity has increased in most LAC countries in the last decades. 
Several nations have achieved almost full coverage, in particular in urban areas. Table 
7.3. shows the share of household with electricity in the house. The gap between the 
rich and the poor is narrow in many countries. The differences are larger, and in some 
cases substantial, in those countries with a large rural population not covered yet by the 
electricity network. Since poor people are more concentrated in rural areas, the 
electricity gap between the rich and the poor is large in those countries (e.g. Bolivia, 
Peru, and most Central American countries). In Bolivia, for instance, while 95% of 
households in quintile 5 have electricity, the proportion falls to 25% in quintile 1. The 
difference is mostly accounted by the fact that the poor live in rural areas: in the 
Bolivian cities 91% of the poor have access to electricity.  
As in the case of water, the expansion in the electricity network has benefited mostly the 
poor. Figure 7.6 shows that the gap in terms of access to electricity between those 
households in the top quintile and those located in the bottom quintile has been 
significantly reduced in the last decade.  
 
An assessment 
  35This section has pictured a situation where the poor has less access to water and 
electricity than the rest of the population. This fact is certainly worrying and deserves 
attention from local policymakers and international organisations. However, two 
elements should be considered in the assessment. First, most of the differences are due 
to low coverage in rural areas, which are mostly populated by the poor. Extending the 
access to water and electricity in these areas is more costly, and then will take more 
time to occur. Second, some progress has been achieved in water and electricity in the 
region over the last decades that mainly benefited the poor. The patterns of increasing 
income polarisation documented in previous sections do not seem to be replicated in the 
access to water, electricity, and likely other services like sanitation and telephone.     
 
  368. Concluding comments  
It has long been argued that Latin American and Caribbean countries are among the 
most unequal economies in the world. From the evidence shown in this study the region 
is also characterised by a high degree of polarisation, i.e. a situation of homogeneous 
groups that antagonize each other. The most polarised country in Europe, Russia, is 
comparable to the least polarised country in LAC, Uruguay, which is considered the 
prototype of social cohesion in Latin America. This high income polarisation may be 
linked to the high levels of socio-political instability and violence that characterize the 
region.  
Moreover, there are some worrying signs of increasing, or at least non-decreasing 
economic polarisation in the region over the last 15 years, which may reinforce the 
latent sources of social tension:  
 
1.  Income polarisation increased in most of South America, and stayed roughly 
unchanged in Central America.  
2.  Unemployment has increased in most of South America, in particular among the 
urban youth and the unskilled.  
3.  Many countries seem to have experienced a labour market bipolarisation 
between professionals and technicians with a superior education degree, who 
have taken advantage of the new economic environment, and the rest of the 
workers, who have struggled with the new economic conditions.  
4.  Households headed by formal workers are increasingly antagonizing in terms of 
income from those households headed by informal workers.  
5.  In most LAC countries income polarisation by educational groups has increased 
over the last decade. 
6.  The educational gaps in terms of area, race and income strata remain large. 
Although the educational situation of the disadvantaged (in terms of income, 
area or race) has substantially improved over the last decades, their “distance” 
with respect to the most-favoured groups remains in general the same. The gap 
in enrolment has substantially widened at the college level in nearly all countries 
of the region.  
 
Along with these negative patterns, it is important to mention some positive changes:  
1.  Income polarisation and inequality have fallen in some economies. There does 
not seem to exist a fatal destiny to increasing disparities in the region.  
2.  Women have moved forward in many dimensions: the gaps in the labour market 
have been reduced, and the educational gaps have been closed in most countries.  
  373.  There has been a sizeable increase in education in the region. The situation of 
the disadvantaged has substantially improved in terms of years of formal 
education over the last decades. The strong increase in enrolment is certainly a 
key instrument for a more integrated society.  
4.  In most countries the gap in primary school enrolment, and the gaps in the 
access to water and electricity by income strata have shrunk over the last 
decades. 
 
The Latin American and Caribbean economies are now in a stage of economic recovery 
and expansion. GDP is growing and poverty is falling in most countries. Societies in 
general, and international organisations and local governments in particular, face a great 
opportunity to reinforce these positive patterns and to change the negative ones in order 
to slowly undo a long history of economic polarisation.  
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Appendix: The measurement of polarisation  
 
Wolfson(1994)  
Wolfson’s polarisation measure is derived from the Lorenz curve. It is defined as twice 
the area between the Lorenz curve and the tangent line at the median point (see figure 
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where µ= mean, m= median, L(0.5) = value of the Lorenz curve at the median income 
and G = Gini coefficient. Polarisation reaches the maximum value when half of the 
population has zero income and the other half has twice the mean. Wolfson shows that 














This measure has problems when there are several income poles. The income 
distribution in the second panel of the next graph is intuitively less polarised than the 
income distribution in the first panel, since income masses are less identified. However, 
the Wolfson index shows the opposite result because it implicitly assumes the existence 
























Esteban and Ray (1994) introduce a model of individual attitudes in a society and use 
four axioms to narrow down the set of possible measures. In particular, they suppose 
that each individual is subject to two forces. On the one hand she identifies with those 
she considers to be members of her own group. I:  + + ℜ → ℜ  represents the identification 
function. On the other hand, she feels alienated from those she consider to be members 
of other groups. a:  + + ℜ → ℜ  is the alienation function. An individual with income y 
feels alienation a(δ(y, y’)) from an individual with income y’, where δ(y, y’) stands  
simply for the absolute distance |y-y’|. Note that alienation, as well as identification, is 
perfectly symmetric in this scheme. The joint effect of the two forces is given by the 
effective antagonism function, T(I,a). Total polarisation in the society is postulated to be 








i j i ))) ' y , y ( ( a ), ( I ( T ) y , ( P   δ π π π π
11
Esteban and Ray demonstrate that the only measure of this family which satisfies the 

















Esteban, Gradín and Ray (1999) state that the ER (1994) polarisation measure for 
discrete groups or “n-spike representation” should be used only after the population has 
been regrouped in a way that captures the group identification structure of society. This 
clustering will lose some of the initial information that concerns the dispersion of the 
population around the clusters that are treated as single groups: the ER measure needs to 
be corrected. EGR propose the following polarisation measure:  
) , f ( ) , ( ER ) , ; f ( P ρ βε ρ α β α − =  
The first term is the ER measure of polarisation and the second term is a measurement 
error or lack of identification weighted by a free parameter β. 
Diagrammatically an n-spike representation is equivalent to transforming the original 
Lorenz Curve into a piecewise linear Lorenz curve (with n pieces) (see figure bellow). 
In other words each individual in a given group is assumed to have the same income. 
Hence the minimal error term is obtain through the minimisation of the area between the 
original Lorenz curve and the piecewise linear representation. It is therefore immediate 
that: 
*) ( G ) f ( G *) , f ( ρ ρ ε − =  
where G(.) assigns the Gini coefficient to the distribution variable in its argument. ρ* is 
the optimal n-spike representation that best approximates to the real distribution. 
Combining the previous equations: 
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The next figure illustrates the optimal three spike representation of the Honduras 2003 
income distribution using the EGR methodology. The values s1 and s2, marked as red 
lines, divide the population into three socioeconomic groups (“poor”, “rich” and 
“middle class”). This approach consists of choosing the n-spike distribution that 
minimizes the income dispersion within all socioeconomic classes. For instance if the s2 
spike moves to the left the “rich” income variance increases while the middle class 
variance is reduced. The figure shown below depicts a situation where no changes in the 
n-spike can produce a reduction in total dispersion. 
 



























Gradín Group Polarisation Index (GGP) 
Gradín (2000) assumes that despite polarisation occurring in the income space, groups 
in the distribution are the result of similarities with respect to a relevant attribute other 
than income. Thus, he treats the distribution as if it were the aggregate result of more 
than one stochastic process. In this sense, a population can be divided into “n” groups or 
sub-populations according with any characteristic (e.g. race, region, occupation, etc.). 
The number of groups depends on the nature of the characteristic. Groups are 
exogenously conformed according to whether their members share the same category 
for a given characteristic regardless of their income proximity. Compared to 
identification by income intervals, we expect higher intra-group dispersion and lower 
between groups heterogeneity.  
Define a partition  , where q ( n n
c m ,... m ; q ,... q 1 1 = ρ i is the population share in group i and 
m1≤m2≤…. m ≤ 3 indicate average incomes of the groups. The measure is defined in 
accordance with the EGR(1999) index as: 
[ ] 1 − − = − − ≡ ) ; F ( ) , ( ER ) ( ) , , ; F ( P ) , , ; F ( GP
c c c c ρ ε β ρ α β ρ β α ρ β α  
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The error term is expressed in parallel to EGR(1999) and accounts for both intra-group 
inequality as well as overlap between groups.
38
The index is sensitive to the number of categories for which the characteristic is 
expressed. In particular, the smaller the number, the larger we expect both terms in the 
index, so the net effect is ambiguous. The most relevant characteristics will be those 
showing at the same time high polarisation between the groups and homogeneity within 
them. 
 
Zhang and Kanbur Index (ZK) 
Zhang and Kanbur (2001) propose an index of polarisation based on the ratio of the 
between-group inequality to the within-group inequality – both measured with Theil’s 
Generalized Entropy index. This polarisation index captures the average distance 
between groups in relation to income differences within groups. As the groups become 
internally more homogeneous, within-group inequality diminishes, differences across 
groups are, relatively speaking, magnified and polarisation is higher. Similarly, if we 
leave within-group inequality unchanged as the distance between-group increases, 
polarisation rises.  






























































K: number of groups; nj: number of individuals in each group; N: total number of 
individuals; µj: mean income of each group; µ: mean income; yi: individual income. 
 
Duclos-Esteban-Ray index (DER) 
                                                 
38 For a more detailed treatment of the subject we refer the reader to Gradín (2000) and Esteban, Gradín 
and Ray (1999) 
39 For a more detailed treatment of the subject we refer the reader to Zhang and Kanbur (2001) 
  46The following axioms that are satisfied by the DER index are based on a density with 
finite support (kernel), and symmetric reductions in dispersion that concentrate the 
density around its mean (squeezes). 








Axiom 2: if a symmetric distribution is composed by three basic densities then a squeeze 






Axiom 3: if we consider a symmetric distribution made up of four basic densities with 
disjoint supports, then a move of the center distributions towards their outer 






Axiom 4: Given two distributions F and G, if P(F) ≥ P(G), being P(F) and P(G) the 
respective polarisation indexes, it must be that P(αF) ≥ P(αG), where αF and αG 
represent a rescaled version of F and G. 
 
The authors establish that a general polarisation measure that respects the previous 
axioms must be proportional to: 
∫∫ − ≡




where f(y) and f(x) denote the income (or other well-being measure) density function. 
The formula can be rewritten as 
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where  F(y) denotes the income distribution function, g(y) captures the “alienation” 
effect, and f(y)
α the “identification” effect.  
If we have a sample of incomes with independent and identically distributed 
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where  yi is the i-th individual income, µ ˆ is the sample mean, wi is the weight of 








The function   is a nonparametric kernel estimate of the income density, using a 
bandwidth that minimizes the mean square error of the estimator h
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Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) provide other formulas that are easier to compute. The 
first can be used with normal distributions and will not exceed the h* that minimizes the 
mean squared error by more than 5%.  
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where IQ is the interquantile range, and σln is the variance of  log-income.  
  
  48Table 3.1 
Household surveys used in the study 
Country Name of survey Acronym Years Coverage
Argentina Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 1992-2003 Urban 
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares-Continua EPH-C 2003-2004 Urban 
Bolivia Encuesta Integrada de Hogares EIH 1993 Urban
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo  ENE 1997 National
Encuesta Continua de Hogares- MECOVI ECH  2000-2002 National
Brazil Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios PNAD 1990-2003 National
Chile Encuesta  de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional CASEN 1990-2003 National
Colombia Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo ENH-FT 1992 Urban
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo ENH-FT 1996-2000 National
Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2000-2004 National
Encuesta de Calidad de Vida ECV 2003 National
Costa Rica Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 1992-2003 National
Dominican R. Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo ENFT 1996-2004 National
Ecuador Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida ECV 1994-1998 National
Encuesta de Empleo, Desemple y Subempleo ENEMDU 2003 National
El Salvador Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 1991-2003 National
Guatemala Encuesta Nacional sobre Condiciones de Vida ENCOVI 2000 National
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo e Ingresos ENEI - 2 2002 National
Haiti Enquête sur les Conditions de Vie en Haïti ECVH 2001 National
Honduras Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EPHPM 1992-2003 National
Jamaica Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions JSLC 1990-2002 National
Mexico Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares ENIGH 1992-2002 National
Nicaragua Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Nivel de Vida EMNV 1993-2001 National
Panama Encuesta de Hogares EH 1995-2003 National
Paraguay Encuesta Integrada de Hogares EIH 1997 National
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 1999-2003 National
Encuesta Integrada de Hogares EIH 2001 National
Peru Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO 1997-2003 National
Suriname Expenditure Household Survey EHS 1999 Urban/Paramaribo
Uruguay Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 1989-2004 Urban
Venezuela  Encuesta de Hogares Por Muestreo EHM 1989-2003 National  
 
  49Table 4.1 
Group polarisation  
Household per capita income  
Levels of GGP (α= 1, β= 1) and ZK measures  
GGP ZK GGP ZK GGP ZK GGP ZK GGP ZK GGP ZK
Argentina 2004 1.26       0.31       0.50      0.000      -         -         0.75      0.03      0.84         0.06       -        -       
Bolivia 2002 1.42       0.50       0.50      0.006      0.99       0.15      0.85      0.06      1.08         0.15       0.90      0.09     
Brazil 2003 1.46       0.62       0.45      0.000      0.62       0.03      0.85      0.07      1.03         0.12       0.98      0.12     
Chile 2003 1.43       0.43       0.52      0.003      0.58       0.02      0.85      0.05      0.93         0.09       0.50      0.01     
Colombia 2004 1.51       0.54       0.58      0.009      -         -         0.91      0.07      -          -          -        -       
Costa Rica 2003 1.42       0.56       0.55      0.002      0.84       0.06      0.81      0.05      0.93         0.10       0.53      0.00     
Dominican Rep 2004 1.26       0.33       0.56      0.004      0.82       0.06      1.03      0.11      0.73         0.04       -        -       
Ecuador 2003 1.24       0.28       0.54      0.003      0.86       0.07      0.56      0.00      0.90         0.08       0.62      0.02     
El Salvador 2003 1.00       0.23       0.50      0.000      0.93       0.11      0.90      0.08      0.88         0.07       -        -       
Honduras 2003 1.38       0.54       0.49      0.001      1.06       0.16      1.10      0.14      0.96         0.17       0.53      0.01     
Jamaica 2002 0.96       0.19       0.87      0.085      0.63       0.02      0.71      0.02      0.70         0.44       -        -       
Mexico 2002 1.39       0.49       0.48      0.000      0.80       0.08      0.86      0.07      1.03         0.14       0.77      0.04     
Nicaragua 2001 1.43       0.55       0.55      0.006      0.87       0.06      1.01      0.09      0.92         0.07       0.57      0.01     
Panama 2003 1.42       0.45       0.46      0.000      0.91       0.11      0.79      0.05      1.07         0.14       - -
Paraguay 2002 1.23       0.27       0.46      0.000      0.79       0.05      0.97      0.10      1.08         0.15       0.87      0.06     
Peru 2002 1.40       0.38       0.49      0.002      1.07       0.20      1.38      0.33      1.06         0.15       0.79      0.05     
Uruguay 2003 1.15       0.31       0.69      0.013      -         -         0.90      0.08      0.83         0.06       -        -       
Venezuela 2003 1.18       0.29       0.60      0.004      -         -         0.82      0.04      0.95         0.10       -        -       
Country Year
Area (urban/rural) Race (*) Labor Relationship Gender Educational Level Region
 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
Note: GGP= Gradín Group Polarisation Index, ZK=Zhang and Kanbur index.  
(*) Peru estimations’ are based on ENAHO 2001 
 
Table 4.2 
Group polarisation  
Household per capita income  
Signs of changes in the GGP (α=1, β=1) measure and its components over the 1990s 
GGP ER ε GGP ER ε GGP ER ε GGP ER ε GGP ER ε GGP ER ε
Argentina 92-04 +++ --+ n / d n / d n / d +++ -++ n / d n / d n / d
Bolivia 97-02 ++- +++ ++- +++ +++ n / d n / d n / d
Brazil 90-03 --+ +-- --+ +-- + +- + - -
Chile 90-03 + + -+ + -+ + -+ + -+ + - n / d n / d n / d
Colombia 92-04 + + + + + + n/d n/d n/d + + - n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d
Costa Rica 92-03 ++- -++ -++ +++ +++ - + +
Dominican Rep 00-04 ++- ++- - -+ - -+ - -+ n / d n / d n / d
Ecuador 94-03 ++- ++- +-- --+ +-- n / d n / d n / d
El Salvador 91-03 --- --- --+ --+ + +- n / d n / d n / d
Honduras 97-03 + + -+ + -+ + -+ + -+ - - n / d n / d n / d
Jamaica 90-99 + + -+ + -+ + -+ + -+ + - n / d n / d n / d
Mexico 92-02 --- +-- --- +-- n / d n / d n / d n / d n / d n / d
Nicaragua 93-01 + +- +-- --+ + +- + +- n / d n / d n / d
Panama 95-03 ++- --+ --+ --+ ++- n / d n / d n / d
Paraguay 97-02 --+ -+ + --+ --+ + +- n / d n / d n / d
Peru 97-02 -++ +++ +++ +++ - -+ n / d n / d n / d
Uruguay 89-03 ++- ++- n / d n / d n / d -++ ++- n / d n / d n / d
Venezuela 89-03 -++ --+ n / d n / d n / d --+ ++- n / d n / d n / d
Educational Level
Country Period
Gender Labour relationship Race Regions Area (urb/rural)
 
Note: GGP= Gradín Group Polarisation Index, ZK=Zhang and Kanbur index.  
         ER   = Esteban and Ray Polarisation Index 
            ε   = lack of identification 
         n/d   = not available 
  (+)   = positive variation 
  (-)   = negative variation 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
 
  50Table 4.3  
Group polarisation  
Household per capita income  
Signs of changes in the ZK measure and its components (within and between) over the 
1990s 
ZK Wth Btw ZK Wth Btw ZK Wth Btw ZK Wth Btw ZK Wth Btw ZK Wth Btw
Argentina 92-04 + + + - + - n/d n/d n/d + + + - + - n/d n/d n/d
Bolivia 97-02 + - + + + + + - + + + + + + + n/d n/d n/d
B r a z i l 9 0 - 0 3 --- --- --- +-- +-+ + - -
C h i l e 9 0 - 0 3 +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ +-+ n / d n / d n / d
Colombia 92-04 - + + + + + n/d n/d n/d + + + n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d n/d
C o s t a  R i c a 9 2 - 0 3 +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ + + +
Dominican Rep 00-04 + + + + + + - + - - + - - + - n/d n/d n/d
Ecuador 94-03 + - - + - + +-- --- +-+ n / d n / d n / d
E l  S a l v a d o r 9 1 - 0 3 --- --- --- --- --- n / d n / d n / d
Honduras 97-03 + - + + - + + - + + - + + - + n/d n/d n/d
Jamaica 90-99 + + + + + + + + + + + + - + - n/d n/d n/d
M e x i c o 9 2 - 0 2 +-- --- --- +-+ n / d n / d n / d n / d n / d n / d
Nicaragua 93-01 + - + - + + - + - - + + + + + n/d n/d n/d
Panama 95-03 + + + - + - - + - - + - + + + n/d n/d n/d
Paraguay 97-02 - + - + + + - + - - + - + + + n/d n/d n/d
P e r u 9 7 - 0 2 -++ +++ -++ -++ -+- n / d n / d n / d
Uruguay 89-03 + - + + - + n/d n/d n/d + - + + + + n/d n/d n/d
Venezuela 89-03 - + - - + - n/d n/d n/d - + - + + + n/d n/d n/d




Note: ZK= Zhang and Kanbur Polarisation Index 
 Wth=  Within  effect 
  Btw= Between effect 
  n/d= not available 
  (+)   = positive variation 
  (-)   = negative variation 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
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Pure income polarisation  




1 1.3 1.6 1 1.3 1.6 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Argentina 
15 cities
1992 0.410      0.204      0.150      0.107      0.730      0.494      0.339      0.334      0.284      0.269      0.289     
1998 0.485      0.228      0.168      0.121      0.803      0.545      0.373      0.355      0.294      0.270      0.272     
28 cities
1998 0.488      0.230      0.170      0.122      0.808      0.548      0.376      0.359      0.300      0.274      0.277     
2004 0.500      0.233      0.172      0.123      0.828      0.560      0.384      0.363      0.298      0.268      0.261     
Bolivia
   Urban
1993 0.477      0.242      0.183      0.137      0.843      0.568      0.387      0.367      0.303      0.272      0.259     
1997 0.497      0.251      0.190      0.142      0.861      0.580      0.395      0.372      0.309      0.278      0.265     
2002 0.485      0.255      0.195      0.149      0.886      0.590      0.406      0.376      0.311      0.282      0.268     
   National
1997 0.552      0.271      0.205      0.155      0.945      0.635      0.432      0.403      0.331      0.297      0.286     
2002 0.578      0.277      0.209      0.157      0.982      0.653      0.450      0.413      0.342      0.314      0.313     
Brazil
1990 0.648      0.302      0.233      0.181      0.998      0.666      0.460      0.425      0.363      0.344      0.354     
1998 0.607      0.292      0.226      0.175      0.977      0.651      0.449      0.414      0.356      0.350      0.395     
2003 0.569      0.279      0.214      0.164      0.949      0.639      0.436      0.402      0.344      0.346      0.399     
Chile
1990 0.501      0.267      0.206      0.160      0.908      0.604      0.415      0.385      0.319      0.289      0.275     
1998 0.518      0.270      0.209      0.161      0.912      0.607      0.418      0.384      0.318      0.289      0.276     
2003 0.476      0.258      0.199      0.153      0.888      0.590      0.406      0.376      0.312      0.283      0.269     
Colombia
  ENH-Urban
1992 0.456      0.238      0.181      0.137      0.822      0.555      0.379      0.367      0.310      0.289      0.299     
2000 0.546      0.276      0.212      0.163      0.933      0.628      0.427      0.409      0.343      0.320      0.341     
ECH-Urban
2000 0.492      0.263      0.203      0.157      0.911      0.605      0.415      0.381      0.323      0.307      0.325     
2004 0.518      0.263      0.201      0.153      0.905      0.609      0.415      0.396      0.321      0.299      0.316     
Costa Rica
1992 0.406      0.195      0.140      0.097      0.715      0.485      0.333      0.326      0.262      0.223      0.199     
1997 0.412      0.199      0.144      0.100      0.725      0.493      0.338      0.324      0.260      0.221      0.195     
2003 0.464      0.223      0.164      0.118      0.794      0.538      0.368      0.345      0.278      0.241      0.219     
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.494      0.240      0.179      0.132      0.853      0.575      0.393      0.365      0.297      0.262      0.243     
2004 0.464      0.238      0.179      0.133      0.841      0.567      0.386      0.360      0.295      0.263      0.246     
Ecuador
1994 0.468      0.243      0.183      0.137      0.873      0.587      0.399      0.377      0.305      0.267      0.248     
1998 0.497      0.253      0.191      0.144      0.905      0.603      0.414      0.379      0.310      0.275      0.258     
2003 0.464      0.233      0.173      0.126      0.839      0.566      0.386      0.361      0.293      0.258      0.242     
El Salvador
1991 0.481      0.237      0.176      0.129      0.853      0.575      0.392      0.367      0.297      0.260      0.240     
2000 0.491      0.234      0.172      0.124      0.844      0.567      0.388      0.369      0.295      0.252      0.227     
2003 0.472      0.224      0.164      0.116      0.822      0.556      0.380      0.358      0.286      0.244      0.218     
Guatemala
2000 0.480      0.255      0.194      0.147      0.890      0.592      0.407      0.377      0.309      0.276      0.259     
Haiti 
2001 0.558      0.285      0.221      0.171      0.973      0.646      0.443      0.406      0.334      0.300      0.283     
Honduras
  Eph 1
1992 0.522      0.247      0.185      0.136      0.873      0.590      0.402      0.372      0.304      0.270      0.251     
1997 0.503      0.249      0.187      0.139      0.890      0.600      0.408      0.379      0.310      0.275      0.257     
  Eph 2
1997 0.476      0.239      0.178      0.131      0.852      0.574      0.391      0.369      0.300      0.263      0.241     
2003 0.515      0.258      0.196      0.147      0.883      0.596      0.406      0.383      0.315      0.281      0.263     
Jamaica
1990 0.639      0.257      0.189      0.135      0.924      0.624      0.434      0.397      0.311      0.260      0.226     
1999 0.626      0.269      0.200      0.146      0.961      0.650      0.444      0.408      0.334      0.308      0.317     
2002 0.610      0.275      0.205      0.150      0.974      0.658      0.449      0.419      0.345      0.316      0.318     
Mexico
1992 0.478      0.255      0.195      0.149      0.894      0.600      0.407      0.375      0.308      0.276      0.264     
1996 0.474      0.241      0.181      0.135      0.856      0.577      0.393      0.364      0.297      0.264      0.248     
2002 0.467      0.232      0.173      0.126      0.834      0.563      0.384      0.362      0.290      0.256      0.239     
Nicaragua
1993 0.548      0.261      0.195      0.144      0.919      0.620      0.422      0.391      0.318      0.281      0.261     
1998 0.475      0.244      0.183      0.136      0.876      0.584      0.401      0.379      0.308      0.271      0.251     
2001 0.478      0.249      0.188      0.142      0.886      0.589      0.404      0.375      0.310      0.279      0.263     
Panama
1995 0.545      0.257      0.192      0.141      0.900      0.609      0.416      0.385      0.306      0.262      0.233     
2003 0.572      0.265      0.200      0.149      0.922      0.623      0.426      0.393      0.321      0.285      0.269     
Paraguay
1997 0.557      0.256      0.190      0.138      0.920      0.621      0.425      0.395      0.319      0.281      0.261     
2002 0.557      0.259      0.193      0.141      0.927      0.625      0.426      0.392      0.318      0.281      0.262     
Peru
1997 0.514      0.243      0.180      0.131      0.871      0.589      0.402      0.378      0.306      0.267      0.243     
2002 0.502      0.247      0.185      0.137      0.885      0.590      0.407      0.382      0.312      0.274      0.251     
Suriname
1999 0.493      0.253      0.191      0.143      0.849      0.573      0.390      0.370      0.291      0.244      0.212     
Uruguay
1989 0.366      0.181      0.130      0.089      0.680      0.459      0.313      0.311      0.252      0.217      0.193     
1998 0.401      0.194      0.140      0.097      0.709      0.485      0.331      0.320      0.257      0.218      0.191     
2003 0.418      0.203      0.148      0.105      0.728      0.495      0.340      0.325      0.265      0.230      0.207     
Venezuela
1989 0.376      0.184      0.131      0.090      0.683      0.463      0.316      0.318      0.265      0.243      0.246     
1998 0.433      0.209      0.152      0.107      0.762      0.517      0.355      0.338      0.272      0.233      0.210     
2000 0.408      0.194      0.140      0.097      0.709      0.481      0.331      0.320      0.259      0.222      0.199     
2003 0.430      0.205      0.149      0.104      0.745      0.506      0.347      0.332      0.267      0.229      0.207     
αα α
National
EGR (2) EGR (3) DER
 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys.  
 
  52Table 4.5 
Pure income polarisation  




1 1.3 1.6 1 1.3 1.6 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Argentina 
15 cities
1992 0.410      0.204      0.150      0.107      0.730      0.494      0.339      0.334      0.284      0.269      0.289     
1998 0.485      0.228      0.168      0.121      0.803      0.545      0.373      0.355      0.294      0.270      0.272     
28 cities
1998 0.488      0.230      0.170      0.122      0.808      0.548      0.376      0.359      0.300      0.274      0.277     
2004 0.500      0.233      0.172      0.123      0.828      0.560      0.384      0.363      0.298      0.268      0.261     
Bolivia
   Urban
1993 0.477      0.242      0.183      0.137      0.843      0.568      0.387      0.366      0.303      0.272      0.258     
1997 0.497      0.251      0.190      0.142      0.861      0.580      0.395      0.372      0.309      0.278      0.265     
2002 0.485      0.255      0.195      0.149      0.886      0.590      0.406      0.376      0.311      0.282      0.268     
   National
1997 0.487      0.249      0.189      0.143      0.859      0.578      0.393      0.367      0.303      0.272      0.258     
2002 0.485      0.255      0.195      0.149      0.886      0.590      0.406      0.376      0.311      0.282      0.268     
Brazil
1990 0.615      0.290      0.223      0.171      0.966      0.651      0.444      0.409      0.348      0.334      0.352     
1998 0.594      0.284      0.218      0.168      0.952      0.641      0.437      0.405      0.347      0.340      0.383     
2003 0.556      0.276      0.212      0.162      0.936      0.631      0.430      0.404      0.346      0.344      0.409     
Chile
1990 0.505      0.262      0.201      0.154      0.892      0.600      0.409      0.380      0.314      0.283      0.268     
1998 0.519      0.268      0.206      0.158      0.906      0.609      0.415      0.381      0.316      0.287      0.274     
2003 0.478      0.257      0.198      0.152      0.885      0.589      0.405      0.378      0.312      0.282      0.267     
Colombia
  ENH-Urban
1992 0.456      0.238      0.181      0.137      0.822      0.555      0.379      0.367      0.310      0.289      0.299     
2000 0.546      0.276      0.212      0.163      0.933      0.628      0.427      0.409      0.343      0.320      0.341     
ECH-Urban
2000 0.492      0.263      0.203      0.157      0.911      0.605      0.415      0.381      0.323      0.307      0.325     
2004 0.518      0.263      0.201      0.153      0.905      0.609      0.415      0.387      0.321      0.299      0.316     
Costa Rica
1992 0.410      0.199      0.145      0.102      0.716      0.486      0.333      0.323      0.263      0.228      0.205     
1997 0.401      0.194      0.140      0.098      0.705      0.483      0.329      0.319      0.257      0.219      0.193     
2003 0.447      0.212      0.155      0.109      0.767      0.521      0.357      0.340      0.275      0.237      0.213     
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.465      0.234      0.176      0.130      0.837      0.565      0.386      0.359      0.294      0.260      0.241     
2004 0.490      0.250      0.191      0.145      0.868      0.585      0.399      0.369      0.305      0.274      0.259     
Ecuador
1994 0.432      0.233      0.175      0.130      0.829      0.557      0.379      0.358      0.292      0.258      0.240     
1998 0.460      0.247      0.187      0.141      0.869      0.576      0.396      0.372      0.305      0.274      0.262     
2003 0.477      0.235      0.175      0.129      0.839      0.566      0.387      0.362      0.296      0.263      0.249     
El Salvador
1991 0.432      0.218      0.161      0.116      0.793      0.535      0.365      0.346      0.281      0.248      0.232     
2000 0.439      0.216      0.159      0.114      0.765      0.518      0.355      0.343      0.278      0.240      0.218     
2003 0.416      0.208      0.152      0.108      0.761      0.514      0.351      0.337      0.272      0.235      0.213     
Guatemala
2000 0.520      0.264      0.202      0.154      0.903      0.608      0.414      0.386      0.318      0.286      0.272     
Haiti 
2001 0.760      0.322      0.250      0.195      1.051      0.704      0.492      0.440      0.370      0.344      0.340     
Honduras
  Eph 1
1992 0.476      0.241      0.180      0.133      0.839      0.567      0.387      0.365      0.294      0.254      0.228     
1997 0.453      0.237      0.178      0.132      0.838      0.564      0.383      0.365      0.298      0.265      0.249     
  Eph 2
1997 0.453      0.231      0.172      0.127      0.829      0.557      0.379      0.358      0.293      0.261      0.242     
2003 0.506      0.235      0.175      0.127      0.852      0.576      0.393      0.368      0.300      0.264      0.246     
Jamaica
1990 0.584      0.248      0.181      0.129      0.917      0.625      0.431      0.391      0.303      0.249      0.212     
1999 0.667      0.286      0.215      0.158      0.987      0.657      0.449      0.417      0.342      0.316      0.337     
2002 0.693      0.292      0.219      0.162      1.030      0.696      0.475      0.440      0.373      0.360      0.399     
Mexico
1992 0.456      0.250      0.192      0.147      0.855      0.574      0.390      0.370      0.307      0.279      0.270     
1996 0.449      0.233      0.175      0.130      0.828      0.558      0.380      0.353      0.290      0.260      0.246     
2002 0.423      0.218      0.162      0.118      0.776      0.524      0.358      0.344      0.281      0.249      0.233     
Nicaragua
1993 0.508      0.244      0.182      0.133      0.877      0.592      0.404      0.374      0.305      0.268      0.249     
1998 0.469      0.242      0.183      0.137      0.861      0.570      0.392      0.378      0.310      0.275      0.256     
2001 0.467      0.252      0.192      0.146      0.901      0.589      0.405      0.383      0.319      0.290      0.277     
Panama
1995 0.505      0.239      0.178      0.130      0.844      0.571      0.391      0.364      0.291      0.251      0.225     
2003 0.503      0.245      0.184      0.136      0.850      0.575      0.393      0.365      0.294      0.256      0.232     
Paraguay
1997 0.471      0.236      0.176      0.129      0.839      0.565      0.386      0.365      0.295      0.257      0.235     
2002 0.459      0.229      0.169      0.122      0.837      0.563      0.384      0.361      0.294      0.258      0.238     
Peru
1997 0.419      0.214      0.158      0.114      0.776      0.524      0.357      0.339      0.277      0.244      0.224     
2002 0.413      0.223      0.167      0.124      0.802      0.535      0.368      0.350      0.289      0.257      0.240     
Suriname
1999 0.493      0.253      0.191      0.143      0.849      0.573      0.390      0.370      0.291      0.244      0.212     
Uruguay
1989 0.366      0.181      0.130      0.089      0.680      0.459      0.313      0.311      0.252      0.217      0.193     
1998 0.401      0.194      0.140      0.097      0.709      0.485      0.331      0.320      0.257      0.218      0.191     
2003 0.418      0.203      0.148      0.105      0.728      0.495      0.340      0.325      0.265      0.230      0.207     
Venezuela
1989 0.345      0.175      0.126      0.088      0.644      0.435      0.296      0.298      0.244      0.213      0.194     
1998 0.440      0.215      0.159      0.114      0.756      0.513      0.351      0.336      0.272      0.239      0.218     
2000 0.394      0.190      0.137      0.095      0.702      0.475      0.323      0.317      0.257      0.222      0.199     
2003 0.409      0.204      0.150      0.107      0.727      0.493      0.337      0.327      0.266      0.232      0.212     
αα α
Urban
EGR (2) EGR (3) DER
 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys.  
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Pure income polarisation  




1 1.3 1.6 1 1.3 1.6 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Bolivia
   National
1997 0.739      0.327      0.253      0.197      1.126      0.741      0.510      0.464      0.407      0.405      0.445     
2002 0.741      0.296      0.221      0.163      1.035      0.701      0.480      0.438      0.373      0.365      0.393     
Brazil
1990 0.515      0.259      0.196      0.147      0.887      0.598      0.408      0.384      0.321      0.296      0.299     
1998 0.503      0.254      0.192      0.144      0.905      0.603      0.415      0.384      0.322      0.299      0.303     
2003 0.516      0.246      0.184      0.135      0.864      0.583      0.398      0.379      0.312      0.282      0.278     
Chile
1990 0.431      0.279      0.223      0.180      0.959      0.627      0.427      0.386      0.329      0.308      0.301     
1998 0.375      0.217      0.164      0.123      0.799      0.528      0.359      0.338      0.285      0.260      0.247     
2003 0.380      0.228      0.175      0.134      0.821      0.541      0.367      0.353      0.294      0.267      0.253     
Costa Rica
1992 0.385      0.183      0.130      0.087      0.686      0.469      0.320      0.310      0.249      0.212      0.187     
1997 0.387      0.183      0.131      0.089      0.688      0.467      0.318      0.311      0.251      0.214      0.192     
2003 0.421      0.208      0.152      0.108      0.768      0.518      0.352      0.341      0.272      0.231      0.203     
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.429      0.217      0.161      0.116      0.774      0.524      0.358      0.342      0.275      0.235      0.209     
2004 0.407      0.197      0.143      0.100      0.707      0.481      0.331      0.320      0.258      0.221      0.195     
Ecuador
1994 0.443      0.223      0.165      0.119      0.845      0.567      0.383      0.369      0.299      0.261      0.242     
1998 0.471      0.224      0.163      0.114      0.840      0.562      0.381      0.368      0.295      0.253      0.228     
2003 0.413      0.201      0.145      0.100      0.754      0.508      0.344      0.335      0.271      0.234      0.213     
El Salvador
1991 0.414      0.205      0.147      0.102      0.780      0.527      0.357      0.345      0.278      0.239      0.215     
2000 0.457      0.206      0.146      0.098      0.762      0.523      0.358      0.344      0.271      0.223      0.189     
2003 0.476      0.221      0.160      0.111      0.818      0.554      0.377      0.360      0.284      0.236      0.204     
Guatemala
2000 0.411      0.206      0.150      0.107      0.770      0.516      0.352      0.339      0.274      0.237      0.214     
Haiti 
2001 0.443      0.214      0.155      0.109      0.797      0.537      0.364      0.352      0.281      0.240      0.213     
Honduras
  Eph 1
1992 0.466      0.226      0.167      0.121      0.800      0.542      0.371      0.348      0.282      0.247      0.225     
1997 0.477      0.232      0.172      0.124      0.847      0.572      0.390      0.370      0.300      0.262      0.242     
  Eph 2
1997 0.457      0.227      0.168      0.122      0.817      0.552      0.376      0.357      0.289      0.253      0.230     
2003 0.414      0.203      0.148      0.104      0.749      0.508      0.348      0.335      0.274      0.239      0.218     
Jamaica
1990 0.588      0.274      0.203      0.148      0.931      0.626      0.427      0.403      0.313      0.259      0.222     
1999 0.589      0.252      0.184      0.131      0.933      0.632      0.432      0.398      0.326      0.300      0.314     
2002 0.552      0.256      0.188      0.135      0.908      0.615      0.420      0.390      0.305      0.254      0.219     
Mexico
1992 0.489      0.226      0.165      0.117      0.814      0.552      0.378      0.359      0.292      0.255      0.236     
1996 0.436      0.225      0.166      0.120      0.827      0.554      0.375      0.361      0.293      0.257      0.238     
2002 0.452      0.245      0.184      0.137      0.903      0.596      0.405      0.393      0.324      0.289      0.275     
Nicaragua
1993 0.487      0.229      0.167      0.118      0.846      0.569      0.389      0.374      0.302      0.261      0.237     
1998 0.448      0.221      0.160      0.113      0.828      0.554      0.375      0.364      0.296      0.258      0.236     
2001 0.404      0.201      0.146      0.102      0.746      0.497      0.341      0.330      0.267      0.231      0.208     
Panama
1995 0.538      0.236      0.171      0.119      0.863      0.586      0.402      0.374      0.300      0.260      0.241     
2003 0.541      0.251      0.187      0.137      0.893      0.604      0.413      0.382      0.312      0.276      0.258     
Paraguay
1997 0.616      0.257      0.190      0.136      0.903      0.610      0.420      0.389      0.316      0.280      0.267     
2002 0.589      0.296      0.229      0.178      1.028      0.682      0.467      0.421      0.354      0.329      0.328     
Peru
1997 0.428      0.208      0.151      0.106      0.745      0.505      0.345      0.334      0.269      0.230      0.205     
2002 0.386      0.188      0.135      0.094      0.691      0.467      0.319      0.313      0.254      0.219      0.195     
αα α
Rural
EGR (2) EGR (3) DER
 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys.  
 
  54Table 4.7 
Pure income polarisation  
Household equivalised income 
National statistics 
Wolfson
1 1.3 1.6 1 1.3 1.6 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Argentina 
15 cities
1992 0.386      0.193      0.141      0.100      0.694      0.471      0.323      0.322      0.262      0.226      0.202     
1998 0.443      0.215      0.158      0.114      0.764      0.518      0.355      0.341      0.276      0.240      0.220     
28 cities
1998 0.447      0.217      0.160      0.115      0.770      0.522      0.358      0.343      0.276      0.237      0.212     
2004 0.462      0.220      0.161      0.115      0.787      0.532      0.365      0.346      0.279      0.242      0.219     
Bolivia
   Urban
1993 0.444      0.233      0.175      0.130      0.812      0.548      0.373      0.354      0.292      0.260      0.243     
1997 0.465      0.241      0.182      0.136      0.829      0.559      0.381      0.361      0.298      0.267      0.251     
2002 0.441      0.242      0.185      0.141      0.854      0.569      0.391      0.369      0.304      0.273      0.257     
   National
1997 0.521      0.256      0.192      0.142      0.912      0.613      0.418      0.383      0.312      0.276      0.256     
2002 0.538      0.261      0.195      0.143      0.949      0.629      0.430      0.404      0.333      0.301      0.290     
Brazil
1990 0.619      0.292      0.225      0.174      0.972      0.655      0.447      0.406      0.338      0.310      0.301     
1998 0.582      0.283      0.218      0.168      0.949      0.633      0.437      0.398      0.330      0.303      0.298     
2003 0.533      0.270      0.207      0.158      0.919      0.619      0.422      0.389      0.320      0.292      0.284     
Chile
1990 0.476      0.260      0.201      0.156      0.886      0.589      0.405      0.377      0.313      0.283      0.269     
1998 0.491      0.262      0.202      0.156      0.889      0.592      0.407      0.378      0.313      0.283      0.270     
2003 0.454      0.251      0.193      0.148      0.864      0.574      0.394      0.364      0.303      0.276      0.263     
Colombia
  ENH-Urban
1992 0.428      0.227      0.172      0.129      0.792      0.535      0.365      0.345      0.282      0.250      0.231     
2000 0.515      0.264      0.202      0.155      0.904      0.608      0.414      0.381      0.312      0.280      0.266     
ECH-Urban
2000 0.456      0.248      0.189      0.144      0.874      0.581      0.399      0.376      0.309      0.279      0.268     
2004 0.489      0.251      0.190      0.142      0.874      0.589      0.401      0.374      0.307      0.273      0.259     
Costa Rica
1992 0.373      0.183      0.131      0.090      0.683      0.462      0.315      0.311      0.249      0.211      0.185     
1997 0.382      0.187      0.134      0.093      0.689      0.467      0.318      0.313      0.251      0.213      0.187     
2003 0.438      0.212      0.155      0.110      0.763      0.518      0.354      0.340      0.273      0.233      0.209     
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.465      0.231      0.172      0.127      0.824      0.556      0.380      0.354      0.289      0.254      0.233     
2004 0.439      0.227      0.170      0.126      0.808      0.545      0.372      0.352      0.288      0.255      0.236     
Ecuador
1994 0.432      0.230      0.171      0.126      0.840      0.563      0.380      0.359      0.291      0.254      0.232     
1998 0.458      0.238      0.178      0.131      0.870      0.577      0.393      0.374      0.302      0.265      0.245     
2003 0.433      0.219      0.161      0.115      0.802      0.541      0.369      0.349      0.282      0.244      0.221     
El Salvador
1991 0.444      0.222      0.163      0.117      0.814      0.549      0.374      0.346      0.280      0.242      0.217     
2000 0.457      0.219      0.160      0.112      0.806      0.541      0.368      0.356      0.283      0.240      0.211     
2003 0.441      0.212      0.153      0.106      0.788      0.532      0.362      0.344      0.275      0.234      0.207     
Guatemala
2000 0.441      0.237      0.179      0.134      0.844      0.568      0.386      0.369      0.300      0.265      0.245     
Haiti 
2001 0.538      0.278      0.215      0.167      0.961      0.637      0.437      0.404      0.330      0.295      0.277     
Honduras
  Eph 1
1992 0.483      0.235      0.174      0.126      0.835      0.565      0.386      0.366      0.296      0.258      0.235     
1997 0.472      0.233      0.173      0.126      0.852      0.575      0.392      0.367      0.295      0.256      0.233     
  Eph 2
1997 0.440      0.225      0.166      0.120      0.813      0.549      0.374      0.354      0.287      0.251      0.229     
2003 0.481      0.242      0.182      0.135      0.846      0.571      0.389      0.367      0.300      0.265      0.245     
Jamaica
1990 0.572      0.244      0.176      0.123      0.881      0.599      0.411      0.387      0.303      0.251      0.215     
1999 0.550      0.249      0.182      0.129      0.914      0.619      0.422      0.395      0.320      0.288      0.286     
2002 0.574      0.259      0.190      0.135      0.942      0.637      0.435      0.409      0.336      0.305      0.301     
Mexico
1992 0.448      0.243      0.185      0.140      0.863      0.580      0.394      0.368      0.301      0.267      0.248     
1996 0.443      0.230      0.172      0.127      0.823      0.555      0.378      0.356      0.288      0.252      0.231     
2002 0.432      0.220      0.163      0.118      0.799      0.540      0.368      0.345      0.279      0.242      0.218     
Nicaragua
1993 0.513      0.247      0.183      0.133      0.883      0.596      0.407      0.384      0.310      0.270      0.246     
1998 0.440      0.227      0.169      0.123      0.838      0.557      0.381      0.363      0.295      0.258      0.236     
2001 0.441      0.233      0.175      0.130      0.841      0.559      0.384      0.369      0.303      0.268      0.249     
Panama
1995 0.510      0.243      0.180      0.131      0.866      0.586      0.401      0.373      0.295      0.251      0.221     
2003 0.525      0.251      0.188      0.138      0.887      0.599      0.409      0.378      0.306      0.267      0.244     
Paraguay
1997 0.518      0.242      0.177      0.127      0.886      0.597      0.406      0.379      0.305      0.265      0.241     
2002 0.516      0.245      0.182      0.132      0.891      0.601      0.410      0.382      0.309      0.271      0.250     
Peru
1997 0.479      0.229      0.168      0.119      0.835      0.564      0.385      0.361      0.292      0.253      0.228     
2002 0.472      0.234      0.174      0.127      0.851      0.574      0.391      0.372      0.301      0.263      0.240     
Suriname
1999 0.452      0.235      0.175      0.129      0.816      0.554      0.374      0.358      0.281      0.235      0.203     
Uruguay
1989 0.345      0.173      0.124      0.085      0.646      0.436      0.297      0.297      0.243      0.210      0.189     
1998 0.374      0.183      0.132      0.091      0.672      0.460      0.313      0.306      0.247      0.211      0.186     
2003 0.380      0.190      0.139      0.098      0.688      0.467      0.320      0.311      0.254      0.222      0.201     
Venezuela
1989 0.348      0.169      0.119      0.080      0.638      0.433      0.295      0.297      0.243      0.209      0.188     
1998 0.403      0.196      0.141      0.098      0.725      0.491      0.334      0.323      0.259      0.222      0.197     
2000 0.376      0.181      0.129      0.088      0.670      0.458      0.312      0.307      0.247      0.210      0.185     
2003 0.397      0.191      0.138      0.095      0.704      0.477      0.325      0.317      0.254      0.216      0.189     
αα α
National
EGR (2) EGR (3) DER
 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys.  
 
  55Table 4.8 
Pure income polarisation  




1 1.3 1.6 1 1.3 1.6 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Argentina 
15 cities
1992 0.386      0.193      0.141      0.100      0.694      0.471      0.323      0.322      0.262      0.226      0.202     
1998 0.443      0.215      0.158      0.114      0.764      0.518      0.355      0.341      0.276      0.240      0.220     
28 cities
1998 0.447      0.217      0.160      0.115      0.770      0.522      0.358      0.343      0.276      0.237      0.212     
2004 0.462      0.220      0.161      0.115      0.787      0.532      0.365      0.346      0.279      0.242      0.219     
Bolivia
   Urban
1993 0.444      0.233      0.175      0.130      0.812      0.548      0.373      0.354      0.292      0.260      0.243     
1997 0.465      0.241      0.182      0.136      0.829      0.559      0.381      0.361      0.298      0.267      0.251     
2002 0.441      0.242      0.185      0.141      0.854      0.569      0.391      0.369      0.304      0.273      0.257     
   National
1997 0.455      0.237      0.179      0.134      0.824      0.555      0.378      0.356      0.292      0.260      0.242     
2002 0.441      0.242      0.185      0.141      0.854      0.569      0.391      0.369      0.304      0.273      0.257     
Brazil
1990 0.589      0.281      0.216      0.166      0.943      0.636      0.434      0.399      0.330      0.299      0.286     
1998 0.561      0.275      0.211      0.162      0.926      0.624      0.426      0.391      0.325      0.298      0.294     
2003 0.538      0.268      0.205      0.156      0.909      0.612      0.417      0.386      0.320      0.293      0.287     
Chile
1990 0.484      0.256      0.197      0.151      0.872      0.587      0.400      0.372      0.308      0.278      0.263     
1998 0.497      0.260      0.200      0.153      0.883      0.594      0.404      0.378      0.312      0.281      0.267     
2003 0.456      0.249      0.191      0.146      0.861      0.573      0.394      0.369      0.305      0.275      0.260     
Colombia
  ENH-Urban
1992 0.428      0.227      0.172      0.129      0.792      0.535      0.365      0.345      0.282      0.250      0.231     
2000 0.515      0.264      0.202      0.155      0.904      0.608      0.414      0.381      0.312      0.280      0.266     
ECH-Urban
2000 0.456      0.248      0.189      0.144      0.874      0.581      0.399      0.376      0.309      0.279      0.268     
2004 0.489      0.251      0.190      0.142      0.874      0.589      0.401      0.374      0.306      0.273      0.259     
Costa Rica
1992 0.381      0.189      0.137      0.096      0.684      0.464      0.318      0.313      0.253      0.218      0.194     
1997 0.381      0.185      0.133      0.092      0.673      0.460      0.314      0.308      0.248      0.212      0.186     
2003 0.426      0.203      0.148      0.104      0.740      0.503      0.345      0.328      0.265      0.228      0.204     
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.439      0.226      0.168      0.123      0.810      0.547      0.374      0.350      0.285      0.251      0.231     
2004 0.461      0.239      0.181      0.136      0.835      0.563      0.384      0.362      0.299      0.266      0.248     
Ecuador
1994 0.403      0.221      0.166      0.122      0.798      0.537      0.365      0.348      0.284      0.250      0.231     
1998 0.427      0.236      0.179      0.135      0.835      0.553      0.380      0.363      0.298      0.266      0.252     
2003 0.448      0.223      0.166      0.120      0.807      0.545      0.372      0.347      0.282      0.246      0.224     
El Salvador
1991 0.402      0.207      0.151      0.108      0.761      0.514      0.350      0.333      0.271      0.236      0.214     
2000 0.408      0.203      0.149      0.106      0.733      0.493      0.338      0.331      0.269      0.233      0.210     
2003 0.392      0.196      0.142      0.100      0.729      0.491      0.333      0.322      0.261      0.226      0.204     
Guatemala
2000 0.475      0.250      0.190      0.144      0.865      0.581      0.396      0.375      0.308      0.276      0.263     
Haiti 
2001 0.742      0.320      0.247      0.192      1.044      0.706      0.486      0.436      0.366      0.341      0.336     
Honduras
  Eph 1
1992 0.452      0.228      0.169      0.123      0.805      0.544      0.371      0.354      0.284      0.244      0.218     
1997 0.424      0.224      0.166      0.122      0.803      0.540      0.367      0.351      0.285      0.249      0.227     
  Eph 2
1997 0.420      0.219      0.162      0.118      0.791      0.532      0.363      0.345      0.281      0.247      0.227     
2003 0.460      0.223      0.164      0.118      0.817      0.553      0.377      0.353      0.285      0.248      0.227     
Jamaica
1990 0.546      0.235      0.170      0.118      0.874      0.595      0.410      0.382      0.296      0.241      0.203     
1999 0.593      0.265      0.197      0.143      0.944      0.630      0.431      0.404      0.327      0.293      0.294     
2002 0.626      0.277      0.206      0.150      1.002      0.678      0.463      0.430      0.361      0.346      0.381     
Mexico
1992 0.425      0.240      0.184      0.140      0.825      0.554      0.376      0.356      0.296      0.268      0.255     
1996 0.419      0.223      0.166      0.122      0.797      0.538      0.366      0.343      0.281      0.248      0.230     
2002 0.398      0.206      0.152      0.110      0.741      0.501      0.342      0.326      0.265      0.230      0.208     
Nicaragua
1993 0.478      0.231      0.171      0.125      0.842      0.569      0.389      0.364      0.295      0.258      0.237     
1998 0.428      0.228      0.171      0.127      0.822      0.549      0.373      0.365      0.298      0.263      0.242     
2001 0.433      0.237      0.179      0.135      0.858      0.560      0.382      0.371      0.308      0.278      0.264     
Panama
1995 0.472      0.228      0.169      0.122      0.813      0.550      0.377      0.347      0.280      0.242      0.217     
2003 0.467      0.233      0.174      0.128      0.820      0.555      0.379      0.355      0.286      0.248      0.224     
Paraguay
1997 0.437      0.227      0.169      0.124      0.805      0.544      0.372      0.355      0.283      0.242      0.215     
2002 0.432      0.214      0.156      0.110      0.794      0.533      0.362      0.343      0.278      0.243      0.221     
Peru
1997 0.392      0.200      0.147      0.105      0.739      0.500      0.341      0.329      0.269      0.237      0.218     
2002 0.390      0.212      0.158      0.116      0.771      0.514      0.353      0.333      0.276      0.248      0.232     
Suriname
1999 0.452      0.235      0.175      0.129      0.816      0.554      0.374      0.358      0.281      0.235      0.203     
Uruguay
1989 0.345      0.173      0.124      0.085      0.646      0.436      0.297      0.297      0.243      0.210      0.189     
1998 0.374      0.183      0.132      0.091      0.672      0.460      0.313      0.306      0.247      0.211      0.186     
2003 0.380      0.190      0.139      0.098      0.688      0.467      0.320      0.311      0.254      0.222      0.201     
Venezuela
1989 0.309      0.159      0.113      0.077      0.600      0.406      0.276      0.283      0.233      0.203      0.184     
1998 0.397      0.202      0.148      0.105      0.720      0.488      0.334      0.323      0.263      0.229      0.209     
2000 0.367      0.178      0.127      0.086      0.665      0.451      0.307      0.306      0.248      0.213      0.191     
2003 0.375      0.191      0.139      0.098      0.689      0.467      0.320      0.312      0.255      0.222      0.201     
αα α
Urban
EGR (2) EGR (3) DER
  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys.  
 
  56Table 4.9 
Pure income polarisation  
Household equivalised income 
Rural areas 
Wolfson
1 1.3 1.6 1 1.3 1.6 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Bolivia
   National
1997 0.738      0.314      0.241      0.185      1.092      0.722      0.498      0.455      0.392      0.379      0.399     
2002 0.716      0.289      0.214      0.156      1.008      0.684      0.470      0.433      0.368      0.350      0.362     
Brazil
1990 0.494      0.249      0.189      0.142      0.856      0.576      0.393      0.365      0.301      0.270      0.254     
1998 0.456      0.238      0.180      0.134      0.864      0.575      0.395      0.369      0.306      0.275      0.262     
2003 0.463      0.228      0.168      0.121      0.822      0.555      0.379      0.356      0.289      0.254      0.234     
Chile
1990 0.398      0.266      0.213      0.172      0.922      0.603      0.410      0.383      0.323      0.300      0.292     
1998 0.355      0.208      0.157      0.118      0.776      0.512      0.348      0.339      0.284      0.257      0.245     
2003 0.355      0.220      0.168      0.129      0.798      0.526      0.357      0.343      0.289      0.263      0.251     
Costa Rica
1992 0.357      0.171      0.120      0.079      0.655      0.446      0.302      0.303      0.242      0.202      0.174     
1997 0.359      0.173      0.123      0.082      0.655      0.445      0.303      0.301      0.242      0.205      0.179     
2003 0.397      0.198      0.143      0.099      0.737      0.497      0.338      0.329      0.263      0.223      0.196     
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.407      0.207      0.151      0.108      0.747      0.504      0.342      0.330      0.267      0.229      0.204     
2004 0.388      0.187      0.135      0.094      0.680      0.463      0.318      0.311      0.252      0.216      0.192     
Ecuador
1994 0.405      0.211      0.153      0.108      0.814      0.547      0.370      0.363      0.295      0.256      0.233     
1998 0.451      0.215      0.154      0.106      0.814      0.546      0.371      0.358      0.287      0.246      0.221     
2003 0.383      0.188      0.134      0.091      0.716      0.483      0.328      0.323      0.259      0.221      0.195     
El Salvador
1991 0.393      0.192      0.136      0.092      0.747      0.505      0.343      0.334      0.267      0.225      0.197     
2000 0.433      0.196      0.138      0.091      0.734      0.504      0.345      0.333      0.262      0.216      0.182     
2003 0.453      0.210      0.150      0.102      0.790      0.535      0.364      0.351      0.276      0.230      0.197     
Guatemala
2000 0.381      0.193      0.140      0.097      0.736      0.493      0.334      0.323      0.264      0.229      0.206     
Haiti 
2001 0.409      0.199      0.142      0.097      0.757      0.510      0.347      0.340      0.272      0.229      0.202     
Honduras
  Eph 1
1992 0.445      0.215      0.158      0.113      0.769      0.522      0.358      0.344      0.277      0.239      0.214     
1997 0.458      0.221      0.162      0.115      0.813      0.550      0.375      0.353      0.286      0.248      0.224     
  Eph 2
1997 0.435      0.215      0.159      0.114      0.786      0.532      0.363      0.345      0.279      0.243      0.221     
2003 0.395      0.190      0.137      0.094      0.715      0.484      0.330      0.322      0.263      0.229      0.207     
Jamaica
1990 0.562      0.256      0.189      0.136      0.892      0.601      0.411      0.390      0.303      0.249      0.211     
1999 0.524      0.234      0.168      0.116      0.889      0.602      0.411      0.387      0.313      0.284      0.289     
2002 0.524      0.240      0.174      0.123      0.871      0.589      0.400      0.378      0.295      0.244      0.209     
Mexico
1992 0.460      0.220      0.160      0.114      0.799      0.541      0.370      0.355      0.288      0.251      0.229     
1996 0.410      0.210      0.154      0.110      0.789      0.529      0.358      0.346      0.280      0.244      0.224     
2002 0.425      0.231      0.172      0.126      0.874      0.578      0.392      0.386      0.317      0.280      0.261     
Nicaragua
1993 0.468      0.218      0.157      0.109      0.818      0.550      0.375      0.359      0.289      0.248      0.222     
1998 0.430      0.209      0.150      0.103      0.805      0.539      0.365      0.355      0.287      0.249      0.226     
2001 0.379      0.186      0.133      0.091      0.707      0.472      0.321      0.321      0.260      0.224      0.202     
Panama
1995 0.500      0.223      0.159      0.109      0.824      0.558      0.381      0.364      0.291      0.247      0.218     
2003 0.505      0.232      0.171      0.122      0.845      0.572      0.392      0.366      0.297      0.259      0.235     
Paraguay
1997 0.573      0.244      0.177      0.124      0.859      0.583      0.401      0.378      0.303      0.260      0.236     
2002 0.577      0.281      0.215      0.164      1.004      0.666      0.456      0.428      0.354      0.322      0.314     
Peru
1997 0.409      0.194      0.140      0.096      0.709      0.483      0.330      0.322      0.259      0.221      0.195     
2002 0.368      0.177      0.126      0.086      0.652      0.445      0.304      0.299      0.244      0.210      0.187     
αα α
Rural
EGR (2) EGR (3) DER
 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. 
 
 
  57Table 4.10 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
Pure income polarisation indices and Gini coefficient 
1 1.3 1.6 1 1.3 1.6 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1 0 . 9 00 . 9 50 . 9 30 . 8 80 . 9 90 . 9 80 . 9 90 . 9 70 . 9 30 . 9 20 . 8 5
1 0 . 9 00 . 8 60 . 7 90 . 8 90 . 9 20 . 9 20 . 9 60 . 9 20 . 8 80 . 8 4
EGR (2) 1 1 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.90
1.3 1 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.90
1.6 1 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.88
EGR (3) 1 1 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.88
1.3 1 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.94 0.88
1.6 1 0.99 0.95 0.93 0.87
DER 0.25 1 0.97 0.95 0.90
0.5 1 0.99 0.96











Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
  58Table 4.11 
Changes (%) in polarisation measures and Gini coefficient   
                                       DER
Wolfson EGR (2) EGR (3) 0.25 0.5 0.75 Gini
Argentina
   1992-1998 18.1 11.8 10.1 6.1 3.5 0.1 11.5
   1998-2004 2.6 1.3 2.5 1.0 -0.5 -2.4 0.9
   1992-2004 21.9 14.1 13.5 8.6 4.9 -0.6 12.4
Bolivia
   1993-1997 (urb.) 4.2 3.7 2.1 1.6 2.0 2.3 -0.5
   1997-2002 4.7 2.1 3.9 2.5 3.4 5.7 3.6
    1993-2002 8.8 5.8 6.0 4.1 5.4 8.0 3.1
Brazil
   1990-1998 -6.4 -3.0 -2.1 -2.6 -1.9 1.6 -2.0
   1998-2003 -6.2 -4.7 -2.9 -2.8 -3.3 -1.2 -2.6
   1990-2003 -12.2 -7.6 -4.9 -5.3 -5.2 0.4 -4.6
Chile
   1990-1998 3.5 1.4 0.5 -0.4 -0.2 0.1 0.6
   1998-2003 -8.2 -4.4 -2.7 -2.0 -2.0 -2.2 -1.6
   1990-2003 -5.0 -3.1 -2.2 -2.3 -2.2 -2.1 -1.0
Colombia
   1992-2000 19.6 15.6 13.6 11.5 10.7 10.8 13.6
   2000-2004 5.2 -0.1 -0.7 3.8 -0.4 -2.6 -0.1
   1992-2004 24.9 15.5 12.9 15.3 10.2 8.2 13.5
Costa Rica
   1992-1997 1.7 2.0 1.4 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8 0.6
   1997-2002 12.5 12.0 9.5 6.6 7.1 8.8 9.1
   1992-2003 14.5 14.3 11.0 6.1 6.3 7.9 9.8
El Salvador
   1991-2003 -2.0 -5.4 -3.6 -2.7 -4.0 -6.0 -3.3
Honduras
   1992-1997 -3.7 0.7 2.0 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.1
   1997-2003 8.2 8.0 3.7 3.9 5.1 6.9 2.3
   1992-2003 4.6 8.8 5.6 5.5 6.9 8.8 4.4
Jamaica
   1990-1999 -2.1 4.7 4.0 2.8 7.4 18.2 -3.0
   1999-2002 -2.5 2.1 1.4 2.7 3.2 2.8 8.7
   1990-2002 -4.5 6.9 5.4 5.6 10.8 21.6 5.5
Mexico
   1992-1996 -0.8 -5.6 -4.2 -2.9 -3.5 -4.4 -2.7
   1996-2002 -1.6 -3.7 -2.7 -0.5 -2.5 -3.2 -6.2
   1992-2002 -2.5 -9.1 -6.8 -3.4 -5.9 -7.4 -8.7
Nicaragua
   1993-1998 -13.3 -6.8 -4.7 -3.0 -3.0 -3.4 -4.4
   1998-2001 0.8 2.2 1.1 -1.1 0.5 3.0 0.6
   1993-2001 -12.6 -4.7 -3.7 -4.1 -2.4 -0.5 -3.8
Panama
   1995-2003 4.9 3.3 2.5 2.0 4.7 9.0 1.7
Paraguay
   1997-2002 0.1 1.0 0.8 -0.6 -0.5 0.2 1.3
Peru
   1997-2002 -2.4 1.7 1.6 1.0 1.8 2.7 1.6
Uruguay
   1989-1998 9.7 7.2 4.3 3.2 1.8 0.5 3.9
   1998-2003 4.0 4.2 2.7 1.5 3.0 5.4 1.9
   1989-2003 14.1 11.7 7.1 4.7 4.9 5.9 5.9
Venezuela
   1989-1998 15.1 13.9 11.5 6.2 2.5 -3.9 10.9
   1998-2003 -0.8 -1.9 -2.2 -1.7 -1.7 -1.8 -2.0
   1989-2003 14.2 11.7 9.0 4.4 0.7 -5.6 8.7  
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
 
Table 4.12 
Changes (%) in polarisation measures and Gini coefficient  
                                       DER
Wolfson EGR (2) EGR (3) 0.25 0.5 0.75 Gini
Change in index (%)
South America 4.9 4.8 4.6 2.5 1.1 0.7 4.5
Central America 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.8 1.7 -0.3
Latin America 2.1 3.1 2.9 1.9 1.7 2.5 2.5
Change in coefficient of variation of index (%)
Latin America -35.7 -28.8 -25.4 -17.5 -9.1 4.3 -24.3  
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
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Table 5.1 
Pure income polarisation  
Individual labour income (earnings) 
Wolfson
1 1.3 1.6 1 1.3 1.6 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Argentina 
15 cities
1992 0.341     0.173     0.124     0.085     0.634     0.429     0.294     0.330     0.290     0.265     0.249    
1998 0.377   0.200   0.147   0.106   0.734   0.495   0.335   0.346   0.283   0.244   0.217   
28 cities
1998 0.392   0.201   0.147   0.104   0.739   0.498   0.338   0.335   0.276   0.239   0.213   
Bolivia
   Urban
1993 0.455   0.249   0.190   0.145   0.878   0.575   0.396   0.372   0.315   0.301   0.328   
1997 0.479   0.255   0.196   0.150   0.876   0.590   0.401   0.377   0.316   0.293   0.30  
2002 0.447   0.243   0.183   0.137   0.879   0.588   0.397   0.370   0.303   0.272   0.26  
   National
1997 0.497   0.260   0.198   0.151   0.924   0.621   0.422   0.405   0.342   0.328   0.36  
2002 0.507   0.247   0.183   0.132   0.930   0.626   0.424   0.394   0.323   0.295   0.30  
Brazil
1990 0.626   0.297   0.229   0.176   0.988   0.660   0.455   0.479   0.486   0.620   1.03  
1998 0.543   0.284   0.221   0.172   0.943   0.628   0.432   0.485   0.506   0.675   1.181   
2003 0.494   0.272   0.212   0.167   0.906   0.602   0.414   0.476   0.536   0.797   1.572   
Chile
1990 0.429   0.259   0.203   0.160   0.884   0.584   0.399   0.394   0.363   0.394   0.511   
1998 0.459   0.268   0.208   0.162   0.906   0.601   0.412   0.402   0.381   0.421   0.57  
2003 0.452   0.262   0.205   0.161   0.887   0.588   0.402   0.412   0.389   0.441   0.60  
Colombia
  ENH-Urban
1992 0.380     0.222     0.171     0.131     0.743     0.502     0.345     0.372     0.323     0.301     0.295    
2000 0.388     0.243     0.186     0.142     0.823     0.548     0.367     0.397     0.393     0.470     0.729    
ECH-Urban
2000 0.347     0.225     0.172     0.131     0.799     0.531     0.355     0.396     0.379     0.449     0.663    
2004 0.353     0.219     0.166     0.126     0.816     0.546     0.369     0.396     0.377     0.436     0.637    
Costa Rica
1992 0.313     0.164     0.116     0.078     0.640     0.431     0.292     0.297     0.245     0.218     0.211    
1997 0.346     0.172     0.122     0.081     0.677     0.457     0.311     0.306     0.246     0.208     0.181    
2003 0.371     0.195     0.142     0.100     0.729     0.489     0.331     0.335     0.276     0.247     0.241    
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.441     0.238     0.180     0.135     0.814     0.549     0.374     0.359     0.293     0.258     0.236    
2004 0.450     0.222     0.167     0.123     0.778     0.526     0.359     0.345     0.281     0.243     0.219    
Ecuador
1994 0.463     0.236     0.175     0.128     0.880     0.585     0.399     0.366     0.302     0.274     0.281    
1998 0.468     0.233     0.172     0.125     0.883     0.590     0.399     0.378     0.309     0.277     0.276    










1991 0.385     0.206     0.150     0.105     0.774     0.520     0.351     0.349     0.301     0.294     0.324    
2000 0.403     0.211     0.156     0.113     0.752     0.508     0.346     0.340     0.282     0.256     0.255    
2003 0.408     0.223     0.166     0.122     0.791     0.529     0.356     0.350     0.291     0.266     0.265    
Guatemala
2000 0.504     0.246     0.182     0.133     0.919     0.611     0.417     0.403     0.330     0.298     0.311    
Haiti 
2001 0.907     0.347     0.272     0.214     1.143     0.762     0.526     0.482     0.431     0.445     0.529    
Honduras
  Eph 1
1992 0.445     0.216     0.158     0.114     0.812     0.546     0.370     0.366     0.304     0.278     0.283    
1997 0.466     0.234     0.173     0.125     0.864     0.576     0.389     0.386     0.323     0.302     0.322    
  Eph 2
1997 0.449     0.230     0.174     0.130     0.845     0.562     0.386     0.361     0.302     0.281     0.291    
2003 0.494     0.226     0.164     0.115     0.846     0.571     0.388     0.373     0.304     0.272     0.269    
Jamaica
1990 0.317     0.172     0.123     0.084     0.656     0.437     0.300     0.303     0.253     0.227     0.213    
1999 0.249     0.135     0.094     0.063     0.650     0.440     0.301     0.297     0.257     0.241     0.242    
2002 0.339     0.202     0.152     0.113     0.710     0.463     0.318     0.318     0.266     0.241     0.232    
Mexico
1992 0.437     0.243     0.183     0.137     0.878     0.580     0.394     0.374     0.316     0.308     0.355    
1996 0.466     0.231     0.172     0.125     0.844     0.569     0.387     0.362     0.305     0.292     0.330    
2002 0.446     0.215     0.157     0.110     0.813     0.546     0.371     0.368     0.311     0.309     0.387    
Nicaragua
1993 0.524     0.238     0.174     0.123     0.891     0.602     0.409     0.392     0.318     0.284     0.278    
1998 0.477     0.246     0.183     0.134     0.914     0.604     0.412     0.386     0.313     0.278     0.265    
2001 0.493     0.257     0.194     0.145     0.949     0.627     0.426     0.395     0.325     0.296     0.289    
Panama
1995 0.420     0.214     0.157     0.112     0.786     0.527     0.357     0.354     0.283     0.240     0.212    
2003 0.428     0.225     0.165     0.117     0.852     0.573     0.388     0.387     0.338     0.340     0.409    
Paraguay
1997 0.414     0.214     0.155     0.109     0.827     0.549     0.372     0.367     0.301     0.270     0.269    
2002 0.478     0.219     0.157     0.108     0.863     0.576     0.394     0.364     0.300     0.269     0.262    
Peru
1997 0.441     0.212     0.152     0.104     0.821     0.552     0.375     0.362     0.292     0.255     0.242    
2002 0.479     0.236     0.173     0.124     0.911     0.606     0.414     0.384     0.312     0.278     0.264    
Suriname
1999 0.341     0.190     0.142     0.104     0.716     0.480     0.324     0.320     0.264     0.238     0.233    
Uruguay
1989 0.373     0.182     0.129     0.087     0.702     0.474     0.322     0.314     0.251     0.212     0.186    
1998 0.409     0.204     0.149     0.105     0.747     0.504     0.343     0.333     0.266     0.226     0.198    
2003 0.431     0.210     0.151     0.104     0.796     0.537     0.366     0.349     0.283     0.249     0.233    
Venezuela
1989 0.298     0.152     0.104     0.066     0.628     0.427     0.288     0.360     0.394     0.535     0.905    
1998 0.369     0.192     0.140     0.099     0.705     0.477     0.325     0.331     0.286     0.275     0.292    
2000 0.301     0.164     0.115     0.076     0.641     0.434     0.293     0.321     0.297     0.308     0.352    
2003 0.344     0.173     0.122     0.080     0.676     0.459     0.310     0.327     0.286     0.278     0.297    
EGR (2) EGR (3) DER
α α α
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
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Table 5.2 
Returns to college education in terms of hourly wages  
Coefficients of a Mincer equation  
Country Return Country Return Country Return
Argentina Costa Rica  Peru
EPH-15 cities 1992 0.81 ENAHO 1
1992 0.56 2003 0.92 1997 0.59
1998 0.78 Ecuador 1999 0.63
EPH - 28 cities ECV  ENAHO 2
1998 0.76 1994 0.62 2001 0.68
2003 0.78 1998 0.66 2002 0.73
Bolivia ENEMDU Uruguay
Urban 2003 0.65 1989 0.18
1993 0.96 El Salvador 1998 0.69
1997 1.18 1991 0.37 2004 0.71
2002 1.18 2003 0.79 Venezuela
National Honduras 1989 0.52
1997 1.15 1992 0.65 1998 0.59
2002 1.27 1997 0.82 2003 0.66
Brazil 2003 0.69
1990 0.81 Mexico
1993 0.85 1992 0.76
1998 0.96 1996 0.57
2003 1.06 2002 0.64
Chile Nicaragua
1990 0.92 1993 0.44
1998 1.01 1998 0.74
2003 0.98 2001 0.97
Colombia Panama
ENH-Urban 1995 0.81
1992 0.84 2001 1.01
2000 1.01 2003 0.88
ECH-Urban Paraguay
2000 1.05 1997 0.86
2004 1.04 2001 0.83
2003 0.74  
 
Source: Gasparini et al. (2006) based on household surveys. 
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Gini coefficient of years of education and  
gap of years of education by income quintiles 
Country Year (10-20)        (21-30)           (31-40)
Q5-Q1Q5/Q1 Gini Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1 Gini Q5-Q1Q5/Q1 Gini
Argentina 2004 2.0 1.3 0.215 4.6 1.5 0.166 6.1 1.7 0.197
Bolivia (nac.) 2002 2.8 1.5 0.257 6.7 2.2 0.288 8.6 3.2 0.363
Brazil 2003 3.2 1.7 0.284 6.5 2.2 0.277 7.5 2.9 0.346
Chile 2003 1.1 1.2 0.216 4.4 1.4 0.136 5.6 1.6 0.178
Colombia (urb.) 2004 2.0 1.3 0.233 3.6 1.4 0.194 5.6 1.8 0.262
Costa Rica 2003 2.4 1.5 0.239 6.1 2.0 0.249 6.4 2.1 0.267
Dominican Rep. 2004 2.3 1.4 0.263 5.2 1.8 0.270 5.6 1.9 0.302
Ecuador 2003 2.1 1.3 0.230 4.6 1.6 0.256 5.9 2.0 0.306
El Salvador 2003 2.9 1.6 0.323 6.1 2.2 0.327 6.6 2.4 0.399
Honduras 2003 3.1 1.8 0.323 5.9 2.5 0.350 6.7 3.0 0.413
Jamaica 2002 0.2 1.0 0.205 0.6 1.1 0.107 0.9 1.1 0.114
Mexico 2002 2.2 1.3 0.227 5.4 1.7 0.264 6.0 1.9 0.308
Nicaragua 2001 3.4 1.9 0.364 5.7 2.4 0.382 5.6 2.8 0.428
Panama 2003 2.8 1.5 0.247 7.3 2.1 0.240 7.7 2.2 0.261
Paraguay 2003 2.2 1.4 0.256 5.6 1.9 0.264 6.8 2.4 0.304
Peru 2003 3.4 1.7 0.263 6.8 2.2 0.259 6.9 2.4 0.309
Uruguay 2004 2.2 1.3 0.213 5.9 1.8 0.191 6.6 1.9 0.214
Venezuela 2003 1.8 1.3 0.246 4.6 1.6 0.244 5.3 1.8 0.267 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys. 
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Table 6.2 
Net enrolment rates  
Primary, secondary and tertiary levels 
                                          Primary                                           Secondary                               Tertiary
Male- Urban- Male- Urban- Male- Urban-
Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1 Female rural Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1 Female rural Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1 Female rural
Argentina
   EPH- 15 cities
1992 0.97 0.99 0.014 1.015 0.001 0.50 0.85 0.354 1.711 -0.093 0.17 0.47 0.297 2.709 -0.080
1995 0.98 1.00 0.018 1.019 -0.001 0.56 0.94 0.386 1.692 -0.059 0.12 0.56 0.441 4.753 -0.114
1998 0.98 1.00 0.016 1.016 -0.004 0.68 0.98 0.297 1.437 -0.040 0.08 0.61 0.524 7.433 -0.097
   EPH - 28 cities
1998 0.98 1.00 0.013 1.014 -0.003 0.66 0.97 0.301 1.453 -0.046 0.09 0.59 0.499 6.711 -0.101
2003 0.99 1.00 0.007 1.007 -0.002 0.77 0.97 0.205 1.267 -0.039 0.13 0.69 0.563 5.471 -0.106
   EPH-C
2004 0.98 1.00 0.018 1.019 -0.005 0.66 0.96 0.298 1.448 -0.042 0.11 0.65 0.536 5.704 -0.093
Bolivia
  Urban
1993 0.94 0.98 0.048 1.051 0.010 0.74 0.86 0.127 1.172 0.053 0.18 0.44 0.252 2.372 0.050
1997 0.96 0.99 0.029 1.030 -0.011 0.73 0.94 0.214 1.294 -0.022 0.17 0.46 0.289 2.692 0.008
2002 0.96 0.99 0.029 1.030 0.003 0.80 0.87 0.074 1.092 0.019 0.13 0.51 0.383 3.975 0.014
  National
1997 0.89 0.98 0.085 1.095 0.008 0.086 0.41 0.81 0.400 1.968 0.009 0.399 0.05 0.32 0.264 5.950 0.001 0.198
2002 0.88 0.98 0.105 1.120 0.008 0.062 0.43 0.84 0.405 1.932 0.002 0.334 0.02 0.38 0.356 17.588 -0.013 0.223
Brazil
1990 0.73 0.98 0.242 1.330 -0.020 0.182 0.07 0.61 0.540 8.830 -0.065 0.216 0.01 0.27 0.268 47.211 -0.023 0.087
1998 0.90 0.99 0.090 1.099 -0.005 0.047 0.16 0.79 0.639 5.112 -0.111 0.282 0.01 0.38 0.367 35.092 -0.029 0.107
2003 0.96 1.00 0.040 1.042 -0.006 0.020 0.32 0.90 0.573 2.772 -0.089 0.286 0.02 0.50 0.477 22.978 -0.044 0.148
Chile
1990 0.95 0.99 0.038 1.040 -0.004 0.057 0.50 0.78 0.287 1.578 -0.036 0.329 0.05 0.43 0.381 9.207 0.014 0.165
1998 0.97 1.00 0.026 1.027 -0.004 0.029 0.51 0.80 0.290 1.565 -0.039 0.208 0.09 0.67 0.580 7.347 -0.025 0.243
2003 0.99 1.00 0.010 1.011 -0.002 0.015 0.63 0.81 0.183 1.291 -0.034 0.131 0.13 0.68 0.547 5.276 -0.003 0.248
Colombia
  ENH-Urban
1992 0.88 0.97 0.095 1.108 -0.009 0.63 0.87 0.242 1.386 -0.037 0.14 0.43 0.292 3.072 -0.013
2000 0.92 0.98 0.056 1.060 -0.004 0.63 0.85 0.218 1.345 -0.013 0.17 0.60 0.427 3.512 0.029
 ECH-Urban
2000 0.89 0.99 0.108 1.122 -0.017 0.65 0.89 0.235 1.359 -0.020 0.18 0.55 0.371 3.082 -0.002
2004 0.95 0.99 0.033 1.035 -0.012 0.69 0.93 0.239 1.345 -0.057 0.24 0.52 0.275 2.135 -0.035
Costa Rica
1992 0.86 0.92 0.066 1.077 0.007 0.038 0.34 0.70 0.357 2.054 -0.030 0.301 0.07 0.25 0.180 3.441 -0.015 0.201
1997 0.91 0.99 0.077 1.085 -0.005 0.031 0.30 0.76 0.454 2.498 -0.062 0.289 0.04 0.31 0.266 7.549 -0.026 0.155
2003 0.96 1.00 0.034 1.036 -0.004 0.026 0.42 0.89 0.472 2.132 -0.082 0.227 0.03 0.41 0.380 13.316 -0.043 0.136
Dominican R.
2000 0.94 1.00 0.059 1.063 -0.012 0.026 0.18 0.66 0.483 3.646 -0.111 0.278 0.05 0.42 0.367 7.981 -0.096 0.164
2004 0.96 0.99 0.031 1.033 -0.011 -0.009 0.28 0.68 0.409 2.482 -0.149 0.185 0.05 0.41 0.359 8.094 -0.055 0.118
Ecuador
   ECV 
1994 0.88 0.98 0.105 1.119 0.000 0.030 0.27 0.76 0.487 2.776 -0.040 0.376 0.08 0.27 0.192 3.498 -0.018 0.166
1998 0.91 0.99 0.085 1.094 -0.035 0.041 0.33 0.87 0.538 2.621 -0.060 0.343 0.05 0.35 0.301 7.141 -0.027 0.160
   ENEMDU
2003 0.93 0.99 0.062 1.067 -0.009 0.027 0.49 0.81 0.320 1.653 -0.011 0.323 0.07 0.33 0.257 4.759 -0.042 0.203
El Salvador
1991 0.63 0.91 0.279 1.440 0.002 0.223 0.09 0.47 0.384 5.439 -0.025 0.288 0.00 0.08 0.073 22.620 0.001 0.046
2000 0.76 0.97 0.210 1.276 -0.006 0.121 0.08 0.48 0.400 5.858 -0.023 0.248 0.03 0.40 0.371 12.319 0.001 0.200
2003 0.80 0.95 0.154 1.193 -0.019 0.094 0.14 0.52 0.383 3.809 -0.037 0.261 0.07 0.31 0.244 4.593 -0.006 0.184
Guatemala
2000 0.71 0.94 0.229 1.322 0.048 0.107 0.10 0.55 0.448 5.601 0.026 0.357 0.02 0.27 0.251 17.292 -0.008 0.171
Haiti
2001 0.72 0.87 0.147 1.203 -0.016 0.120 0.15 0.30 0.151 1.994 0.003 0.119 0.01 0.07 0.058 9.438 0.021 0.028
Honduras
1992 0.78 0.93 0.146 1.186 -0.024 0.075 0.09 0.50 0.408 5.309 -0.038 0.244 0.01 0.15 0.140 22.136 0.007 0.088
1997 0.77 0.94 0.170 1.220 -0.025 0.082 0.11 0.50 0.386 4.515 -0.050 0.288 0.00 0.17 0.165 84.551 -0.006 0.106
2003 0.79 0.96 0.170 1.215 -0.012 0.076 0.12 0.61 0.491 5.011 -0.067 0.335 0.01 0.25 0.240 33.041 -0.025 0.136
Jamaica
1990 1.00 1.00 0.000 1.000 -0.006 -0.002 0.73 0.65 -0.076 0.895 -0.002 0.123 0.01 0.02 0.010 2.267 -0.018 0.012
1999 0.97 0.97 -0.004 0.996 -0.003 -0.002 0.73 0.75 0.017 1.024 -0.085 0.053 0.02 0.02 0.005 1.286 -0.032 0.051
2002 1.00 1.00 -0.001 0.999 -0.004 0.005 0.73 0.89 0.168 1.232 -0.062 0.030
Mexico
1992 0.87 0.97 0.099 1.113 0.004 0.070 0.29 0.79 0.504 2.735 -0.032 0.364 0.04 0.26 0.221 6.965 0.047 0.140
1996 0.94 0.99 0.046 1.049 -0.001 0.024 0.50 0.88 0.381 1.763 -0.005 0.355 0.07 0.30 0.222 4.020 0.034 0.146
2002 0.97 0.99 0.021 1.022 0.007 0.009 0.55 0.88 0.332 1.601 -0.022 0.188 0.08 0.33 0.252 4.338 0.009 0.174  
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
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Net enrolment rates  
Primary, secondary and tertiary levels 
                                          Primary                                           Secondary                               Tertiary
Male- Urban- Male- Urban- Male- Urban-
Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1 Female rural Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1 Female rural Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1 Female rural
Nicaragua
1993 0.91 0.99 0.077 1.085 -0.002 0.036 0.17 0.60 0.425 3.451 -0.029 0.380 0.02 0.09 0.071 4.605 0.004 0.041
1998 0.76 0.95 0.190 1.250 -0.048 0.110 0.19 0.60 0.412 3.165 -0.141 0.391 0.00 0.16 0.159 33.740 -0.001 0.099
2001 0.82 0.97 0.154 1.188 -0.018 0.111 0.20 0.69 0.491 3.461 -0.123 0.392 0.01 0.30 0.297 39.560 -0.040 0.149
Panama
1995 0.93 1.00 0.063 1.067 -0.015 0.037 0.39 0.94 0.547 2.396 -0.096 0.329 0.01 0.42 0.409 30.420 -0.056 0.183
2003 0.92 1.00 0.076 1.083 -0.002 0.046 0.48 0.94 0.463 1.972 -0.080 0.323 0.05 0.53 0.480 11.559 -0.101 0.207
Paraguay
1997 0.89 0.99 0.106 1.120 -0.004 0.032 0.30 0.80 0.499 2.664 -0.063 0.260 0.01 0.32 0.304 24.033 -0.037 0.134
2002 0.89 0.97 0.081 1.092 -0.007 0.029 0.43 0.79 0.358 1.832 -0.048 0.236 0.07 0.38 0.317 5.676 -0.080 0.147
2003 0.90 0.98 0.087 1.097 -0.005 0.053 0.43 0.78 0.353 1.820 -0.039 0.222 0.03 0.34 0.306 9.760 -0.074 0.145
Peru
1997 0.89 0.99 0.098 1.110 0.008 0.068 0.35 0.89 0.548 2.578 0.005 0.384 0.05 0.44 0.393 8.554 -0.050 0.230
2002 0.95 1.00 0.051 1.054 0.000 0.032 0.51 0.95 0.441 1.869 0.047 0.291 0.05 0.47 0.419 9.698 -0.024 0.201
Uruguay
1989 0.98 0.97 -0.009 0.991 -0.003 0.51 0.94 0.433 1.855 -0.061 0.05 0.30 0.247 5.759 -0.042
1998 0.98 1.00 0.019 1.019 -0.001 0.55 0.96 0.411 1.749 -0.058 0.02 0.47 0.449 19.861 -0.096
2003 0.98 0.98 0.001 1.001 0.003 0.66 0.97 0.302 1.454 -0.070 0.08 0.64 0.567 8.419 -0.102
2004 0.98 0.99 0.014 1.014 0.003 0.65 0.97 0.322 1.492 -0.062 0.06 0.64 0.579 11.280 -0.093
Venezuela
1989 0.86 0.97 0.115 1.133 -0.016 0.43 0.70 0.274 1.645 -0.165 0.11 0.35 0.239 3.237 -0.088
1998 0.92 0.98 0.062 1.067 -0.009 0.39 0.74 0.348 1.892 -0.138 0.11 0.42 0.308 3.790 -0.084
2000 0.93 0.98 0.052 1.056 -0.011 0.42 0.72 0.293 1.689 -0.119 0.12 0.42 0.308 3.637 -0.121
2003 0.92 0.98 0.063 1.069 -0.014 0.47 0.79 0.324 1.695 -0.124 0.14 0.52 0.383 3.696 -0.115  
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Educational mobility index 
13-19 20-25 13-19 20-25
Argentina El Salvador
   EPH-15 cities 1991 0.78 0.76
1995 0.87 0.79 2000 0.75 0.73
1998 0.87 0.78 2003 0.78 0.71
   EPH - 28 cities Guatemala
1998 0.86 0.77 2000 0.75 0.71
2003 0.89 0.80 Haiti
Bolivia 2001 0.89 0.84
  Urban Honduras
1993 0.87 0.87 1992 0.81 0.70
1997 0.90 0.80 1997 0.79 0.66
2002 0.89 0.83 2003 0.78 0.70
  National Jamaica
1997 0.78 0.69 1990 0.96 0.87
2002 0.82 0.71 1999 0.97 0.98
Brazil 2002 0.99 0.87
1990 0.74 0.71 Mexico
1998 0.77 0.71 1992 0.85 0.78
2003 0.81 0.75 1996 0.84 0.78
Chile 2002 0.85 0.73
1990 0.88 0.81 Nicaragua
1998 0.89 0.77 1993 0.77 0.78
2003 0.92 0.79 1998 0.76 0.74
Colombia 2001 0.78 0.72
  ENH-Urban Panama
1992 0.83 0.79 1995 0.82 0.74
2000 0.86 0.78 2003 0.83 0.74
ECH-Urban Paraguay
2000 0.85 0.77 1997 0.83 0.77
2004 0.85 0.76 2002 0.85 0.75
Costa Rica Peru
1992 0.81 0.73 1997 0.79 0.81
1997 0.82 0.75 2002 0.82 0.79
2003 0.83 0.73 Uruguay
Dominican R. 1989 0.90 0.80
2000 0.78 0.77 1998 0.86 0.76
2004 0.82 0.79 2003 0.82 0.69
Ecuador Venezuela
   ECV  1989 0.84 0.77
1994 0.79 0.76 1998 0.90 0.78
1998 0.78 0.71 2000 0.89 0.76
   ENEMDU
2003 0.81 0.73  
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
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Table 6.4 
Public school attendance 
Share of students in public institutions 
                                          Primary                                           Secondary                               Tertiary
Urban- Urban- Urban-
Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1 rural Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1 rural Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1 rural
Argentina
2004 0.94 0.33 -0.62 0.35 0.91 0.40 -0.51 0.44 0.89 0.70 -0.19 0.79
Bolivia
  Urban
1993 0.92 0.37 -0.55 0.41 0.91 0.37 -0.54 0.41 0.73 0.21 -0.52 0.29
1997 0.94 0.40 -0.55 0.42 0.93 0.30 -0.62 0.33 0.87 0.46 -0.41 0.53
2002
  National
1997 0.99 0.58 -0.41 0.59 -0.18 0.94 0.44 -0.50 0.47 -0.25 0.81 0.53 -0.28 0.66 -0.28
Chile
1990 0.98 0.41 -0.57 0.42 -0.08 0.98 0.68 -0.30 0.69 -0.06 0.53 0.49 -0.04 0.92 -0.08
1998 0.97 0.47 -0.50 0.48 0.01 0.98 0.67 -0.30 0.69 -0.01 0.42 0.53 0.12 1.28 -0.06
2003 0.99 0.58 -0.40 0.59 -0.07 0.99 0.62 -0.37 0.63 -0.07 0.47 0.41 -0.07 0.86 -0.02
Colombia
  ENH-Urban
1992 0.72 0.18 -0.54 0.25 0.62 0.18 -0.44 0.29 0.44 0.24 -0.20 0.54
2000 0.79 0.24 -0.54 0.31 0.77 0.18 -0.60 0.23 0.33 0.20 -0.12 0.63
 ECH-Urban
2000 0.83 0.30 -0.53 0.36 0.74 0.32 -0.42 0.43 0.35 0.23 -0.12 0.66
2004 0.95 0.46 -0.49 0.49 0.86 0.48 -0.38 0.56 0.34 0.38 0.04 1.11
Costa Rica
2003 0.99 0.60 -0.39 0.61 -0.11 1.00 0.72 -0.28 0.72 -0.10 0.69 0.43 -0.25 0.63 -0.09
Dominican R.
2004 0.92 0.41 -0.50 0.45 -0.21 0.88 0.50 -0.38 0.57 -0.17 0.59 0.36 -0.23 0.62 -0.09
El Salvador
1991 0.97 0.57 -0.40 0.59 -0.25 0.87 0.47 -0.40 0.54 -0.23 0.73 0.32 -0.41 0.44 -0.23
2000 0.97 0.48 -0.49 0.49 -0.25 0.79 0.37 -0.42 0.47 -0.24 0.25 0.23 -0.02 0.92 -0.42
2003 0.95 0.61 -0.34 0.64 -0.21 0.84 0.49 -0.35 0.58 -0.26 0.37 0.26 -0.11 0.70 -0.37
Guatemala
2000 0.96 0.65 -0.31 0.68 -0.20 0.51 0.27 -0.24 0.52 -0.16 0.70 0.44 -0.25 0.64 -0.35
Haiti
2001 0.31 0.19 -0.12 0.62 -0.06 0.29 0.21 -0.08 0.72 -0.13 0.76 0.25 -0.52 0.32 -0.06
Jamaica
1999 0.99 0.83 -0.16 0.84 -0.08 0.97 1.00 0.03 1.03 -0.05 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.06
2002 0.93 0.88 -0.06 0.94 -0.05 0.98 0.97 -0.01 0.99 0.00 -0.09
Mexico
1992 0.99 0.65 -0.34 0.66 -0.09 0.89 0.60 -0.29 0.67 -0.11 0.73 0.58 -0.15 0.79 -0.27
1996 0.98 0.73 -0.25 0.75 -0.08 0.95 0.81 -0.15 0.85 -0.07 0.85 0.63 -0.22 0.74 -0.11
2002 0.97 0.70 -0.27 0.72 -0.10 0.96 0.69 -0.27 0.72 -0.12 0.79 0.63 -0.16 0.80 0.17
Nicaragua
1993 0.98 0.73 -0.26 0.74 -0.13 0.82 0.66 -0.16 0.81 0.00 0.91 0.69 -0.22 0.76 -0.19
1998 0.95 0.66 -0.29 0.69 -0.16 0.81 0.47 -0.34 0.58 -0.14 0.25 0.43 0.18 1.70 -0.24
2001 0.97 0.63 -0.34 0.65 -0.16 0.81 0.49 -0.32 0.61 -0.17 0.11 0.13 0.02 1.16 -0.35
Paraguay
1997 0.98 0.52 -0.47 0.53 -0.21 0.92 0.54 -0.37 0.59 -0.28 0.67 0.44 -0.23 0.65 0.02
2002 0.97 0.51 -0.46 0.52 -0.16 0.97 0.57 -0.40 0.59 -0.16 0.41 0.44 0.03 1.08 -0.06
2003 0.96 0.49 -0.47 0.51 -0.23 0.93 0.52 -0.41 0.56 -0.24 0.44 0.37 -0.07 0.85 0.04
Peru
1997 0.99 0.52 -0.47 0.52 -0.18 0.99 0.62 -0.37 0.63 -0.11 0.76 0.32 -0.44 0.42 -0.25
2002 1.00 0.61 -0.39 0.61 -0.14 0.99 0.58 -0.41 0.59 -0.13 0.90 0.46 -0.43 0.52 -0.22
Uruguay
1998 0.99 0.40 -0.59 0.40 0.99 0.49 -0.50 0.49 0.99 0.86 -0.13 0.87
2003 0.99 0.41 -0.58 0.42 0.99 0.58 -0.42 0.58 0.98 0.83 -0.15 0.84
2004 0.99 0.38 -0.61 0.38 0.99 0.51 -0.48 0.51 0.99 0.84 -0.15 0.85  
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
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Housing ownership 
Share of households owning the dwelling and the lot 
                     National                       Urban
Rural Urban National Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1 Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1
Argentina
   EPH-15 cities
1992 0.73 0.62 0.74 0.12 1.19 0.62 0.74 0.12 1.19
1998 0.71 0.58 0.76 0.18 1.31 0.58 0.76 0.18 1.31
   EPH - 28 cities
1998 0.70 0.56 0.76 0.20 1.35 0.56 0.76 0.20 1.35
2004 0.68 0.57 0.74 0.17 1.30 0.57 0.74 0.17 1.30
Bolivia
  Urban
1993 0.56 0.48 0.63 0.15 1.31 0.48 0.63 0.15 1.31
2002 0.51 0.42 0.54 0.12 1.29 0.42 0.54 0.12 1.29
  National
2002 0.84 0.53 0.64 0.86 0.57 -0.29 0.66 0.47 0.57 0.09 1.20
Brazil
1992 0.58 0.65 0.63 0.56 0.70 0.14 1.25 0.59 0.70 0.11 1.19
1998 0.65 0.70 0.69 0.63 0.74 0.11 1.18 0.64 0.74 0.10 1.15
2003 0.66 0.70 0.69 0.63 0.76 0.13 1.20 0.64 0.75 0.11 1.17
Chile
1996 0.53 0.65 0.63 0.49 0.68 0.19 1.38 0.51 0.68 0.16 1.32
1998 0.56 0.67 0.65 0.53 0.71 0.18 1.34 0.55 0.71 0.16 1.29
2003 0.61 0.66 0.65 0.54 0.68 0.14 1.26 0.55 0.68 0.14 1.25
Colombia
ECV-National
2003 0.59 0.46 0.49 0.43 0.55 0.12 1.27 0.27 0.54 0.27 2.01
ECH-Urban
2004 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.63 0.05 1.09 0.58 0.63 0.05 1.09
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.80 0.62 0.68 0.73 0.68 -0.05 0.93 0.62 0.65 0.03 1.06
2004 0.78 0.61 0.67 0.70 0.64 -0.05 0.93 0.58 0.62 0.05 1.08
Ecuador
   ECV 
1994 0.78 0.62 0.68 0.73 0.68 -0.05 0.93 0.55 0.66 0.11 1.20
1998 0.78 0.60 0.67 0.76 0.63 -0.13 0.83 0.64 0.61 -0.03 0.95
   ENEMDU
2003 0.80 0.62 0.70 0.71 0.70 -0.01 0.98 0.57 0.66 0.09 1.15
El Salvador
1991 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.71 0.06 1.09 0.56 0.70 0.14 1.26
2003 0.75 0.66 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.01 1.02 0.62 0.72 0.10 1.16
Guatemala
   ENCOVI
2000 0.78 0.61 0.71 0.68 0.74 0.05 1.08 0.40 0.69 0.29 1.72
   ENEI
2002 0.80 0.60 0.72 0.87 0.69 -0.18 0.79 0.64 0.62 -0.02 0.96
Haiti
2001 0.81 0.45 0.67 0.55 0.62 0.07 1.12 0.39 0.42 0.03 1.08
Honduras
1992 0.82 0.67 0.76 0.81 0.74 -0.07 0.91 0.66 0.72 0.06 1.09
2003 0.75 0.62 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.00 1.00 0.64 0.67 0.03 1.05
Jamaica
1996 0.72 0.51 0.61 0.57 0.66 0.08 1.14 0.48 0.56 0.08 1.16
2002 0.71 0.51 0.62 0.65 0.58 -0.08 0.88 0.58 0.55 -0.03 0.95
Mexico 
1992 0.38 0.66 0.59 0.52 0.69 0.17 1.33 0.67 0.71 0.04 1.05
2002 0.49 0.67 0.63 0.56 0.70 0.14 1.24 0.60 0.69 0.09 1.16
Nicaragua
1998 0.74 0.82 0.79 0.74 0.82 0.08 1.11 0.77 0.84 0.07 1.09
2001 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.82 0.06 1.09 0.70 0.82 0.12 1.17
Paraguay
1997 0.86 0.71 0.77 0.87 0.73 -0.14 0.84 0.73 0.70 -0.03 0.96
2003 0.83 0.74 0.78 0.82 0.77 -0.05 0.93 0.75 0.75 0.00 1.00
Peru
   ENAHO 1
1997 0.86 0.61 0.70 0.81 0.67 -0.14 0.83 0.55 0.67 0.12 1.23
1999 0.87 0.66 0.72 0.81 0.73 -0.08 0.91 0.56 0.73 0.17 1.31
   ENAHO 2
2001 0.83 0.66 0.72 0.78 0.71 -0.07 0.91 0.53 0.72 0.19 1.36
2003 0.86 0.70 0.76 0.85 0.75 -0.10 0.88 0.69 0.76 0.07 1.10
Suriname
1999 0.67 0.71 0.59 -0.11 0.84 0.71 0.59 -0.11 0.84
Uruguay
1989 0.67 0.67 0.39 0.84 0.45 2.15 0.39 0.84 0.45 2.14
1998 0.69 0.69 0.44 0.83 0.39 1.88 0.44 0.83 0.39 1.88
2004 0.67 0.67 0.40 0.82 0.42 2.05 0.40 0.82 0.42 2.05
Venezuela
1989 0.65 0.76 0.80 0.72 -0.08 0.90 0.67 0.66 -0.01 0.98
1998 0.75 0.78 0.76 0.78 0.03 1.04 0.71 0.78 0.07 1.09
2003 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.72 -0.06 0.93 0.86 0.72 -0.14 0.83  
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
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Table 7.2 
Access to a water source in the house or lot 
                     National                       Urban
Rural Urban National Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1 Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1
Argentina
   EPH-15 cities
1992 0.97 0.93 1.00 0.07 1.07 0.93 1.00 0.07 1.07
1998 0.98 0.94 1.00 0.06 1.07 0.94 1.00 0.06 1.07
   EPH - 28 cities
1998 0.98 0.93 1.00 0.07 1.08 0.93 1.00 0.07 1.08
2003 0.99 0.93 1.00 0.06 1.07 0.93 1.00 0.06 1.07
Bolivia
  Urban
1993 0.86 0.73 0.96 0.23 1.31 0.73 0.96 0.23 1.31
2002 0.90 0.88 0.97 0.10 1.11 0.88 0.97 0.10 1.11
  National
1997 0.29 0.89 0.65 0.39 0.89 0.49 2.26 0.80 0.96 0.15 1.19
2002 0.54 0.91 0.77 0.51 0.92 0.41 1.81 0.88 0.96 0.08 1.09
Brazil
1992 0.77      0.96      0.92      0.78 0.99 0.22 1.28 0.86 1.00 0.14 1.16
1998 0.78      0.98      0.94      0.83 1.00 0.17 1.20 0.92 1.00 0.08 1.08
2003 0.81      0.98      0.96      0.88 1.00 0.11 1.13 0.94 1.00 0.05 1.06
Chile
1990 0.46 0.98 0.88 0.80 0.96 0.16 1.20 0.94 1.00 0.06 1.06
1996 0.50 0.99 0.91 0.82 0.97 0.16 1.19 0.96 0.99 0.04 1.04
1998 0.52 0.99 0.92 0.84 0.98 0.14 1.16 0.97 1.00 0.03 1.03
2003 0.58 0.99 0.93 0.90 0.99 0.08 1.09 0.98 1.00 0.02 1.02
Colombia
ECV-National
2003 0.72 0.96 0.23 1.32 0.94 0.99 0.05 1.05
ECH-Urban
2004 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.95 0.07 1.08 0.88 0.95 0.07 1.08
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.49 0.86 0.74 0.56 0.87 0.31 1.55 0.76 0.92 0.16 1.21
2004 0.56 0.83 0.74 0.56 0.88 0.32 1.57 0.70 0.92 0.21 1.30
Ecuador
   ECV 
1994 0.40 0.74 0.59 0.41 0.79 0.39 1.95 0.62 0.87 0.24 1.39
1998 0.50 0.84 0.70 0.55 0.86 0.31 1.55 0.76 0.90 0.14 1.18
   ENEMDU
2003 0.54 0.89 0.73 0.64 0.87 0.23 1.36 0.84 0.95 0.11 1.13
El Salvador
1991 0.17 0.72 0.46 0.21 0.76 0.55 3.69 0.45 0.89 0.44 1.96
2003 0.34 0.74 0.59 0.39 0.81 0.41 2.04 0.59 0.88 0.30 1.51
Guatemala
   ENCOVI
2000 0.54 0.88 0.69 0.55 0.85 0.30 1.54 0.78 0.97 0.19 1.24
   ENEI
2002 0.65 0.92 0.76 0.71 0.88 0.17 1.24 0.82 0.96 0.15 1.18
Haiti
2001 0.08 0.23 0.14 0.09 0.25 0.16 2.85 0.15 0.35 0.20 2.36
Honduras
1992 0.09 0.39 0.22 0.06 0.50 0.44 8.85 0.18 0.64 0.47 3.68
2003 0.14 0.54 0.34 0.13 0.66 0.54 5.31 0.32 0.76 0.44 2.39
Jamaica
1990 0.19      0.57      0.41      0.50 0.50 0.00 1.01 0.60 0.56 -0.04 0.93
1996 0.23      0.63      0.44      0.46 0.60 0.14 1.30 0.59 0.73 0.13 1.23
2002 0.23      0.66      0.42      0.50 0.55 0.05 1.10 0.63 0.78 0.15 1.24
Mexico 
1992 0.63 0.93 0.86 0.68 0.96 0.28 1.42 0.89 0.97 0.07 1.08
2002 0.70 0.96 0.90 0.75 0.99 0.24 1.32 0.90 0.99 0.10 1.11
Nicaragua
1993 0.28 0.86 0.62 0.35 0.85 0.50 2.42 0.80 0.92 0.12 1.15
1998 0.31 0.84 0.61 0.37 0.79 0.42 2.15 0.65 0.92 0.27 1.41
2001 0.26 0.84 0.61 0.37 0.83 0.46 2.26 0.68 0.93 0.25 1.37
Paraguay
1997 0.21      0.80      0.55      0.13 0.88 0.76 6.90 0.39 0.94 0.55 2.42
2003 0.50      0.91      0.74      0.45 0.92 0.47 2.04 0.76 0.98 0.22 1.29
Peru
   ENAHO 1
1997 0.18 0.80 0.59 0.22 0.86 0.65 4.00 0.62 0.90 0.28 1.45
1999 0.27 0.83 0.65 0.32 0.90 0.58 2.80 0.73 0.92 0.20 1.27
   ENAHO 2
2001 0.36 0.78 0.64 0.39 0.85 0.46 2.19 0.62 0.88 0.26 1.43
2003 0.29 0.78 0.61 0.31 0.89 0.58 2.89 0.56 0.91 0.35 1.62
Suriname
1999 0.87 0.88 0.93 0.05 1.05 0.88 0.93 0.05 1.05
Uruguay
1989 0.93 0.93 0.79 0.99 0.20 1.25 0.79 0.99 0.20 1.25
1998 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.99 0.06 1.06 0.93 0.99 0.06 1.06
2004 0.99 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.03 1.03 0.97 1.00 0.03 1.03
Venezuela
1989 1.00 0.92 0.83 0.98 0.15 1.18 0.98 1.00 0.01 1.01
1998 0.99 0.93 0.87 0.97 0.10 1.11 0.97 1.00 0.03 1.03
2003 0.99 0.92 0.86 0.97 0.11 1.12 0.97 0.99 0.02 1.02  
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
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Access to electricity in the house  
                     National                       Urban
Rural Urban National Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1 Q1 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5/Q1
Argentina
   EPH-15 cities
1992
1998 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.01 1.01 0.99 1.00 0.01 1.01
   EPH - 28 cities
1998 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.02 1.02 0.98 1.00 0.02 1.02
2003 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.02 1.02 0.98 1.00 0.02 1.02
Bolivia
  Urban
1993 0.96 0.93 0.99 0.06 1.07 0.93 0.99 0.06 1.07
2002 0.90 0.86 0.95 0.09 1.10
  National
1997 0.25 0.96 0.67 0.34 0.92 0.58 2.68 0.89 0.99 0.10 1.12
2000 0.25 0.96 0.70 0.25 0.95 0.70 3.81 0.91 1.00 0.08 1.09
Brazil
1990 0.56      0.98      0.88      0.68 0.99 0.31 1.46 0.91 1.00 0.09 1.10
1998 0.73      0.99      0.94      0.84 1.00 0.16 1.20 0.97 1.00 0.03 1.03
2003 0.82      1.00      0.97      0.92 1.00 0.08 1.09 0.98 1.00 0.02 1.02
Chile
1990 0.63 0.99 0.92 0.86 0.97 0.11 1.12 0.97 1.00 0.03 1.03
1998 0.82 1.00 0.97 0.94 1.00 0.06 1.06 0.99 1.00 0.01 1.01
2003 0.87 1.00 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.02 1.02 0.99 1.00 0.01 1.01
Colombia
ECV-National
2003 0.89 0.99 0.11 1.12 0.99 1.00 0.01 1.01
ECH-Urban
2004 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.95 0.06 1.07 0.89 0.95 0.06 1.07
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.74 0.97 0.89 0.72 0.97 0.26 1.36 0.89 0.99 0.09 1.11
2004 0.80 0.96 0.90 0.81 0.97 0.16 1.20 0.91 0.98 0.08 1.09
Ecuador
   ECV 
1994 0.71 0.99 0.87 0.71 0.96 0.25 1.35 0.98 1.00 0.02 1.02
1998 0.82 1.00 0.93 0.81 0.99 0.18 1.22 0.99 1.00 0.01 1.01
   ENEMDU
2003 0.86 0.99 0.93 0.87 0.98 0.11 1.12 0.97 1.00 0.02 1.02
El Salvador
1991 0.44 0.94 0.70 0.43 0.92 0.49 2.13 0.79 0.99 0.19 1.24
2003 0.60 0.91 0.79 0.56 0.95 0.39 1.70 0.78 0.98 0.20 1.25
Guatemala
   ENCOVI
2000 0.57 0.94 0.73 0.49 0.89 0.40 1.81 0.83 0.98 0.14 1.17
   ENEI
2002 0.67 0.96 0.79 0.60 0.92 0.32 1.53 0.84 0.99 0.15 1.17
Haiti
2001 0.10 0.62 0.31 0.18 0.56 0.38 3.19 0.37 0.84 0.46 2.24
Honduras
1992 0.31 0.90 0.57 0.31 0.84 0.52 2.66 0.74 0.98 0.25 1.34
2003 0.38 0.95 0.66 0.36 0.92 0.56 2.53 0.84 0.99 0.15 1.18
Jamaica
1990 0.51 0.81 0.69 0.71 0.83 0.11 1.16 0.79 0.88 0.08 1.11
1996 0.67 0.86 0.77 0.70 0.91 0.21 1.29 0.81 0.93 0.12 1.15
2002 0.82 0.93 0.87 0.87 0.92 0.06 1.06 0.91 0.98 0.07 1.08
Mexico 
1992 0.76 0.99 0.93 0.78 0.98 0.20 1.26 0.96 0.99 0.03 1.03
2002 0.92 0.99 0.98 0.92 1.00 0.07 1.08 0.97 1.00 0.03 1.03
Nicaragua
1993 0.42 0.93 0.72 0.44 0.94 0.50 2.14 0.82 0.98 0.16 1.20
1998 0.40 0.91 0.69 0.41 0.88 0.47 2.16 0.72 0.99 0.26 1.36
2001 0.41 0.92 0.72 0.47 0.91 0.44 1.94 0.79 0.98 0.20 1.25
Paraguay
1997 0.72      0.98      0.86      0.68 0.98 0.30 1.44 0.89 1.00 0.11 1.13
2003 0.85      0.98      0.93      0.81 0.98 0.18 1.22 0.91 1.00 0.08 1.09
Peru
   ENAHO 1
1997 0.24 0.92 0.69 0.23 0.95 0.72 4.06 0.69 0.97 0.28 1.41
1999 0.29 0.95 0.74 0.36 0.97 0.62 2.74 0.89 0.99 0.10 1.11
   ENAHO 2
2001 0.28 0.92 0.70 0.35 0.94 0.59 2.70 0.79 0.98 0.19 1.24
2003 0.27 0.94 0.70 0.33 0.96 0.63 2.92 0.81 0.97 0.16 1.20
Suriname
1999 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.00 1.00
Uruguay
1989 0.97 0.97 0.88 1.00 0.11 1.13 0.88 1.00 0.11 1.13
1998 0.99 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.03 1.03 0.97 1.00 0.03 1.03
Venezuela
1989 1.00 0.97 0.93 0.99 0.06 1.07 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
1998 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.02 1.02 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
2003 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.01 1.01  
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
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Household per capita incomes by deciles 
Venezuela, 1989 and 2003  
Deciles Mean CV Mean CV  D Mean  D CV
1 0.186 0.061 0.138 0.057 -26% -7%
2 0.330 0.033 0.281 0.034 -15% 4%
3 0.438 0.031 0.394 0.033 -10% 7%
4 0.550 0.034 0.505 0.034 -8% 0%
5 0.674 0.037 0.627 0.038 -7% 2%
6 0.815 0.045 0.775 0.049 -5% 11%
7 0.986 0.055 0.956 0.057 -3% 3%
8 1.217 0.079 1.220 0.096 0% 21%
9 1.605 0.161 1.670 0.179 4% 12%
10 3.205 2.193 3.437 2.295 7% 5%
1989 2003
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys 
Note: CV=coefficient of variation 
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DER index by region 
0.25 0.5 0.75 1 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Argentina 
15 cities
1992 0.324 0.267 0.237 0.223 0.316 0.258 0.222 0.198 0.317 0.257 0.222 0.198 0.333 0.270 0.235 0.212 0.322 0.259 0.220 0.192
1998 0.361 0.294 0.261 0.250 0.330 0.272 0.246 0.247 0.329 0.266 0.228 0.203 0.356 0.288 0.249 0.225 0.341 0.277 0.243 0.231 0.366 0.296 0.258 0.234
28 cities
1998 0.361 0.294 0.261 0.250 0.331 0.265 0.224 0.195 0.337 0.274 0.239 0.217 0.356 0.287 0.248 0.223 0.341 0.277 0.243 0.231
2004 0.365 0.298 0.263 0.251 0.346 0.283 0.253 0.245 0.336 0.267 0.226 0.198 0.356 0.286 0.246 0.220 0.353 0.280 0.235 0.205 0.353 0.284 0.243 0.216
Bolivia
   Urban
1993 0.368 0.291 0.246 0.216 0.377 0.312 0.283 0.271 0.377 0.316 0.291 0.286 0.340 0.273 0.233 0.206 0.365 0.294 0.256 0.232 0.327 0.262 0.222 0.195 0.335 0.281 0.255 0.243
1997 0.349 0.284 0.248 0.229 0.389 0.328 0.303 0.295 0.369 0.306 0.277 0.265 0.346 0.287 0.258 0.245 0.349 0.277 0.232 0.201 0.336 0.273 0.243 0.233 0.352 0.284 0.245 0.219
2002 0.415 0.349 0.324 0.322 0.365 0.294 0.256 0.232 0.361 0.291 0.252 0.227 0.365 0.285 0.238 0.206 0.341 0.274 0.233 0.206 0.347 0.278 0.238 0.210 0.382 0.308 0.269 0.245
   National
1997 0.460 0.408 0.422 0.484 0.404 0.331 0.298 0.288 0.409 0.337 0.308 0.303 0.390 0.316 0.279 0.261 0.346 0.277 0.235 0.208 0.404 0.334 0.306 0.299 0.381 0.313 0.280 0.265
2002 0.536 0.531 0.648 0.905 0.392 0.319 0.284 0.270 0.432 0.372 0.370 0.415 0.387 0.301 0.251 0.217 0.411 0.319 0.263 0.225 0.383 0.301 0.254 0.222 0.395 0.313 0.269 0.241
   Urban
1993 0.328 0.279 0.259 0.255
1997 0.324 0.256 0.211 0.179
2002 0.347 0.276 0.234 0.206 0.359 0.264 0.206 0.166
   National
1997 0.359 0.281 0.233 0.199 0.396 0.328 0.300 0.292
2002 0.359 0.283 0.237 0.206 0.365 0.286 0.239 0.206
Brazil
1990 0.410 0.344 0.319 0.319 0.421 0.363 0.349 0.364 0.398 0.332 0.305 0.302 0.394 0.326 0.295 0.284 0.414 0.349 0.326 0.326
1998 0.401 0.337 0.311 0.309 0.414 0.356 0.345 0.369 0.393 0.331 0.308 0.316 0.385 0.319 0.289 0.279 0.413 0.350 0.331 0.335
2003 0.377 0.313 0.288 0.289 0.407 0.344 0.325 0.343 0.391 0.328 0.305 0.310 0.369 0.303 0.271 0.259 0.399 0.334 0.310 0.311
Chile
1990 0.380 0.318 0.291 0.281 0.369 0.297 0.258 0.234 0.376 0.314 0.286 0.275 0.366 0.302 0.271 0.256 0.366 0.301 0.269 0.252 0.347 0.282 0.247 0.225 0.396 0.335 0.312 0.307
1998 0.352 0.284 0.242 0.215 0.371 0.313 0.291 0.288 0.357 0.296 0.266 0.255 0.363 0.304 0.278 0.267 0.369 0.301 0.265 0.244 0.359 0.301 0.274 0.263 0.356 0.296 0.267 0.252
2003 0.363 0.296 0.256 0.230 0.331 0.274 0.244 0.230 0.332 0.267 0.227 0.200 0.380 0.318 0.289 0.276 0.333 0.272 0.239 0.219 0.323 0.263 0.230 0.208 0.363 0.303 0.275 0.262
1990 0.386 0.321 0.293 0.282 0.397 0.330 0.300 0.287 0.399 0.337 0.314 0.307 0.356 0.296 0.268 0.257 0.365 0.300 0.269 0.253 0.386 0.320 0.290 0.278
1998 0.395 0.328 0.298 0.286 0.410 0.344 0.319 0.315 0.363 0.295 0.259 0.237 0.413 0.351 0.326 0.322 0.381 0.320 0.290 0.276 0.390 0.324 0.295 0.284
2003 0.375 0.310 0.278 0.263 0.407 0.343 0.315 0.306 0.367 0.304 0.274 0.260 0.368 0.295 0.253 0.227 0.368 0.305 0.273 0.259 0.388 0.326 0.301 0.291
Colombia
  ENH-Urban
1992 0.332 0.270 0.236 0.214 0.323 0.265 0.233 0.213 0.340 0.276 0.242 0.222 0.362 0.295 0.259 0.238 0.373 0.304 0.268 0.248
2000 0.369 0.306 0.278 0.269 0.345 0.277 0.239 0.214 0.377 0.301 0.261 0.236 0.380 0.311 0.278 0.267 0.404 0.325 0.286 0.262
ECH-Urban
2000 0.365 0.297 0.262 0.242 0.351 0.288 0.258 0.245 0.352 0.289 0.258 0.246 0.419 0.354 0.329 0.328 0.402 0.336 0.310 0.307
2004 0.351 0.287 0.254 0.238 0.392 0.328 0.305 0.310 0.380 0.309 0.276 0.270 0.356 0.285 0.244 0.217 0.400 0.331 0.301 0.290
Costa Rica
1992 0.316 0.254 0.217 0.191 0.329 0.265 0.229 0.206 0.301 0.242 0.206 0.183 0.333 0.263 0.220 0.190 0.296 0.240 0.206 0.184 0.337 0.274 0.238 0.216
1997 0.311 0.252 0.216 0.191 0.339 0.274 0.237 0.215 0.322 0.258 0.220 0.193 0.343 0.278 0.244 0.224 0.305 0.247 0.213 0.192 0.320 0.258 0.222 0.200
2003 0.338 0.273 0.237 0.214 0.371 0.293 0.247 0.217 0.324 0.260 0.222 0.195 0.350 0.281 0.240 0.213 0.318 0.257 0.221 0.198 0.354 0.282 0.239 0.210
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.365 0.299 0.265 0.247 0.338 0.275 0.239 0.216 0.341 0.278 0.243 0.224 0.351 0.282 0.241 0.214 0.325 0.264 0.229 0.209
2004 0.382 0.316 0.282 0.264 0.328 0.266 0.231 0.208 0.329 0.270 0.238 0.218 0.336 0.270 0.231 0.205 0.338 0.274 0.238 0.213
Ecuador
1994 0.359 0.290 0.253 0.233 0.391 0.322 0.291 0.280 0.413 0.346 0.327 0.339
1998 0.378 0.306 0.273 0.259 0.394 0.320 0.281 0.262 0.387 0.303 0.251 0.215
2003 0.359 0.293 0.258 0.239 0.363 0.294 0.257 0.237 0.360 0.290 0.251 0.227
El Salvador
1991 0.340 0.276 0.240 0.218 0.345 0.276 0.237 0.212 0.354 0.283 0.241 0.215 0.369 0.297 0.258 0.236 0.337 0.277 0.246 0.230
2000 0.349 0.275 0.228 0.195 0.330 0.259 0.214 0.181 0.355 0.278 0.230 0.196 0.364 0.288 0.242 0.212 0.340 0.279 0.247 0.227
2003 0.355 0.284 0.243 0.218 0.335 0.264 0.219 0.187 0.362 0.289 0.248 0.225 0.372 0.293 0.244 0.211 0.337 0.275 0.243 0.225
Guatemala
2000 0.393 0.322 0.290 0.282 0.353 0.288 0.252 0.232 0.339 0.274 0.237 0.214
Haiti 
2001 0.394 0.324 0.292 0.278 0.336 0.268 0.228 0.202 0.404 0.330 0.293 0.274 0.420 0.350 0.325 0.328 0.406 0.337 0.306 0.296 0.366 0.297 0.261 0.242
2001 0.342 0.268 0.222 0.190 0.341 0.275 0.238 0.216
Honduras
  Eph 1
1992 0.353 0.284 0.245 0.221 0.361 0.294 0.257 0.235 0.370 0.304 0.272 0.258 0.359 0.280 0.231 0.197 0.354 0.288 0.252 0.233 0.347 0.276 0.234 0.205
1997 0.359 0.296 0.264 0.249 0.331 0.271 0.237 0.217 0.385 0.317 0.285 0.270 0.415 0.344 0.315 0.312 0.405 0.336 0.306 0.293 0.355 0.282 0.240 0.211
  Eph 2
1997 0.360 0.296 0.263 0.246 0.328 0.268 0.233 0.211 0.381 0.316 0.285 0.271 0.390 0.319 0.283 0.273 0.382 0.314 0.281 0.264 0.364 0.297 0.262 0.243
2003 0.357 0.288 0.249 0.225 0.347 0.284 0.248 0.227 0.335 0.270 0.232 0.206 0.380 0.314 0.282 0.267 0.374 0.310 0.280 0.267 0.352 0.290 0.259 0.242
Jamaica
1990 0.367 0.283 0.230 0.192 0.416 0.318 0.255 0.211 0.403 0.313 0.259 0.222
1999 0.426 0.354 0.333 0.355 0.379 0.289 0.232 0.193 0.398 0.326 0.300 0.314
2002 0.426 0.326 0.267 0.227 0.432 0.360 0.336 0.351 0.390 0.305 0.254 0.219
Mexico
1992 0.369 0.293 0.249 0.220 0.365 0.290 0.248 0.220 0.410 0.334 0.297 0.276 0.364 0.301 0.269 0.254 0.391 0.325 0.294 0.284
1996 0.334 0.273 0.240 0.222 0.356 0.293 0.261 0.244 0.355 0.283 0.240 0.212 0.347 0.280 0.244 0.220 0.372 0.304 0.271 0.255
2002 0.338 0.270 0.229 0.201 0.350 0.283 0.246 0.225 0.357 0.301 0.276 0.267 0.353 0.286 0.246 0.219 0.354 0.284 0.246 0.222
1992 0.370 0.301 0.268 0.256 0.371 0.297 0.254 0.225 0.351 0.281 0.241 0.215
1996 0.376 0.308 0.274 0.255 0.373 0.310 0.281 0.271 0.408 0.330 0.291 0.268
2002 0.376 0.304 0.265 0.245 0.344 0.279 0.245 0.224 0.341 0.274 0.234 0.207
Nicaragua
1993 0.375 0.305 0.268 0.250 0.392 0.320 0.284 0.266 0.378 0.306 0.269 0.249 0.368 0.300 0.263 0.242
1998 0.385 0.320 0.291 0.280 0.344 0.278 0.241 0.218 0.364 0.294 0.255 0.233 0.411 0.341 0.309 0.297
2001 0.401 0.337 0.309 0.300 0.339 0.281 0.251 0.236 0.342 0.281 0.248 0.228 0.352 0.291 0.261 0.247
Panama
1995 0.415 0.319 0.261 0.221 0.367 0.292 0.250 0.222 0.402 0.328 0.293 0.277 0.364 0.293 0.253 0.229
2003 0.388 0.308 0.263 0.234 0.366 0.295 0.255 0.230 0.378 0.311 0.278 0.262 0.370 0.304 0.272 0.254
Paraguay
1997 0.344 0.277 0.238 0.212 0.313 0.254 0.218 0.195 0.291 0.242 0.209 0.186 0.394 0.324 0.290 0.274 0.393 0.320 0.285 0.274
2002 0.365 0.298 0.264 0.247 0.329 0.261 0.218 0.188 0.347 0.271 0.220 0.183 0.371 0.302 0.266 0.247 0.443 0.372 0.347 0.348
Peru
1997 0.306 0.248 0.212 0.188 0.314 0.254 0.217 0.191 0.322 0.260 0.224 0.201 0.319 0.260 0.225 0.202 0.333 0.268 0.230 0.206 0.327 0.261 0.218 0.189 0.347 0.287 0.257 0.241
2002 0.300 0.247 0.218 0.199 0.325 0.265 0.230 0.208 0.314 0.259 0.229 0.209 0.286 0.235 0.203 0.181 0.319 0.260 0.225 0.203 0.285 0.235 0.205 0.185 0.361 0.302 0.275 0.263
Suriname
1999 0.353 0.271 0.219 0.182 0.356 0.273 0.221 0.183 0.376 0.281 0.218 0.174 0.411 0.293 0.220 0.170 0.341 0.243 0.179 0.135 0.383 0.270 0.198 0.149
1999 0.254 0.202 0.162 0.132 0.348 0.264 0.205 0.163
Uruguay
1989 0.292 0.237 0.203 0.179 0.333 0.273 0.240 0.222 0.346 0.287 0.258 0.243 0.290 0.237 0.205 0.183 0.274 0.228 0.200 0.182
1998 0.314 0.250 0.210 0.183 0.304 0.247 0.211 0.186 0.307 0.249 0.213 0.189 0.292 0.238 0.205 0.182 0.292 0.236 0.201 0.176
2003 0.328 0.264 0.226 0.200 0.277 0.230 0.201 0.182 0.302 0.249 0.218 0.198 0.294 0.242 0.211 0.191 0.283 0.234 0.203 0.182
Venezuela
1989 0.303 0.249 0.218 0.200 0.287 0.234 0.200 0.176 0.303 0.249 0.218 0.200 0.288 0.235 0.201 0.176 0.317 0.257 0.221 0.200 0.293 0.240 0.207 0.186 0.297 0.245 0.213 0.191
1998 0.338 0.273 0.235 0.212 0.316 0.252 0.211 0.183 0.333 0.267 0.228 0.201 0.306 0.245 0.206 0.178 0.320 0.256 0.216 0.188 0.335 0.266 0.224 0.195 0.329 0.265 0.225 0.198
2000 0.315 0.255 0.219 0.196 0.300 0.244 0.211 0.190 0.321 0.258 0.219 0.193 0.319 0.255 0.215 0.187 0.308 0.248 0.211 0.186 0.318 0.256 0.220 0.196 0.329 0.262 0.221 0.192
2003 0.330 0.267 0.231 0.209 0.304 0.244 0.206 0.180 0.336 0.270 0.232 0.209 0.339 0.268 0.226 0.196 0.306 0.247 0.210 0.185 0.346 0.276 0.234 0.206 0.338 0.267 0.223 0.192
Los Andes Nor - Oriental Guayana Capital Central Centro Occidental Zuliana
8
Montevideo Interior Norte Interior Centro Norte Interior Centro Sur Interior Sur
Selva rural Lima Metrop.
1 2 3 456
7
Resto Rural
Costa urbana Sierra urbana Selva urbana Costa rural Sierra rural
Asuncion Central Urbano Central Rural Resto Urbano
Oriental Metropolitana Central Occidental
Península de Yucatán
Managua Pacífico Central Atlántico
Centro-Occidente Centro-Este
Sur Oriente
KMA Other Towns Rural Areas
Noroeste Norte Noreste
Metropolitana Norte Occidente Sur Oriente Central
Artibonite   Centre      
Sud          Grand Anse  
Ouest        Sud Est      Nord         Nord Est    
Oriental Area Metrop. SS
Urbano metropolitano Resto Urbano Resto rural
Costa Sierra Oriente
Occidental Central 1 Central 2
56
Distrito Santiago Cibao Suroeste Sureste
1234
13
Atlántica Oriental Central Pacífica  Bogotá





Norte Nordeste Sudeste Sur Centro-Oeste
Potosi Tarija Santa Cruz
Beni
Chuquisaca La Paz Cochabamba Oruro
GBA Pampeana Cuyo NOA Patagonia NEA
α αα ααα α
 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
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DER index (α=0.5) by region 
  
# Country Region DER α=0.5 # Country Region DER α=0.5 # Country Region DER α=0.5
1 Uruguay Interior Norte 0.230 51 Costa Rica 4 0.281 101 Colombia Central 0.309
2 Uruguay Interior Sur 0.234 52 Costa Rica 6 0.282 102 Guatemala National 0.309
3 Peru Costa rural 0.235 53 Bolivia Beni 0.283 103 Chile Region 8 0.310
4 Peru Selva rural 0.235 54 Mexico Norte 0.283 104 Nicaragua National 0.310
5 Uruguay Interior CS 0.242 55 Argentina  Pampeana 0.283 105 Honduras Oriente 0.310
6 Venezuela Central 0.244 56 Honduras Norte 0.284 106 Panama Central 0.311
7 Venezuela Los Andes 0.247 57 Argentina  NEA 0.284 107 Peru National 0.312
8 Peru Costa urbana 0.247 58 El Salvador occidental 0.284 108 Chile National 0.312
9 Uruguay Interior CN 0.249 59 Mexico Centro-Este 0.284 109 Bolivia Santa Cruz 0.313
10 Costa Rica 5 0.257 60 Colombia Pacifica 0.285 110 Brazil Norte 0.313
11 Peru Selva urbana 0.259 61 El Salvador National 0.286 111 Honduras Sur 0.314
12 Costa Rica 3 0.260 62 Bolivia Pando 0.286 112 Honduras National 0.315
13 Peru Sierra rural 0.260 63 Mexico Centro-Occidente 0.286 113 Dominican Rep Distrito Nacional 0.316
14 Paraguay Centro Urb 0.261 64 Argentina  NOA 0.286 114 Paraguay National 0.318
15 Haiti Nord Ouest 0.262 65 Colombia Atlantica 0.287 115 Chile Region 4 0.318
16 Chile Region 6 0.263 66 Guatemala Resto urb 0.288 116 Bolivia Potosí 0.319
17 Uruguay Montevideo 0.264 67 Honduras Metropolitana 0.288 117 Bolivia La Paz 0.319
18 El Salvador central1 0.264 68 El Salvador central2 0.289 118 Panama National 0.321
19 Uruguay National 0.265 69 Mexico National 0.290 119 Colombia National 0.321
20 Peru Sierra urbana 0.265 70 Ecuador oriente 0.290 120 Guatemala Urb-metro 0.322
21 Dominican Rep Distrito 0.266 71 Honduras Central 0.290 121 Haiti Ouest 0.324
22 Dominican Rep Santiago 0.266 72 Bolivia Cochabamba 0.291 122 Chile Region 13 0.326
23 Venezuela National 0.267 73 Suriname National 0.291 123 Jamaica KMA 0.326
24 Chile Region 3 0.267 74 Nicaragua Atlántico 0.291 124 Colombia Oriental 0.328
25 Venezuela Capital 0.267 75 El Salvador oriental 0.293 125 Brazil Sudeste 0.328
26 Argentina Cuyo 0.267 76 Ecuador costa 0.293 126 Haiti Nord 0.330
27 Venezuela Guayana 0.267 77 Ecuador National 0.293 127 Colombia Bogotá 0.331
28 Haiti Sud 0.268 78 Costa Rica 2 0.293 128 Brazil Centro-Oeste 0.334
29 Haiti SudEst 0.268 79 Ecuador sierra 0.294 129 Haiti National 0.334
30 Venezuela Zuliana 0.268 80 Panama Metropolitana 0.295 130 Nicaragua Managua 0.337
31 Dominican Rep Cibao 0.270 81 Dominican Rep National 0.295 131 Haiti Artibonite   0.337
32 Dominican Rep Suroeste 0.270 82 Chile Region 11 0.295 132 Bolivia National 0.342
33 Venezuela Centro Occidental 0.270 83 Chile Region 1 0.296 133 Chile Region 9 0.343
34 Mexico Noroeste 0.270 84 Haiti Centre 0.297 134 Brazil Nordeste 0.344
35 Honduras Occidente 0.270 85 Paraguay Asuncion 0.298 135 Brazil National 0.344
36 Paraguay Centro Rur 0.271 86 Argentina  GBA 0.298 136 Jamaica National 0.345
37 Chile Region 5 0.272 87 Argentina National 0.298 137 Haiti NordEst 0.350
38 Costa Rica 1 0.273 88 Bolivia Oruro 0.301 138 Jamaica Other Towns 0.360
39 Mexico Yucatan 0.274 89 Mexico Noreste 0.301 139 Paraguay Resto rur 0.372
40 Chile Region 2 0.274 90 Bolivia Tarija 0.301 140 Bolivia Chiquisaca 0.400
41 Dominican Rep Sureste 0.274 91 Paraguay Resto urb 0.302
42 Guatemala Resto rur 0.274 92 Peru Lima Metrop. 0.302
43 Haiti Grand Anse 0.275 93 Brazil Sur 0.303
44 El Salvador amss 0.275 94 Chile Region 7 0.303
45 Venezuela Nor - Oriental 0.276 95 Mexico Sur 0.304
46 Costa Rica National 0.278 96 Chile Region 10 0.304
47 Mexico Oriente 0.279 97 Panama Occidental 0.304
48 Argentina Patagonia 0.280 98 Jamaica Rural 0.305
49 Nicaragua Pacífico 0.281 99 Chile Region 12 0.305
50 Nicaragua Central 0.281 100 Panama Oriental 0.308  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. 
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Middle-income group  
Share middle-income group in population and income 
Ratio of mean and median top 50% with respect to overall median 
    Share of middle group in…  Ratio w.r.t. median income 
Population Income  Mean Median top 50%
Argentina 
15 cities
1992 0.26 0.17 1.4 2.7
1998 0.24 0.14 1.6 3.6
28 cities
1998 0.22 0.14 1.6 3.5
2004 0.21 0.12 1.6 3.9
Bolivia
   Urban
1993 0.24 0.14 1.7 4.1
1997 0.24 0.13 1.8 4.4
2002 0.24 0.13 1.8 4.7
   National
1997 0.21 0.11 1.8 4.8
2002 0.19 0.10 1.8 5.5
Brazil
1990 0.19 0.09 2.1 6.7
1998 0.20 0.10 2.0 6.3
2003 0.20 0.11 1.9 5.6
Chile
1990 0.23 0.12 1.8 5.1
1998 0.23 0.12 1.9 5.1
2003 0.24 0.13 1.8 4.5
Colombia
  ENH-Urban
1992 0.25 0.15 1.6 3.7
2000 0.21 0.11 1.9 5.0
ECH-Urban
2000 0.24 0.13 1.8 4.4
2004 0.23 0.12 1.8 4.7
Costa Rica
1992 0.25 0.18 1.4 2.5
1997 0.25 0.17 1.4 2.7
2003 0.24 0.15 1.5 3.1
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.22 0.13 1.7 4.1
2004 0.24 0.14 1.7 4.0
Ecuador
1994 0.25 0.15 1.6 3.9
1998 0.21 0.10 1.9 5.6
2003 0.23 0.14 1.6 3.7
El Salvador
1991 0.23 0.14 1.6 3.8
2000 0.22 0.14 1.6 3.7
2003 0.22 0.14 1.5 3.4
Guatemala
2000 0.24 0.13 1.7 4.5
Haiti 
2001 0.21 0.11 1.9 5.5
Honduras
  Eph 1
1992 0.22 0.13 1.7 4.2
1997 0.21 0.12 1.7 4.1
  Eph 2
1997 0.23 0.14 1.7 3.8
2003 0.22 0.13 1.7 4.4
Jamaica
1990 0.15 0.09 1.8 2.8
1999 0.18 0.10 1.7 2.7
2002 0.18 0.10 1.8 3.2
Mexico
1992 0.24 0.13 1.7 4.3
1996 0.24 0.14 1.7 4.0
2002 0.23 0.14 1.6 3.7
Nicaragua
1993 0.21 0.12 1.8 4.7
1998 0.23 0.13 1.7 4.0
2001 0.23 0.13 1.8 4.2
Panama
1995 0.20 0.12 1.7 4.6
2003 0.20 0.11 1.8 5.0
Paraguay
1997 0.18 0.10 1.7 4.4
2002 0.19 0.10 1.8 4.2
Peru
1997 0.21 0.12 1.7 4.1
2002 0.21 0.12 1.7 4.1
Suriname
1999 0.28 0.17 1.7 4.0
Uruguay
1989 0.27 0.20 1.3 2.5
1998 0.26 0.18 1.4 2.7
2003 0.25 0.17 1.4 2.9
Venezuela
1989 0.26 0.19 1.3 2.5
1998 0.24 0.16 1.5 3.0
2000 0.25 0.18 1.4 2.7
2003 0.24 0.16 1.4 2.9  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. 
Note: The middle income group is defined as those individuals whose  
household per capita incomes are in an interval around the median of  
the income distribution (in the range of 75 and 125 percent of the median). 
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Table B.5 
DER decomposition  
Alienation (Gini), identification and correlation effects  
Gini ic i . c DER
Uruguay 2003 0.449 0.730 0.808 0.590 0.265
Venezuela 2003 0.462 0.709 0.814 0.577 0.267
Costa Rica 2003 0.490 0.716 0.794 0.568 0.278
El Salvador 2003 0.509 0.703 0.797 0.561 0.286
Suriname 1999 0.528 0.702 0.785 0.551 0.291
Mexico 2002 0.514 0.729 0.780 0.569 0.292
Ecuador 2003 0.517 0.737 0.768 0.567 0.293
Dominican Rep 2004 0.514 0.755 0.760 0.573 0.295
Argentina 2004 0.507 0.733 0.802 0.588 0.298
Guatemala 2000 0.545 0.761 0.746 0.568 0.309
Nicaragua 2001 0.543 0.770 0.741 0.570 0.310
Peru 2002 0.543 0.745 0.770 0.574 0.312
Chile 2003 0.540 0.783 0.738 0.577 0.312
Honduras 2003 0.542 0.757 0.769 0.581 0.315
Paraguay 2002 0.571 0.729 0.764 0.557 0.318
Panama 2003 0.561 0.736 0.776 0.571 0.321
Colombia 2004 0.551 0.772 0.774 0.597 0.329
Haiti 2001 0.592 0.762 0.741 0.565 0.334
Bolivia 2002 0.601 0.749 0.760 0.569 0.342
Jamaica 2002 0.599 0.732 0.788 0.576 0.345
Brazil 2003 0.576 0.799 0.763 0.610 0.351
0.5 Country Year
 
Notes: a=alienation (Gini coefficient) 
  i=identification 
  c=correlation 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
Table B.6  
Decomposition of changes in the DER 
Alienation (Gini), identification and correlation effects  
 
Country Year α=0
a ic i . c Pol ic i . c Pol ic i . c Pol ic i . c Pol
Argentina 92-04 + ---+ ---+ ---- ----
Bolivia 97-02 + ---+ +--+ +-++ ++++
Brazil 90-03 - -++- -++- +++- ++++
Chile 90-03 - +--- +--- +--- ----
Colombia 92-04 + -+-+ -+-+ -+-+ -+-+
Costa Rica 92-03 + ---+ +--+ +--+ +-++
Dominican Rep 00-04 - +--- +-+- +-++ +-++
Ecuador 94-03 - ---- -+-- +++- +++-
El Salvador 91-03 - -++- -+-- -+-- -+--
Honduras 97-03 + ++++ +-++ +-++ ++++
Jamaica 90-02 + +--+ +-++ +-++ ++++
Mexico 92-02 - -++- -++- -+-- -+--
Nicaragua 93-01 - +--- +-+- +-+- +-++
Panama 95-03 + +-++ +-++ +-++ ++++
Paraguay 97-02 + +--- +--- +--+ +--+
Peru 97-02 + +--- +--- +--+ +--+
Uruguay 89-03 + ---+ +--+ +-++ +-++
Venezuela 89-03 + ---+ ---+ ---- ----
α=0.25 α=0.5 α=0.75 α=1
 
Notes: a=change in alienation (Gini coefficient) 
    i=change in identification 
  c=change in correlation 
 Pol = change in polarisation  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
  74Figure 4.1 
Income polarisation by education 
Gradín Group Polarisation measure (α= 1, β= 1) 


















Income polarisation by area, labour relationship and gender 
Gradín Group Polarisation measure (α= 1, β= 1) 
Last survey available for each country 
 
 Area  Labour  relationship  Gender 
0.860 

































































Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
 
  75 
Figure .  4 3  





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































LAC Europe Other countries
DER (α=0.75)
 
Source: Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) and own calculations based on household surveys. 
 
 
  76Figure 4. 4  
Pure income polarisation 
DER index (α=0.5) for the household per capita income distribution 















Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
 
Figure 4.5  
Pure income polarisation 
DER index (α=0.5) of the household per capita income distribution 
Urban and rural areas 








els cri mex pan per par ecu hon dom bol chi gua nic bra hai jam
Urban  Rural
 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
 
  77Figure 4.6  
Inequality and pure income polarisation 
Gini coefficient and EGR polarization index 
Household per capita income  
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Chile Colombia Costa Rica







































































































































































































































































































Gini EGR  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
  78Figure 4.6 (cont.) 











































































































































































































Gini EGR  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. 
 
 
  79Figure 4.7 
Pure Income Polarisation 
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Arg Bol Bra Chi Col Cos Sal Hon Jam Mex Nic Pan Par Per Sur Uru Ven  
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. 
  80Figure 4.8 
Inequality and polarisation  
Gini coefficient and DER with alternative values for parameter α  















































































Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
Figure 4.9 
Inequality and polarisation changes 
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R2 = 0.03
 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. 
 
  81Figure 4.10 
Decomposition of the DER index: participation in DER by vintiles 
Mean values across LAC countries 
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a=0.5 a=0.75
 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
Figure 4.11  
Decomposition of the DER index  (α=0.5): participation in DER by vintiles 
Average for LAC, and values for Bolivia and Jamaica  
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Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
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Figure 5.1  









































Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
Figure 5.2  
Polarisation of labour income  
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Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
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Source: Gasparini et al. (2006) based on SEDLAC.  
  84Figure 5.3 (cont.) 











































































































































































Source: Gasparini et al. (2006) based on SEDLAC.  
 
  85Figure 5.4  
Unemployment rates 




















Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
Figure 5.5  




























































































































































(15-24) (25-64) (65 +)
 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
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Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
Figure 5.7  
Labour income by education  
 
A. Ratios low/medium education and high/medium education 










































































































































































Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
  87Figure 5.8  




















First year Last year
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
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Figure 6.1 
Mean years of formal education  
For age groups  























































































































































































































Quintile 1 Quintile 5  
 
Bolivia 
By gender By area
























































































































































































































































































Quintile 1 Quintile 5  
 
Brazil 
By gender By area
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Quintile 1 Quintile 5  
 
Colombia 



















































































































































































































Quintile 1 Quintile 5  
 
Costa Rica 
By gender By area
























































































































































































































































































Quintile 1 Quintile 5  
  89Dominican Republic 
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Quintile 1 Quintile 5  
Panama 
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Peru 







































































































































































































Quintile 1 Quintile 5  
Paraguay 
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Quintile 1 Quintile 5  
Venezuela 
 



















































































































































































































Quintile 1 Quintile 5    
  Uruguay 
   



















































































































































































































Quintile 1 Quintile 5  
 
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
  92Figure 6.2 
Mean years of formal education  
For age groups  
































































































































































































































































































Mean years of formal education  
For age groups  





























































































































































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
 
  93Figure 6.4 
Mean years of formal education  
For age groups  



























































































































































































































































































White Non-white  
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
 
Figure 6.5 
Mean years of formal education  
For age groups  



























































































































































































































































































Quintile 1 Quintile 5  
Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
 
 
  94Figure 6.6 
Gini coefficient of years of education and gap of years of education by income quintiles 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
 
 
  95Figure 6.7 
Literacy rates  
For age groups  
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Guatemala 
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Jamaica 
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Figure 6.8 
Primary completion rates  
For age groups  
By gender, area, race and income quintile 
 
Argentina 
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Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
  106  
Figure 6.9 
Net enrolment rates – Primary, secondary and tertiary levels 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
 
Figure 6.10 
Net enrolment rates – Primary, secondary and tertiary levels 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
 
 
  107Figure 6.11 
Net enrolment rates – Primary, secondary and tertiary levels 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
 
  108Figure 6.12 
Net enrolment rates – Primary, secondary and tertiary levels 































































































































































































































































































































































































Net enrolment rates – Primary, secondary and tertiary levels 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
 
  109Figure 6.14 























































































































































































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
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Figure 6.15 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
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Figure 6.16 




























































































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
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Figure 7.1 
Housing ownership  

































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
 
Figure 7.2 
Housing ownership  













































































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
 
Figure 7.3 
Access to water  































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
 
  113Figure 7.4 
Access to water  



















































































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
 
Figure 7.5 
Access to electricity  


































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
 
Figure 7.6 
Access to electricity 













































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
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Figure B.1  























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  115Figure B.1 (cont.) 
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Figure B.1 (cont.) 
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Figure B.2 
Household per capita income distribution  
Kernel estimation of density functions 



















Source: Own estimates based on household surveys.    
 
  118Figure B.3 
Ratios whites/non-whites 
Last survey available for each country 
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Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
  119Figure B.4 
Income polarisation by basic needs 







































































Source: Own calculations based on household surveys 
 
 
  120Figure B.5 
DER index (α=0.5) 
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